

# HON. T. STEVENS, OF PENNSYLVANIA,

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JUNE 11, 1852,

## ON THE PUBLIC LANDS—THE TARIFF.

The House being in Committee of the Whole, and having under consideration the bill making appropriations for the Indian Department—

Mr. STEVENS, of Pennsylvania, said:

Mr. CHAIRMAN: I have nothing to offer which can much interest the House after the spicy debates of the last few weeks, for I have nothing to say on the presidential question. Indeed, with us, there is no occasion for it. For among all true Whigs there is perfect harmony, entire unanimity. And, although I am sorely distressed at the unhappy dissensions which have destroyed the Democratic party, and slaughtered her ablest and most honored chiefs, yet it would be impertinent in me to interfere. Nor need aught be said of that very select and highly respectable body of gentlemen who denominated themselves the Union party; for, although it started with lofty pretensions, and considerable *éclat*, yet it has met an early fate. Engendered by a whirlwind of their own creation, it vanished with the element that gave it birth. For, although we have lately seen its ghost flitting across this Hall, in the agreeable form of the gentleman from Tennessee, [Mr. WILLIAMS,] with certain uneasy attendant spirits, yet its *corpus* is in the tombs; and, admonished by the charitable injunction, *de mortuis nil nisi bonum*, I am necessarily held in the profoundest silence with regard to it.

I propose to discuss the several land bills already reported to this House, with the legions that are yet in the womb of the committee, and incidentally a protective tariff. Those bills involve the question both of the right and the policy of the General Government to dispose of the public lands. The right to dispose of them is expressly given by the Constitution, and ought, therefore, to be unquestioned. The objects to which they ought to be applied must depend on the nature of the title. The title is of two kinds. When the thirteen colonies became independent, they laid claim to large tracts of unoccupied land. Those claims were often conflicting. Congress, under the Confederation, invited the States to cede them to the General Government; and pledged the Government, by a sol-

emn resolution, to hold them for the equal benefit of all. Virginia, who ceded the Northwest Territory, inserted the express provisions of the grant, "that it should be a common fund for the benefit of all the States." The following is an extract from the deed:

"To remain a fund, for the use and benefit of such States as should become members of the Federal Alliance, according to their respective proportions in the usual general charges and expenditures."

That proportion has been definitively fixed by the Constitution of the United States to be in proportion to the Federal population of the several States. The General Government, therefore, holds this land, not in absolute, unconditional fee-simple, but in trust, to be applied according to the conditions of the grant.

I can find no authority anywhere in Congress to violate those conditions, and bestow the land in a different direction. I would thank gentlemen from the new States, who entertain such delicate scruples about the right of the General Government to distribute the lands or their proceeds among all the States, to tell me where they find authority for this partial distribution.

There is another class of public lands held by a different title. The Government, after its formation, acquired large countries by purchase or by conquest. Such was Louisiana purchased from France; Florida, from Spain; and New Mexico and Utah, obtained from Mexico. To this land Government has an unconditional title, and may dispose of it as she sees fit; still such disposition should be governed by principles of justice, equity, and equality. At the time of their acquisition, the old States were the sole owners of all the land. Their means acquired the whole. They sold certain portions of it to actual settlers at small prices. Did their grantees acquire any rights beyond the extent of their surveys? Did their purchase of a section give them any title or claim, in law or equity, to the adjoining or any other section?

The Government, in process of time, laid off certain boundaries of the public domain, and admitted the inhabitants into the Union as a State



Did that act divest the old States of their title to the unsold lands, or vest any new interest or right in the inhabitants of such new State, except what they acquired in common with all the other States?

This Government has been compared, in this debate, to a partnership. Be it so. Here is a strong firm carrying on business, rich in real estate. The new partner asks admission into the firm. He is poor, and naked, and penniless. The old partners are magnanimous. They admit him. They agree to find all the capital. They put their whole fund into the common stock. Does this give the new partner any right to rebel, to claim the whole property, to put his hand into the coffers and take out all the money, and refuse the senior partners any part of it? Modesty, as well as justice, would seem to dictate that he should allow the elder partners at least an equal share of their own.

But gentlemen of the Northwest entertain conscientious scruples as to the power of Congress to divide the public lands, or the proceeds, among the States.

Why does not the same objection lie to dividing it among part of the States? Can any authority be found for the latter that does not apply to the former?

The truth is, their scruples lie much nearer the heart than any cold abstractions. The objection is, that the divisor was too large when it consisted of all the States, and the dividend too small. It grows more constitutional as you reduce the divisor and increase the dividend. Their conscience is a large one. Fill it with the whole public domain, and, like a surfeited boa constrictor, it is quiet and placid. Put into it but a part of the land, and, like the stomach of a hungry man, it becomes uneasy and collapses. This anti-division school are very hostile to large corporations. Yet they would give the whole of the public lands to increase the wealth of private railroad companies. The bills, to be sure, propose to give it to the States. But they grant it to the corporations. Last Congress granted land thirty miles wide to make a railroad from Chicago to Mobile. The State of Illinois has granted it to the Central Railroad Company, consisting of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. RANTOUL] and his associates.

The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. RANTOUL] says that the United States grants this land for the benefit of all the States; that those roads are but links of one vast chain of public improvements, leading to the Atlantic shores. True; but why not grant to all the other companies a just proportion, to make their links of this same chain? If the Western links are useful to the East, so the Middle and Eastern links are at least equally useful to the West. Are the old States to make the whole chain, and not be allowed to take part of their own lands to do it with? Pennsylvania has expended \$40,000,000, which she still owes, to make her link—to make a railroad over the most invincible portion of the whole route; and yet these grasping new States refuse to let her have her share of her own lands to pay it with, and relieve the burden of her people.

But, the gentleman from Massachusetts, and others, tell us that the Government gives away nothing by such grants, because the bills provide

that the remaining alternate sections (for thirty miles wide) shall not be sold at less than \$2 50 per acre—double the present price of public lands. This I look upon as one of the worst features of these unnumbered bills. It tends to retard the settlement of the country, by raising the price to actual settlers. The alternate sections granted to the railroad companies are held still higher; no maximum price is fixed to them; they are held up, as we find to be the avowed intention of the Chicago and Mobile road, until they shall bring \$10, \$15, and \$20 per acre.

If the Government does not make the railroad, who does? Why, the purchasers of the remaining sections. You give every alternate section for fifteen miles, on each side of the road, to the corporation, and charge the price to the actual settlers on the adjoining land. You make the actual settlers build the whole road without giving them a dollar of the stock. Their money goes to the benefit of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. RANTOUL] and other speculating corporators and furnishes stock worth hundreds of millions to them, without their paying a dollar; and thus enriches them and their posterity out of the hard earnings of others. This whole system I look upon as a shameful private speculation. To this I object. Let every man pay for his own property, and enjoy what he pays for.

This raising the price of lands is unjust to the poorer settlers. The more wealthy man may select the choice locations, and leave the worthless to him of less means. Now, all who can raise \$200 may enter land on equal terms. But you raise the price, and he who can raise \$400 may select a pleasant site near a railroad; while he who has but \$200 must go back fifteen miles from any such road. Indeed, the hundred roads which you are projecting parallel to, and at right angles to each other, will thrust him back to the foot of the Rocky Mountains. I can give no vote which will make that injurious distinction.

#### THE TARIFF.

The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. RANTOUL] supports these grants to railroad companies on the principles of free trade. It is not my intention to discuss at much length the doctrine of free trade. That has been so amply done of late, both orally and in writing, as to become tedious.

But although the theory has been much discussed, it has never been reduced to practice, except among barbarian tribes. I think gentlemen cannot point to a single highly-civilized commercial and manufacturing nation capable of producing the raw material, that has ever adopted it. Every highly-cultivated nation has made the protection of domestic industry the special care of Government. It has been found by the experience of more than twenty centuries that the protection of domestic manufactures by prohibitions, discriminating duties, and commercial regulations, has been, and is, the true, natural, and wise policy of nations, or all history is a lie. It is a mistake to suppose that the elevation of one national interest is the depression of others, as is more than insinuated by the Baltimore platform, which is intended, not only for all kinds of men, but for every fowl of the air, fish of the sea, four-footed beasts, and especially for every creeping thing to stand upon. All classes of national industry, like the arts and



sciences, are bound together by one common band. All flourish or languish together.

Manufactures, in every age, have been the especial handmaid of agriculture and commerce. Select from history any example that you please—take Tyre, which was perhaps as highly commercial as any nation of her time. She was also the furthest advanced in manufactures. Many of her fabrics have scarcely ever been excelled. Her dyes have passed into a proverb. She transplanted her policy with her colony to Carthage, which soon became a powerful—the most powerful maritime nation of her time. The same cause has produced the same effect wherever it has existed in ancient or modern times—at Syracuse, at Genoa, and Venice. But the most powerful example of the influence of manufactures on the commerce and wealth of nations, is to be found in the case of Holland.

Up to the end of the reign of Charles I. Holland was the workshop of Europe. Her ingenious and industrious mechanics and manufacturers produced not only enough for their own country, but large surpluses to export to other nations. That surplus furnished employment for a large number of her own vessels, which took her fabrics to other countries, and brought back rich cargoes, not merely for their own consumption, but for the supply of neighboring markets. While other nations were trafficking in the bulky raw materials of little value, she was dealing in the same material, increased a hundred fold in value by the industry and skill of her people. Thus she commanded the market of every country, and not only enriched her mechanics and manufacturers, but her traders and shippers became merchant princes. She had more wealth than any other nation, and her commercial marine exceeded in number of ships all the other nations of Europe together. Her war vessels also exceeded that of any other nation. All this wealth, all this commerce, all this power, was produced by a country of small circumference and with little agricultural advantages. It was done by manufactures alone. How did she lose this superiority, and what country has gained it, and by what means?

Whatever else may be said of the English Puritans, it is certain that the Commonwealth under Cromwell produced some of the ablest statesmen of the world.

England, at that time, was a poor nation, with but few manufacturing establishments. Her wise men saw that her insular position, and her small territory, rendered it impossible for her to become rich and powerful except through commerce and manufactures. How were they to accomplish it? Did they then preach free-trade doctrine? That would have exactly suited Holland. She had an immense start in skill and capital, and that system would have left her forever without a rival; for the nation which is far above all others in knowledge and means, that system which will keep other nations from starting at all, is the true one. Just so surely it is the wrong one for those who are behind. The statesmen of England were deluded by no such folly. They saw that they must exclude the manufactured articles of other nations, and give the home market *exclusively* to their own artisans, so as to induce them to embark their time, capital, and talents in the creation of domestic fabrics. She admitted the raw material,

which she could not produce, free; prohibited the importation of many articles, and laid heavy discriminating duty on others. But her main instrument was the celebrated Navigation Act.

The provisions of that famous law it would be pedantic for me to enumerate before a body of gentlemen, every one of whom is thoroughly acquainted with it. It is enough to say that its provisions were the most stringent, and the most highly protective, both of commerce and manufactures, of any that it was possible to form. Nothing could be further from free trade. Its effect was all that its projectors desired. England at once became a manufacturing country. She not only had a monopoly of the home market, but was soon able to compete with her great rival in the markets of the world. As a necessary consequence, her commercial marine increased rapidly; that nursery fed her war navy, until she has become the most manufacturing, commercial, rich, and powerful nation that the world ever saw. And where is Holland, who, in her pride, neglected these precautions? She has sunk to an insignificant Power among European nations; she is overshadowed by her mighty rival!

England has acquired all this power, wealth, and grandeur through her protective policy alone. And now she preaches "free trade" to others—to young nations! And there are found shallow dupes who swallow the bait!

It is often objected to a protective tariff, that it is for the benefit of the rich capitalists. This argument, I know, is never used by statesmen, or writers on political economy; but often by demagogues, who fancy themselves statesmen.

Now, sir, it is easy to show that protection against foreign competition is mainly for the benefit of the laborer. True, it helps the capitalists; for it is impossible to benefit labor without aiding capital, and it is impossible to benefit capital without aiding labor.

I have said that protection would principally benefit labor. The chief value of most manufactured articles consists in labor. Take iron for an example. The cost of a ton of pig-metal in the most favorable locations in this country, is about twenty dollars. The capital invested consists of the real estate—the furnace and land for fuel and ore. Of the twenty dollars cost, the labor in producing the ore, coal, and smelting, amounts to about eighteen dollars per ton. Not more than two dollars is capital. Any protection given to iron is given to the laborer in the proportion of nine dollars to one dollar to capital.

The whole of the labor, to be sure, is not done by the collier, the miner, and the furnace hands—a part of it is the labor of the farmer, the miller, and the butcher, who supply the grain, beef, and other provisions. Still, the protection is mainly to the laborious industry of the country. So it is with fabrics of cotton and wool. The value of the raw material is increased by the labor of the operatives from four to twenty times. And a great part of the value of the raw material is the effect of labor, not capital. Whoever, therefore, sustains the protection of domestic industry, sustains the labor of the people; whoever opposes it, votes for their oppression and poverty.

I have said that every branch of national industry is dependent on every other, and partakes of its prosperity or depression. But, perhaps no



class is so largely benefited by protection as the farmers, as none contributes so largely to the power and independence of nations. If it were necessary that either commerce or agriculture should sacrifice something to the other, let it be commerce. It is possible to push foreign trade too far. Cicero, in his treatise on the Republic, says that the reason of the great weakness of Carthage, was that she gave too much attention to her shipping, and neglected agriculture. The wealth of the farmer arises from his surplus products. And their value depends upon a ready, a handy, and a constant market. The nearer to his farm you bring that market, the better for him. The farmer who must send his produce from Pennsylvania to England for a market, must deduct from the price the cost of freight. The farmer in Ohio, Indiana, or Illinois, who sends his to the sea-board, and thence to Europe, finds half the price consumed in carriage. If each had as good a market in his own State, he would save all that expense, and double his profits.

How are you to create that market? In the same way that other nations have done. Build up manufacturing villages, towns, and cities in your own land. Your surplus provisions now go to a distant market, to feed those who make your cloths, your cottons, and your iron. If those consumers were within ten miles of you, instead of three thousand or four thousand miles, how much more profitable would farming be! Give the home market to your own manufacturers, and you would find flourishing cities filled with consumers springing up on your numerous water-falls, from Maine to Missouri. So it was that England built Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, Glasgow, and all her other manufacturing cities. Under this system not only would such establishments exist in the Atlantic States, but they would swarm in the vast world that lies north and west of the Ohio.

The true policy of this country is to build up large manufacturing and commercial cities on the great lakes and the waters that feed the Mississippi. There is perhaps no country in the world of equal extent more fertile than that valley. A few years will fell the forests, and reduce it to cultivation. Where will that vast grain-growing country find a market for its products?

One gentleman [Mr. RANTOUL] advises them to build railroads, and send it to New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, instead of consuming it at home; but they should recollect, that when they have got it there, they will find no market. They have simply taken it to the place of embarkation to a European market—a poor and uncertain market. They are taught that their true policy is to raise the raw material, of great bulk and little value, to carry five thousand miles to a precarious market! They are not even to encourage a market for it in Pennsylvania, New York, or Massachusetts.

It seems to me that the interest of the Northwest is, to find their market beyond the Alleghenies; why should not the shores of the great lakes and rivers become the seat of great manufacturing and commercial towns and cities, as well as the shores of the Euxine and the Baltic?

Suppose all the people of the West to be agriculturists, and to bring their produce to the Atlantic cities for a market, what would be the effect on the farmers this side the Alleghenies—of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New York? The Eastern market would be glutted by Western prod-

uce, and the prices so depressed as to destroy the farming interests of the Middle States. Land in Pennsylvania and New York would greatly sink in value, and all stimulants to industry be taken away. Surely this free trade is a lovely system, which not only casts its blight on the manufacturer and laborer, but reduces real estate to half its value!

It is a question of serious import, whether this country will ever become sufficiently manufacturing to produce enough for her own consumption, and furnish for exportation. It is very certain that under the free-trade system she never will. It is just as certain that she may soon become so if she follows the system which gave England her present preëminence. Take iron, and see how England fostered its growth from infancy to its present gigantic stature. At the time of our Revolution, England produced less than 150,000 tons of all kinds of iron. She commenced protective duties, which were several times increased until 1820. In that year, her whole make was 365,000 tons. The duty on foreign bar iron was then fixed at £7 18s. 6d., about \$40 per ton. Under the influence of that tariff her production increased with astonishing rapidity. Her make of the present year is about 3,000,000 of tons. She can now take off the duty and supply the world with the article which she has created by protection! The following extract is from the proceedings of English iron masters, lately assembled:

"The iron masters of Great Britain held their quarterly meeting at Birmingham on the 8th of January. An English paper rejoices over the healthy state of the iron trade in that country, and gives the following facts in corroboration of it:

"*It may be useful, too, to mention that the low price of iron in this country has had the effect of checking, to a very great extent, the produce in America.*

"Very large orders have been received from that quarter within the last fortnight, and we have the assurance of those who are well informed on the subject, that orders to a greatly increased amount may be expected in the spring."

You have observed what interest England takes in this great branch of industry, and what pains she takes to prevent any rivalry; to prevent other nations from adopting the policy which she pursued at their age. That shrewd and selfish nation goes the extraordinary length of interfering with the legislation of other countries. At the commencement of the last Congress, the British Government, hearing that the Whigs had elected their President, became alarmed lest American interests should triumph over British interests, and instructed their minister here to interfere. Sir H. L. Bulwer addressed the following letter to our Government:

BRITISH LEGATION,  
WASHINGTON, January 30, 1850. }

SIR: It having been represented to her Majesty's Government that there is some idea on the part of the Government of the United States to increase the duties upon British iron imported into the United States, I have been instructed by her Majesty's Government to express to the United States Government the hope of her Majesty's Government that no addition will be made to the duties imposed by the present tariff of the United States, which already weigh heavily on British productions; and I cannot but observe, for my own part, that an augmentation of the duties on British produce or manufactures, made at a moment when the British Government has, by a series of measures, been facilitating the commerce between the two countries, would produce a very disagreeable effect on public opinion in England.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurance of my most distinguished consideration.

HENRY L. BULWER.

HON. JOHN M. CLAYTON, &c., &c., &c.



This certainly was a bold measure. For a foreign Government to attempt to obstruct the modification or repeal of an American law by an American Congress, was denounced by some as impertinent. But to me it seemed natural, if not proper. It must be remembered that the tariff of 1846 was produced by Her Britannic Majesty, after great anxiety, expense, and labor. During the period of its gestation she had an agent, with rooms assigned him in this Capitol, to watch over its progress, and facilitate its advent. It was safely delivered by the aid of the celebrated accoucheur, Mr. Secretary Walker. It is now one of the most cherished of her Majesty's numerous offspring. No wonder, then, that she felt paternal yearnings for its fate, when she heard that it was in danger of being mutilated by the ruthless hands of the Whigs. The gentleman from Massachusetts has done, and may still further do, a benevolent act, by assuring Her Majesty that she has no cause for alarm; that she has in this country numerous faithful, able, and vigilant friends guarding its safety; and that, so long as the Democratic party governs the councils of the nation, British interests will be protected against the incroachments of American interests. I need hardly say, sir, that, under the operation of this British tariff, the iron masters of the United States are not only doing a losing business, but that utter and inevitable ruin stares them in the face, without speedy Congressional relief.

I have heard of but two modes suggested to enable the manufacturers of this country to compete with Europe. The one is, to lay a duty on foreign importations, equal to the difference between the cost of the article in Europe, and the cost of the same article here. The other is, to reduce the price of American labor to the average price of labor in Europe.

Certainly, if practicable, either mode would effect the object.

The duty, to be protective, should be equal to the difference of the wages of labor in the two countries, or we can never long sustain our establishments. That would give liberal wages, and all the comforts of life to our laboring classes. This is the Whig policy. The other mode, advocated by able statesmen in the South as well as in the North, whose standard-bearer is now General Pierce, is to strike off from the price paid American operatives the difference between what they now receive, and what is paid in Europe to similar laborers. Let us for a moment look at its effect. The common price paid laborers in Europe is one shilling sterling a day, and they find themselves. I see by an address of a large operator, published in 1851, that he pays from 8d. to 1s. By a later publication, I find wages on the Continent are eight cents. In order to get cheap labor, they employ women as well as men in the most laborious work. According to the report of a committee of Parliament, women are employed in mining coal several hundred feet under ground. They were found harnessed into cars, hauling heavy loads from the long drifts to the shaft. In consequence of these low prices, the laboring classes have scarcely enough to feed and clothe them. They live on poor fare, are meanly clad, and have nothing to bestow on the education of their children. They grow up in ignorance, to remain hewers of wood and drawers of water, from generation to generation. This may be

borne where the people have no voice in the Government. This is the Democratic scheme. For my part, I prefer the protective policy, which gives to laborers the dignity and the feelings of independent freemen, and enables them to fit their children to share in the government of the Republic; let those who wish to degrade labor choose the other.

I think every impartial mind must see that the tariff of 1846 is vicious in principle, and unwise in its provisions. When protection is most needed, the *ad valorem* system affords the least; and when not needed at all it becomes burdensome. When foreign iron costs \$30 per ton in Europe, the duty at thirty per cent. would be nine dollars, when no protection would be needed. When it falls in Europe to \$10 per ton, which is the present case, the duty also falls to three dollars per ton. This is an absurdity in legislation. Nor can it be remedied by the *ad valorem* system, without adopting the sliding scale, raising the duty as the price falls, so as to keep the cost here always the same. This would be difficult to do. There are many things that enter into manufactures which we cannot produce in this country. They should be admitted duty free. But the tariff of 1846 levies a revenue duty on them.

May we not hope that the Committee on Ways and Means will take up the subject and revise that injurious act? Cannot a fixed duty be levied on iron equal to what was intended by Congress to be fixed by the tariff of 1846? In 1846 the official price of pig iron at Glasgow was \$21, the duty at thirty per cent. was \$6 30—\$27 30; which, with the costs and charges, would have brought foreign iron to \$30 per ton. Now, the price of pig at the same place is \$10 per ton, and the duty falls to \$3—\$13—making, with costs and charges added, not more than \$15 for the price on our wharves. The difference between the price of foreign iron now and when the duty was laid is \$15. To carry out the spirit of the tariff of 1846, the duty should be raised so as to keep the price of the foreign articles at what it was when that tariff went into effect. In 1846 bar iron in Liverpool was worth \$88 per ton. The duty then laid was \$26 40—\$114 40. Now, the same article is at \$25 per ton, and the duty falls to \$7 50, making \$32 50 per ton—making the difference of the cost here \$81 90.

The consequence of this tariff is, that in 1843 we imported pig iron..... 3,873 tons.  
In 1849..... 105,632 "  
In 1843 of bar iron only..... 22,011 "  
In 1849..... 274,499 "  
More than tenfold of an increase.

It is easy to see that under such a tariff, with such increased importations, and such diminished prices, the iron works of the United States must soon be closed; that every rolling-mill, furnace, and forge must extinguish their fires, and every hammer must lie idle on the anvil.

An impression has gone abroad that England has adopted free trade, and abandoned her protective policy. This, I think, is a great mistake. I believe her present system to be as highly protective as it ever was; and, if it should be as successful with other nations as it has been with this, more certain to insure her permanent ascendancy.

Her boast of free trade is founded on the repeal of the corn laws. That act, in my judgment, was



"An act to give further protection and encouragement to her manufactures." By her corn laws, the importation of foreign grain was prohibited, unless when it raised to famine prices in England. That kept the price of provisions high. The manufacturers were out of proportion to the agriculturists. The price of provisions materially affected the cost of manufactures. The low price of provisions in this country was some set-off to the low price of labor in England. England saw it, and determined to deprive us of this advantage. She repealed her corn laws, and admitted provisions duty free. The price of flour in England now is as cheap as it was in this country before the repeal of her corn laws. Germany and Russia are close at hand with large surpluses ready for market. The manufacturers feed their workmen just so much the cheaper, and can afford to reduce the price of their goods.

England has thus given additional protection to manufactures, and deprived us of the only advantage we had over them. This is "free trade!" This is "liberalizing" commerce!

But let us look a little further, and see how far England has abandoned the protective system. *Ad valorem duties* are said to be a great advance towards absolute free trade, which Mr. Walker lately boasted he hoped to see soon prevail. We collect all our own duties on the *ad valorem* principle—England rejects it. I have not been able to see her returns for this year, but in 1848 she collected from customs something over \$105,000,000! Of that sum less than \$170,000 was raised on the *ad valorem* principle, and more than \$104,750,000 on the specific discriminating principle. Specific duties give protection by discrimination, and prevent frauds, which must always occur under the *ad valorem*.

Let us look at a few items of the British tariff, and see how wisely it is contrived to foster domestic industry. Take the article of silk, for example. Her climate is too moist to enable her to produce the raw material. Her tariff is so framed as to invite that to her shores to be worked by her laborers. Here is her rate of duties:

Raw silk.....	free.
Thrown silk, dyed.....	£ s. d. \$ cts.
Silk or satin, plain, per lb.....	0 2 0-0 44
Figured or brocaded, per lb.....	11 0-2 42
Gauze, figured or brocaded, per lb.....	15 0-3 30
Velvet, figured, per lb.....	1 7 6-6 66
Dresses, each, silk.....	2 10 0-12 50

Precisely as the value of the raw material is increased by labor, is the duty increased, so as to secure that labor to her own citizens—a wise and patriotic regulation.

Again, take tobacco, which is mostly imported from this country:

	£ s. d. \$ cts.
Tobacco, unmanufactured, per lb.....	0 3 0-0 66
Snuff, per lb.....	0 6 0-1 32
Manufactured or segars, per lb.....	0 9 0-2 00

This is not all—it is further provided, that all tobacco imported, manufactured in England into shag, roll, cut, or twist tobacco, or segars, and exported, shall be allowed a drawback per pound of 2s. 7½d., leaving a duty on the raw article imported for manufacture and exportation of 4½d., or eight cents.

Under this encouragement, owing to the cheap price of labor in Europe, our tobacco is taken

there, manufactured, and brought back to undersell the same article in our own markets. Journeymen segar-makers in this country are now petitioning Congress for relief, stating that they cannot compete, under the present duties, with the journeymen segar-makers of Europe, who materially interfere with their business. Free-trade England levies a duty on segars of \$2 the pound. Duped America of a few cents! Why should not the importation of segars into this tobacco country be prohibited?

In looking into the English tariff laws I find the following:

"A list of GOODS ABSOLUTELY PROHIBITED to be IMPORTED."

It begins with ARMS, AMMUNITION, and *utensils of war*, and goes through several pages of other articles.

I will not tire you by enumerating other articles—all are rated with a similar view to the encouragement of domestic manufactures. I think I have shown that England acquired and preserved her wealth, her greatness, her prosperity, both as a manufacturing and commercial nation, by PROTECTION; and that, at this day, she still adheres to it with determined pertinacity; and that all her seeming approaches to free trade are really protective enactments.

I will now briefly notice the extraordinary and fabulous statement of the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. RANTOUL,] relative to the effects of the tariff of 1842 and 1846, on the prices of our agricultural products. He states that agricultural products were reduced in value under the tariff of 1842; and raised in value under the tariff of 1846. He states that all the exports for four years before 1842 were worth more than they would have brought under the tariff of 1842 by \$125,000,000. And that all our exports for the four years since 1846, brought more by \$150,000,000, than they would have brought under the tariff of 1842. It is said that figures cannot lie. If the gentleman intended to convey the idea by this array of figures, that the price of grain and other provisions was depressed by the tariff of 1842, and again raised by the tariff of 1846, (and what else could he mean?) then I am bound to say, that figures have been so arranged as to convey a false idea, and make an erroneous impression on the public mind.

From 1837 to 1842 there was a suspension of specie payments. Of course, there being no check on bank issues, our circulating medium became very large. The price of everything rose in proportion to that increase, just as it did in 1814. The tariff of 1842 restored the circulating medium to a sound specie basis, contracted the currency, and of course reduced the nominal value of everything.

The gentleman says then the *average* prices of grain raised about thirty cents per bushel under the tariff of 1846. Observe, he says, the *average* price for the last four years. And he would have us infer that this was caused by that tariff. This is hardly candid. It hardly becomes the argument of a veracious statesman. He cannot be ignorant of the cause of such rise. In 1847, a portion of Europe was visited by a famine more distressing than any of modern times. The surplus grain from all parts of the world was hardly sufficient to supply them. The price of wheat ran up from about \$1 per bushel to \$1 75, and in some in-



stances to \$2, in our own markets. Did the tariff of 1846 produce this rise? If it did, then it produced the famine in Europe. This I can hardly believe, although it is producing poverty, want, and misery in the poor man's cottage in this country.

During the famine, in 1847 and 1848, our exports of provisions amounted to \$105,907,973. This was at prices varying from \$1 50 to \$2 per bushel. With the disappearance of the famine, prices sunk below the standard of 1846; and in the two following years, 1849 and 1850, our exports amounted to only \$65,167,420. Now, the gentleman [Mr. RANTOUL] takes the \$105,000,000, raised to near \$2 by the famine, and adds it to the \$65,000,000, and averages the two, and tells the country that the tariff of 1846 had raised the price of grain to an average of \$1 26 a bushel, from ninety-six cents under the tariff of 1842. Sir, every farmer knows the fallacy of such statement. He knows by sad experience that as soon as the famine ceased to operate, grain fell lower than it had been for many years; and instead of being at \$1 26, it sunk and is now selling at from seventy-five to eighty-five cents a bushel. I see by a morning paper that flour is selling in Baltimore at \$4 the barrel.

Such, also, is the sophistry—to give it no harder name—which the gentleman uses with regard to all our other articles of exportation. The gentleman boasts that the tariff of 1846 has largely increased our exports. It is true, that since 1846 our exports have increased some \$70,000,000; and our imports, \$90,000,000, or perhaps more. This I consider the worst effect of the tariff of 1846. The exports of breadstuffs and provisions in 1851 has sunk to \$21,948,651, being \$5,752,470 less than in 1846, while the law of 1842 was operating. That year our exports of these articles were \$27,701,121. The increase of exports consists in cotton and a few other articles used for manufacturing. The increase of imports consists in fabrics manufactured from those same exports—with iron, et cetera. In other words, the tariff of 1846 decreased the manufacture of cotton in this country, and sent abroad about \$40,000,000 worth which had before been bought for the home market, and then reimported the same articles in the shape of manufactures.

The gentleman might easily devise a law which would still further increase these blessings. Let the manufacturing and mechanic arts in this country be entirely destroyed by your legislation: then several hundred millions of raw materials which we still manufacture, would be sent abroad to be worked up, and brought back again; and our export would be greatly enlarged. The principle and policy are the same which we are now pursuing, carried to their legitimate results.

The balance of trade is now, and has been for several years, about \$30,000,000 per year against us. Had it not been for the discovery of the gold mines of California, it would, before this, have drained the country of every dollar of specie. We are exporting specie now at the rate of \$66,000,000 a year; the exports for the first five months of this fiscal year being \$27,594,236. The gentleman admires this operation. He says, if we were not thus drained, gold would become so plenty, as to throw us into "inextricable confusion." I thought the gentleman was a hard-money pol-

itician, and desired to see hard money enough to form our whole circulating medium. But has the gentleman no compassion for Europe? Are we to dig \$100,000,000 of gold a year, and pour all into Europe, to throw her into a "state of perfect anarchy?" He says if it were to remain here, "it would be the greatest calamity." Who would it hurt? I know it would raise the price of property, of manufactures, and would increase the wages of the laborer. That, to be sure, would run counter to the Democratic scheme of reducing the price of labor to ten cents a day. It would do no other damage.

The gentleman seems perplexed to know how to reconcile his constituents to the squandering of the public lands. But he argues that increasing the means of transportation between the East and the West, will retard the progress of the new States in the manufacturing and mechanic arts, and secure to the northeastern portion of the Union a monopoly of that business for an indefinite period of time. Why, sir, this is protection! This is a cunningly-devised scheme, under the pretense of friendship for the West, to postpone their progress, for the benefit of New England. This is a kind of English corn-law free trade. The gentleman hopes, in this way, to secure the affections of the manufacturers of Massachusetts, and of the people of the West. In other words, he would keep the inhabitants of the Northwest in a state of imperfect civilization. Nations, without manufactures, may be highly respectable, but cannot be highly refined. Man, in the shepherd state, is innocent, and, perhaps, happy. But it is not his true, ultimate destiny. I think the Northwest owe the gentleman but little gratitude for this attempt to retard their refinement.

But the gentleman gives a gloomy warning that even this ingenious contrivance will not always keep down manufacturers in the Northwest—that they will not always get their sheetings from Lowell, and their iron from Pennsylvania; that they will ultimately make all these things for themselves. For my part, sir, I say the sooner the day arrives the better. Let only a wise policy exclude foreign articles, and the Eastern market, with the markets of other countries, which we should be finally strong enough to enter, will suffice the manufactures of the East. And the Eastern agriculturist, being free from the competition of the West, will rejoice in the event.

The gentleman tells us that all branches of industry are flourishing. This will be news to the manufacturers and farmers. He tells us that the iron business is particularly prosperous. This will be consoling to our iron-masters. Let them go home and dream, as the gentleman dreams, of golden profits, while the sheriff is selling them out under the hammer. Sir, these are the opiates of a quack administered to a dying man. The iron business, instead of flourishing, is nearly destroyed. The tariff of 1842 raised the production in this country from 230,000 tons to 765,000 tons, which was the make of 1846. The tariff of 1846 sunk it to 413,000 tons, which was the make of 1851—a decrease of one half.

In 1846, the importation of bar iron, was  
(tons), ..... 69,625  
In 1851, it was, ..... 341,750  
Increased fivefold by the tariff of 1846.

We hear much of the beauty and justice of



"reciprocity" in commercial regulations. Can there be any real reciprocity under the same laws among nations, unless their circumstances are equal? Suppose two nations agree to admit, without duty, certain articles which one nation produces, and the other nation does not—where is the reciprocity? Suppose they agree to admit at equal duties, articles in which one nation has already embarked large capital, and much skill, and is in the successful production of, while the other is just struggling to start the manufacture of it; there is no reciprocity. The one will monopolize the market and crush the other.

It is only when nations are equally advanced in skill, in capital, and the power of production, that

reciprocal laws are just. You may impose on a full-grown man the task of carrying one hundred pounds weight. "Reciprocity" requires that the boy of ten years old should carry a like burden, though it crushes him to the earth. Such is the operation of "reciprocity" between old and young nations. It is well illustrated in the article of cotton fabrics. In 1850, we imported cotton goods from England to the amount of \$19,096,530; England imported of the same article from this country, \$50! Twenty millions of dollars against fifty dollars is the effect of free reciprocal "trade."

Let the people reflect on these things, and elect such rulers as will pursue a wise and prosperous policy.

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