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THE DEPARTMENT OF THE SUSQUEHANNA

Here for the first time is the history of the military department and its commander who was charged with repelling the Confederate invaders of Pennsylvania.

INTRODUCTION

Many historians state that 1863 was the crucial year of the Civil War. Pennsylvania's part in this crisis was, to say the least, of great significance, especially when the dual role of the Keystone State is considered: first, Pennsylvania provided nearly one-third of Meade's total force at Gettysburg, the battle which thwarted the desire of the Confederacy to end the war quickly; secondly, the creation and organization of the Department of the Susquehanna helped frustrate Lee's intentions of carrying the war north of the Mason and Dixon line in a victorious fashion.

After his triumph over Hooker at Chancellorsville, Lee decided to undertake an invasion of Pennsylvania. Whatever his specific military objectives might have been, Lee probably hoped for a quick, decisive triumph over the Army of the Potomac on Northern soil or the capture of an important city such as Harrisburg or Philadelphia. Such a military coup would draw away some of Grant's troops at Vicksburg for home defense and, at the same time, increase the agitation of certain disgruntled groups in the North against the administration. Perhaps, Lee must have thought, it might even bring the end of the war.

What response did the aspirations of Lee and the South arouse in Lincoln, Stanton and Halleck? One remedy, the replacement of Joseph Hooker by George Gordon Meade at the head of the Army of the Potomac, was a panacea used under similar circumstances before. Authorities in Washington generally believed that Meade, a cautious and deliberate general, would arouse more confidence among his men.

The creation of several new military departments, one of which was the Department of the Susquehanna, was among the other solutions suggested and put into effect. The purpose of this paper is to explore more thoroughly the activities of this military department and to discuss not only its contributions to repelling the Confederate invasion but also its failures and shortcomings.

CHAPTER I

THE FORMATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE SUSQUEHANNA

In the summer of 1863, as soon as it became evident that Pennsylvania might bear the brunt of the attack launched by Lee's veterans, the War Department took steps to protect the commonwealth.

On June 10, the office of the Adjutant-General in Washington issued General Order #172 which placed Major-General W. T. H. Brooks in command of the Department of the Monongahela, headquarters at Pittsburgh, which included that portion of the state located west of Johnstown as well as parts of Ohio and Virginia. According to the same order, ". . . The Department of the Susquehanna will embrace that portion of the State of Pennsylvania east of Johnstown and the Laurel Hill range of mountains. Major-General Couch is assigned to the command of this department, headquarters at Chambersburg."¹

During the Civil War military departments varied in size according to the nearness of the enemy and their possible involvement in military action. Thus, Pennsylvania was in eight different departments during the course of the war:²

Department of the East	Jan. 1, 1861 to April 19, 1861
Department of Washington	April 20, 1861 to April 27, 1861
Department of Pennsylvania	April 28, 1861 to Aug. 17, 1861
(Assigned to no department)	Aug. 18, 1861 to Feb. 1, 1862
Department of the Potomac	Feb. 2, 1862 to Mar. 22, 1862
Middle Department	Mar. 23, 1862 to June 9, 1863
Department of the Susquehanna	June 10, 1863 to Dec. 1, 1864
³ Department of the Monongahela	June 10, 1863 to April 6, 1864
Department of Pennsylvania	Dec. 2, 1864 to the close of the war

The remainder of the Northern states were also members of military districts. At the time of the battle of Gettysburg, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York and New Jersey were members of the Department of the East; Delaware, West Virginia, Maryland, and Virginia made up the Middle Department; and Ohio, Michigan, Indiana and Illinois belonged to the Department of the Ohio.

A military department facilitated the coordination of the military activities of the War Department as they pertained to a local departmental area. A departmental military commander supervised and commanded all military forces of the United States, whether they be Line or Staff, within the geographical limits of his jurisdiction.⁴ However, if the conflict of opposing armies extended into the sphere of his own district, he would then be expected to subordinate himself to and cooperate fully with his superior in the field. It was also his duty to recruit, train and equip all military forces enrolled for federal service as well as to supervise their mobilization and dispatch in accordance with the request of the War Department.

The powers of a departmental commander did not always fit into a well-defined niche but rather they varied as did the powers of a commanding general, a Secretary of War, or a president in peace and war. During the time of Lee's entry onto Northern soil in 1863, the responsibilities and duties of Couch extended beyond logistics and administration to include tactical obligations as well. After the battle of Gettysburg and the Confederate retreat into Virginia the Department of the Susquehanna again resembled a typical military district.

The commander of the Department of the Susquehanna, Darius Nash Couch, a tough West Point graduate of 1846 with a reputation for courage and cool judgment under pressure, had been cited for gallantry at Buena Vista, had served against the Seminoles, and had completed a tour of duty in "Bleeding Kansas." His excellent record culminated in a distinguished performance with the Army of the Potomac: as commander of a division of the 4th Corps under Brigadier-General E. D. Keyes; in the Peninsular Campaign at Seven Pines, Malvern Hill, Siege of Yorktown and Williamsburg; and since February 5, 1863, as commander of the Second Army Corps in the Chancellorsville campaign. Although frail and in bad health, he brought to the department the practical knowledge of a capable military tactician in lieu of the inexperience of a political appointee.⁵

During the early days of May 1863 at Chancellorsville, Couch fell into complete disagreement with Hooker and eventually asked to be relieved from further service with the Army of the Potomac. For some time, Couch had been unhappy and dissatisfied with the lack of seriousness of purpose exhibited by important men in the army. On February 21, 1863, he complained: "Higher officers spend their time in reading newspapers or books, playing cards or the politician, drinking whisky, and grumbling."⁶ The War Department granted his request and on June 10 he departed to his new post in Pennsylvania.

A student of American history cannot escape speculating about what might have happened during the critical days of July 1863, if Couch had been patient a few more days, when he would have been under the command of Meade, an officer for whom he had infinitely more respect. In that case, Couch would have been in command of his old Second Corps at Gettysburg. Also, if he had accepted Lincoln's invitation to command the Army of the Potomac (Meade was his junior in rank), perhaps, he might have prosecuted with more vigor the campaign during the fateful

days of Lee's retreat to the Potomac. However, it serves no purpose to pursue further the realm of fanciful imagination here.

CHAPTER II

BUILDING THE ARMY CORPS OF THE SUSQUEHANNA

During the first two years of the war the federal government had relied on volunteers to fill the ranks but by the end of 1862 the bubble of a swift and overwhelming victory had burst. The potential soldier had become dismayed at the news of successive defeats in the field, the removal of the popular McClellan, and stories of corruption and graft. The ordinary individual had become apathetic and could not be enticed by bonuses or other seemingly attractive inducements.

Therefore, on March 3rd, 1863, the national government found it advisable to pass an Enrollment Act. This law divided the country into districts supervised by provost marshals. The President, when necessary, would assign a quota to each district and the provost marshal would superintend the enrolling of men to meet his quota.

However, most of the men furnished by the state of Pennsylvania were not drafted. "Very few, if any, Philadelphians went into the army as drafted men."¹

The weeks following June 10, 1863, must have been extremely hectic for the new commander, for he had the responsibility of marshaling the manpower of most of Pennsylvania in the face of an immediate Confederate onslaught. By June 15 scouting reports placed part of the enemy's advance in the vicinity of Chambersburg, sixteen miles north of the Maryland line. Later, Couch observed that on that date there were not even 250 men in the department organized for duty.²

The primary task of the department was to assemble a military force sufficiently large to aid the Army of the Potomac in the defense of Northern soil. To attain this objective, Couch worked in harmony with the governor of the state, Andrew Gregg Curtin.

In accordance with instructions from Stanton, Couch held an interview with Curtin and his advisors and subsequently prepared and issued an order to the department calling for a corps of troops for state defense:

... To prevent serious raids by the enemy, it is deemed necessary to call upon the citizens of Pennsylvania to furnish promptly all the men necessary to organize an army corps of voluntary infantry, artillery, and cavalry, to be designated the Army Corps of the Susquehanna. They will be enrolled and organized in accordance with the regulations of the United States service, for the protection and defense of the public and private property within this department, and will be mustered into the service of the United States, to serve during the pleasure of the President or the continuance of the war.

... They will be armed, uniformed, equipped, and, while in active service, subsisted and supplied as other troops of the United States.

When not required for active service to defend the department, they will be returned to their homes, subject to the call of the commanding general.

Cavalry volunteers may furnish their own horses, to be turned over to the United States at their appraised value, or allowance will be made for the time of actual service at the rate authorized by law.

All able-bodied volunteers between the ages of eighteen and sixty will be enrolled and received into this corps.

The volunteers for State defense will receive no bounty, but will be paid the same as for like service in the Army of the United States for the time they may be in actual service, as soon as Congress may make an appropriation for that purpose.

If volunteers belonging to this Army Corps desire, they can be transferred to the volunteer service for three years, or during the war, when they will be entitled to all the bounties and privileges granted by the acts of Congress³

The order emphasized the need for experienced veterans and stated the numerical requirements for company organization. Each company would include a captain, a first lieutenant, a second lieutenant, and from sixty-four to eighty-two privates. Any person who furnished forty or more men received a captaincy; twenty-five or more a lieutenantcy; and fifteen or more a second lieutenantcy. As soon as a captain had completed the organization of his company, he forwarded a report of its strength to Harrisburg. The Department would then arrange for its transportation to the rendezvous at the state capital. There, companies from the same localities would be formed into regimental organizations.

On June 12, Governor Curtin issued a proclamation lending the persuasiveness of civil authority to that of the military edict:

. . . I know too well the gallantry and patriotism of the freemen of this commonwealth to think it necessary to do more than commend this measure to the people, and earnestly urge them to respond to the call of the General Government, and promptly fill the ranks of these corps, the duties of which will be mainly the defense of our own homes, firesides, and property from devastation⁴

During the period immediately following these pleas for troops, misunderstanding and friction developed between the state authorities and the national government concerning the raising of voluntary forces. Couch

Left to Right: General Henry Wager Halleck (1815-1872) West Point 1839, Lawyer and Railroad President. Chief of Staff, 1862-1865. Edwin McMasters Stanton (1814-1869) Secretary of War in Lincoln's cabinet after Cameron; refused to be dismissed by President Johnson thereby precipitating Johnson's impeachment. General Joseph Hooker (1814-1879) West Point 1837, angered his associates and superiors by his personality.



played the difficult role of conciliator. He faced a dual task: Stanton required him to find troops for the Departmental Corps of the Susquehanna to serve in Pennsylvania and, at the same time, Stanton expected him to produce three years' volunteers for national service outside the state.

On June 12, Curtin telegraphed Stanton to postpone the recruiting of regiments for three years' service or the duration of the war because he believed it would interfere with filling up the Departmental Corps for General Couch since the War Department expected Pennsylvania to furnish men for national service as well as men for the Departmental Corps. ". . . If the organizations of both should be started now, General Couch will be deprived of the best material in the State to make his force efficient, and both branches of the service be delayed . . ." ⁵ He stated that regiments of the Corps of the Department could be transferred later to the national service, in the Army of the Potomac, and added, with the hope of convincing Stanton, that Couch concurred fully with him.

Stanton immediately sent a telegram to Couch, leaving no doubt of his opinion:

. . . I hope you have had nothing to do with such agreement. The recruiting for three years or during the war should not be postponed an hour. You will spare no effort to carry that recruiting into effect, and be on your guard against giving any assent or countenance to such postponement. If Governor Curtin neglects to act under the authority given to him to recruit for three years, that is his own affair. But you are to give his neglect or countenance no assent . . . ⁶

There were several reasons why the call of the 12th of June did not produce sufficient volunteers. There were two competing calls made for men: one intended to enlist troops for three years' service in the Regular Army; the other a petition for men to serve in the Departmental Corps for duty in Pennsylvania. These separate pleas led to misunderstanding on the part of the potential volunteer and created confusion among recruiting personnel. Farmers were reluctant to leave crops in the middle of the harvesting season. Also, the appeals of Couch and Curtin in some respects tended to minimize the danger. Both men referred to possible "raids" by the enemy rather than to a full-scale invasion with the threat of major battles and a lengthy occupation of Northern soil by the South. Finally, civilians who responded to the calls were to serve during the pleasure of the President, or the continuance of the war. False rumors of attack had been frequent during 1861 and 1862 in Pennsylvania and many men ignored the call because they doubted that serious danger threatened. They also believed the Government was trying to obtain soldiers for the national armies for use outside the state.

On June 14, Curtin registered an additional complaint to Lincoln himself through his emissary, Colonel T. A. Scott, who said that existing plans to raise troops quickly were "ineffectual." In response to Curtin's request, Lincoln issued a call for one hundred thousand volunteers, to serve six months, unless sooner discharged by the President. Of this total, Pennsylvania's quota was fifty thousand and Maryland, West Virginia and Ohio were to furnish the remaining fifty thousand. Curtin said, "The plan seems good."



Left: Matthew Stanley Quay (1833-1904) Jefferson College 1850; secretary to Governor Curtin 1861 and military agent for Penna. 1861-1865. He became a state legislator in 1865, and pursued an extremely successful career in politics including State Treasurer, U. S. Senator and National Chairman of the Republican Party. (Right) Andrew Gregg Curtin (1817-1894) Dickinson College 1837; admitted to the Bar in 1839; famous war time governor 1861-1867; minister to Russia 1869-1872; and served in Congress 1881-1887.

On the 15th of June Curtin issued a more urgent proclamation stating that "the issue is one of preservation or destruction." He now believed that "it is the purpose of the enemy to invade our borders with all the strength he can command." Recalling Pennsylvania's glorious history of the past and her devotion to liberty, he appealed in bombastic terms to the state's citizenry to come forth "for the protection of the State and the salvation of our common country."

This dramatic appeal, phrased in military language and repeated in General Order # 43, Headquarters Pennsylvania Militia, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, appeared on the same day above the signature of the Governor who was, of course, commander-in-chief of the militia.⁷ His call for volunteers to serve for six months brought only seven full regiments.

On the 16th in the face of a continued lack of response Curtin dangled additional bait before wavering volunteers. He pointed out that men should not shrink back because of the six months' term of service because no one intended to keep men beyond the extent of the emergency. He promised to accept men without reference to any terms of service except the duration of the immediate threat.

Couch, on the 17th, informed Stanton that the militia would not generally be mustered for six months and echoed Curtin's desire that they be mustered to serve during the emergency. In reply, Stanton said, "Let

them be called upon to muster under the President's call. If they refuse, then muster them in which ever way you can." ⁸

Stanton and Curtin directed appeals to governors of other states for troops to be forwarded to Harrisburg. The War Department assured Curtin that any forces raised from calls by the President or the state would be issued supplies by Couch and other federal officers. The Governor also received notification that Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Jersey, and New York would forward troops, while response from other states was expected shortly.

Governor Curtin sent out an appeal from Harrisburg to the Governor of New Jersey on the 15th:

This state is threatened with invasion by a large force, and we are raising troops as rapidly as possible to resist them. I understand there are three regiments of your troops at Beverly waiting to be mustered out. Could an arrangement be made with you and the authorities at Washington by which the services of those regiments could be had for the present emergency? Please advise immediately.⁹

Response was varied: Stanton informed Couch on the 15th that Governor Horatio Seymour would send New York City forces totaling eight to ten thousand men;¹⁰ Governor William A. Buckingham telegraphed Stanton that Connecticut did not have an organized militia and was not sure if he could get volunteers;¹¹ Governor James Y. Smith of Rhode Island told the Secretary of War on the same day that he could probably furnish two or three thousand men;¹² Governor Frederick Holbrook of Vermont had no organized militia but believed he could probably raise one full regiment of volunteers in thirty days, and two more regiments in sixty days, to serve six months unless sooner discharged;¹³ and Governor Austin Blair of Michigan had no organized militia and could furnish very few men for at least sixty days.¹⁴ Governors Blair and Holbrook preferred to send volunteers for national service rather than militia for a local emergency.

By the 20th of June the only state response of any consequence came from New York which, by that date, had forwarded eight regiments totaling 5150 men. As a matter of fact, most of those New York troops arrived at Harrisburg before a single regiment came from Philadelphia. Few of the men who were sent had actual fighting experience and Couch frequently expressed his horror as to what might happen under actual battle conditions. As he once cryptically remarked about troops from Pennsylvania, "Most of the men that rushed to arms at Altoona and south are rushing home." New Jersey sent one regiment for three days!¹⁵

Many still doubted the seriousness of Lee's intentions. The New York militia were mustered into the United States service for only thirty days while Pennsylvanians generally declined to be mustered for six months. A greater number consented to serve during the existence of the emergency in southern Pennsylvania.

Delay and misunderstanding often confronted Governor Curtin in his efforts to encourage the Northern governors to recruit volunteers quickly. A good example of this type of frustration appeared in his communications with Governor Joel Parker of New Jersey.

On the 15th Parker sent a dispatch to Curtin containing the promising information that one regiment had already volunteered and on the 16th Curtin learned that the nine months' regiments awaiting discharge in New Jersey would be forwarded as fast as possible. Parker further pledged that a proclamation would be issued calling for state militia to assist Pennsylvania during the emergency and expected that, as a result, his state would be able to send some twelve thousand men.¹⁶

On the 20th Parker informed Curtin that he halted the raising of troops for duty in Pennsylvania because he had received information that the urgent need for militia had passed and that Curtin did not need more state militia to add to the Corps of the Susquehanna. Parker now intended to organize six-months' or three-years' troops for the national service. The Pennsylvania governor entreated his colleague not to discontinue sending troops since the rebels were still in the state.¹⁷

On the same day, Curtin inquired whether the New Jersey troops would remain in Pennsylvania for the duration of the emergency, whatever its length might be.

In a lengthy telegram on the 22nd Parker again misunderstood Curtin's intentions. He stated that he called upon the citizens of his state to enlist as militia believing they would not be mustered into United States service and would be returned home after the immediate threat to Pennsylvania had passed. Because of this assurance, many men enlisted whose business would not permit them to be away from home for a long period.¹⁸

However, Curtin's telegram of the 20th left Parker with the impression that Pennsylvania wanted only troops who would be mustered into the United States service; therefore, he concluded by saying he would send only such troops.

Two days later Curtin attempted to clarify the confusing state of affairs and reassure the anxious governor by pointing out that there were two kinds of volunteer forces. Stanton had authorized a call for troops to serve throughout the duration of the war but only in periods of crisis such as existed in Pennsylvania. But the troops raised by the call of the governor in Pennsylvania were to be mustered for the present emergency only and those sent by New York for thirty days, unless sooner discharged. With the approbation of the War Department, these latter troops were to be discharged when, in Curtin's judgment, as governor of the invaded state, the emergency had ended. Curtin asked New Jersey to send men in the latter category. To emphasize the need for prompt action, he mentioned that there were approximately eight thousand enemy soldiers in the vicinity of Greencastle and thirty thousand threatening the state border. General Couch believed that a large force might, at that very moment, be on the move toward southern Pennsylvania. Therefore, the need for volunteers had increased. Curtin wrote:

Any troops furnished by your State will only be called into service for the military department established in Pennsylvania, and will be discharged when, in my judgment, the emergency has expired, and if there should be a limitation to their term of service, they will be returned to your State at your pleasure if the emergency should not have expired.¹⁹

Almost daily, Curtin sent additional appeals to New Jersey with descriptions of the size of the enemy army, the forceful news that Lee, himself, was in the state, the expectation of an imminent battle, and a constant repetition of the fact that Governor Parker could control the length of service of New Jersey troops in Pennsylvania.

From the 15th to the 26th of June Couch estimated that several thousand Union militia assembled at rendezvous points had returned to their homes because malcontents had spread the news that volunteers under the call of the 15th could be retained in service for any length of time. Therefore, there was a general mistrust of the Government's intentions.

Growing desperate, Governor Curtin issued a new proclamation on the 26th. This exhortation promised a short term of service and seemed less hazardous to the prospective volunteer.

The enemy is advancing in force into Pennsylvania. He has a strong column within twenty-three miles of Harrisburg, and other columns are moving by Fulton and Adams counties, and it can no longer be doubted that a formidable invasion of our State is in actual progress. The calls already made for volunteer militia in the exigency have not been met as fully as the crisis requires.

I therefore, now issue this proclamation calling for 60,000 men to come promptly forward to defend the State. They will be mustered into the service of the State for the period of ninety days, but will be required to serve only so much of the period of muster as the safety of our people and the honor of our State may require. They will rendezvous at points to be designated in the general orders to be issued this day by the adjutant-general of Pennsylvania, which orders will also set forth the details of the arrangements for organization, clothing, subsistence, equipments, and supplies.

I will not insult you by inflammatory appeals²⁰ The remainder of the proclamation did just that. Curtin used every technique at his command, pride, loyalty, freedom, disgrace, fear, honor, and possible loss of property, to demand, persuade, and beg troops.

General Order #44, Headquarters Pennsylvania Militia, reiterated the terms of the proclamation in more detail. The commanders of the Department of the Susquehanna and Monongahela set up camps of rendezvous at Harrisburg, Reading and Huntingdon. Squads, and companies of at least sixty-four men, were to report to these camps as soon as possible. There they would be organized into regiments of ten companies each and finally mustered into state service. Officers were to be elected — company officers by the men and field officers by the company or line officers. The national government promised to arrange transportation to the rendezvous point and furnish men, after their arrival, clothing, subsistence, equipment and all other necessities. Quotas were allotted for each county, from 7718 in Philadelphia down to 70 in Cameron. Each county received credit for volunteers previously sent under earlier calls.²¹

Stanton objected to part of General Order #44. He declared the Government could not furnish clothing to troops in state service. Colonel Scott attempted to persuade Stanton to allow General Couch to provide clothing for the ninety days' men under Government authorization since a call of the legislature would be required if the state was to supply this commodity.

Stanton telegraphed Couch on the 26th that he should not furnish uniforms except to troops that were sworn into United States service, but Couch had already given clothing and arms to a few New York regiments and to the Pennsylvania troops called for the emergency. On the 27th Stanton acquiesced and authorized the issue of clothing to troops raised by the call of the governor.

The officers of Couch's command did not understand or receive the new orders on clothing issue. At Reading, men refused to be mustered until they were positive that uniforms would be issued to them by the Government. They feared that their monthly pay of thirteen dollars, especially if the emergency lasted for only a month, would not cover the cost of their uniforms. This delay and misunderstanding slowed the growth of the Corps of the Susquehanna.

Some officers under Couch's command were either guilty of taking liberties with recruiting orders or were not informed of proper procedures. General Napoleon J. T. Dana, at Philadelphia, mustered troops into the United States service for three months instead of for six months as specified by the War Department. Couch petulantly informed Stanton, "I do not see the necessity of having any new varieties of service. It appears to me that there should be one military head in this department, and that he should carry out the views of the General Government."²²

J. R. Fry, chairman of the military committee of Philadelphia, learning of Couch's reaction, expressed his astonishment that Couch had suspended the enlistment of three-months' men. Although Couch had not done so, Fry's misunderstanding between mustering for state service and United States service led to bitterness and misconception.

Disturbed by what he considered needless trifles, Stanton had to assure Couch of his correct interpretation and instruct Mr. Fry that "the general's view of the law is correct, and there should be no difficulty in conforming to it. If the present raid is overcome, it will be in less than three months, and there will be no disposition to hold troops longer than necessary. If they will enlist only for three months let it be done under the State organization."²³

Individuals who were convinced they had plans for assisting in the procurement of a military force frequently made suggestions. Colonel A. K. McClure notified Lincoln that the only way to persuade men to volunteer in sufficient numbers was to give them trustworthy leadership and confidence. He recommended that Couch be supplanted by McClellan who possessed the personal magnetism necessary to rally troops not only from Pennsylvania but from New York and New Jersey as well.

Were men who volunteered for three or six months' service subject to the draft? Stanton answered this frequent question in the affirmative saying that those volunteers now in United States service must, however, receive credit for the time they might have served or might yet serve under the terms of their present enlistment. They should first be permitted to remain on duty with their present organizations and should, when their term expired, be assigned to the three-years' regiments. Those not mustered into United States service who were called out by the Governor for protection against the Confederates in Pennsylvania, should,

if drafted, report to their district provost-marshal and be enrolled into the United States service for three years, the same as if they were not in the military service of the state.

Methods of encouraging men to enlist varied. Patriotic addresses by local mayors and other public figures, farm wagons carrying large placards advertising the glory awaiting anyone who would join a particular regiment, and hand-bills extolling the martial qualities of a local businessman were commonplace. In Philadelphia a "lay Peter the Hermit" on the steps of Independence Hall made an impassioned appeal to its citizens on behalf of state defense. In the same city the Citizens' Bounty Fund Committee offered these enticements:

Resolved, that the sum of ten dollars, in addition to pay from the Government be, and the same is hereby appropriated to each officer and private of every military company that is now or may be organized in Philadelphia, and received into the service of the State or of the United States for any length of time they may be required for the present emergency; provided, that the said amount hereby appropriated shall not exceed the sum of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars.²⁴

When Mayor Henry called out the Philadelphia Home Guard under Brigadier-General A. J. Pleasanton, the latter included in his address the following merciless words: "Ladies of Philadelphia! Spurn from your presence the able-bodied men who hesitate to enlist for your defense—none but the brave deserve the fair."²⁵ In the June 16th issue of the *Philadelphia Daily Evening Bulletin* there were no less than twenty-eight advertisements for enrolling troops. In the June 17th issue of the same paper appeared the following description of the city:

The city to-day presents a warlike appearance. One can scarcely turn in any direction without meeting a fife and drum. Recruiting officers are constantly marching up and down the streets. Large four horse omnibuses, with bands of music and placards announcing various rendezvous, are driving about the city. Recruiting stations have been opened in numerous places and recruits are coming forward pretty rapidly . . .²⁶

In Harrisburg Couch laid plans to raise an Invalid Corps comprised of those not fit for field duty. The term of enlistment was to be a maximum of three years and members of the Corps would receive the same pay as regulars in the field. There were different categories of duty: armed with muskets, the First Battalion, consisting of those with no serious disability, performed guard duty; armed with swords, the Second and Third Battalions, filled by those of lower degrees of physical efficiency who had lost a hand, arm, foot, or leg, acted as garrison troops for cities, as guards for hospitals and other public buildings, and served as clerks, orderlies, etc.

One of the most inspiring sights in Harrisburg for young men who had not yet enlisted must have been the company of seventeen 1812 veterans (the youngest was sixty-eight) marching under a tattered flag that had been carried by Pennsylvania troops at Trenton. They offered to serve behind the entrenchments and were promptly accepted by the governor.

The only favor they asked, was to be armed with the old flint-lock muskets, such as they used to carry when they were young. It was a grand and inspiring sight! Those old men, scarcely hoping to live through the war, their locks white with the frosts of many winters, their frames bowed by age, and long toil in the journey of life, marched as briskly and as accurately to the drum and fife, as any of their grand-sons could . . . When they came out of the Governor's room, they marched, according to the old fashion, in single file. They were halted on the green. It was curious to modern ears to hear the orders of the Captain—so different from our tactics. It was: "by section of two march", instead of "file right", or "left", it was "right", or "left wheel"; instead of the sharp, short, peremptory "front", it was left face." 27

Calls for volunteers such as the following appeared in Harrisburg newspapers and were repeated throughout the state with few changes except for names:

All persons who wish to join a cavalry company are requested to meet at the livery office of Frank Murray, in Fourth Street near Walnut, this evening at seven o'clock for the purpose of organizing a company.

The members of the Fourth Ward Company of Pennsylvania militia are earnestly urged to meet promptly this evening at the Hope Engine House to prepare to defend our homes.

Attention, firemen and citizens of the Fifth and Sixth Wards! A meeting will be held at the Good Will Engine House this evening at seven and a half o'clock to form a military company to fight in defense of Harrisburg.

Attention Russell Guards! A meeting of Company F, One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, will be held at the Hope Engine House this evening at seven o'clock.

Capt. Val. B. Hummel, late a member of the Anderson Body-Guard, which did such effectual service under Gen. Rosecrans during the year and a half they were with him, is raising a volunteer cavalry company in this city . . . A meeting will be held at the Exchange this evening at seven o'clock for the purpose of organizing the company.²⁸

Couch struggled mainly with the problems of recruitment during a few short weeks. The trials and tribulations of raising volunteers, of necessity, were lost in the life and death struggle during the first three days of July and in the less glorious, cautious pursuit of Lee to the Potomac. After Gettysburg, the Department concentrated its efforts on enforcing the draft rather than on the task of procuring volunteer militia under state authority.

There was considerable resentment toward any form of draft by the inhabitants of the mining districts of Pennsylvania, particularly, in Schuylkill County. On one occasion, Couch exclaimed,

The ignorant miners have no fear of God, the State authority, or the devil. The Democratic leaders have not the power of burnt flax over them for good. A strong military power under the General Government alone keeps matters quiet.²⁹

Not infrequently reports appeared in newspaper columns describing efforts to thwart the draft. Angry demonstrators hurled rotten eggs and vegetables at recruiting officers, sent them threatening notes, burned their houses and barns, and employed many other methods to hinder recruiting programs. When the Department officers attempted to quell resistance

with force, Pennsylvania militiamen declined to march against their brethren. Davis Pearson, chairman of the group in Philadelphia that organized the Coal Regiments, wrote Curtin:

We telegraphed you today that it was rumored in our city that you had ordered the two Coal Regiments, to the mining regions, to assist in enforcing the draft. This may be a mere idle rumor but it has greatly alarmed our whole entire trade, both Miners and Shippers. Many of the officers of the two Coal Regiments are owners of mines The effect would be disastrous, if the owners of the mines should be sent to fight their own employees

Leaders of opposition to the draft would not hesitate to urge destruction of private mine property³⁰

Couch and Curtin organized a sizeable force for the protection of the Commonwealth although the program of recruitment did not meet their expectations. The adjutant-general of Pennsylvania reported that there were organized in the Department of the Monongahela during the year 1863, 5,166 men; in the Department of the Susquehanna, 31,422. The arrival of troops from New York and New Jersey augmented Couch's command. During the Gettysburg campaign, New York sent nineteen regiments and one battery; New Jersey sent one battalion of infantry that remained until after the invasion; and Pennsylvania supplied eight regiments of emergency men, twenty-two regiments of three-months' militia, five companies of artillery, one battery of six-month infantry, two regiments and one battalion of six-month cavalry, and one battalion of three-month cavalry. The Department organized most of the men between the 4th and 11th of July.

During August and early September, the three-months' militia called by the proclamation of June 26th obtained their discharge and were paid with funds, amounting to \$671,476.43, raised from a temporary loan secured by the Governor from large banks and corporations in the state.

The following is a summary of Pennsylvania troops called in 1863:³¹

I. Organized by the Department of the Susquehanna and the Monongahela:	
A. Organized into national service under call of the President in June 1863 for six months.....	4,484
B. Organized into national service for the duration of the emergency in Pennsylvania.....	7,062
C. Organized into state service in June 1863 for ninety days.....	25,042
TOTAL.....	36,588
II. Troops not organized by the Departments of the Susquehanna and the Monongahela:	
A. Organized under special authority from the War Department for three years or the duration of the war. These troops were to serve only during times of local emergency.....	1,066
B. Drafted men forwarded by the superintendent of the recruiting service.....	4,458
C. Enlistments in the Regular Army.....	934
TOTAL.....	6,458
GRAND TOTAL.....	43,046

CHAPTER III

SCOUTING AGAINST LEE

The Department of the Susquehanna rendered invaluable service to Washington by supplying information about the enemy's location. Dispatches from Lincoln, Stanton, Halleck and Meade revealed their sole dependence, at times, upon Couch's command for news. Although the Department of the Susquehanna could not boast of heroic efforts in the face of rebel fire, it proved its worth in ferreting out and transmitting information about the elusive Lee.

There was no distinct unit or body of men assigned solely to this task in the campaign of 1863. Rather, the Department served as a clearing house. Periodically, cavalry companies, such as the ones under Captain William H. Boyd and Lieutenant Hancock T. McClean, were assigned a dual task, picket duty and military scouting. Representatives of the railroads in southern Pennsylvania and other private individuals such as Alexander McClure of Chambersburg and David McConaughy of Gettysburg went themselves or sent men to observe enemy movements. William Bender Wilson and other telegraph operators also served as scouts. From all of these sources information was sent back to Couch's headquarters and subsequently passed on to Washington or directly to General Meade, if possible.

The civilian agents of Thomas A. Scott, of the Pennsylvania Central Railroad, who had personal as well as patriotic ends to serve, provided an indispensable supply of information about Confederate troop movements. As soon as news reached him of Lee's northward movement, Scott sent William Bender Wilson south to Williamsport, Maryland, to supervise a group of scouts who reported Lee's progress. They continued in this capacity until the rebel advance guard approached to within three miles of Harrisburg. Colonel A. K. McClure headed another group of scouts with headquarters at Chambersburg while twelve men under Alexander Lloyd watched over the railroad at Mount Union, an extremely vulnerable point for cavalry raids.

These and other scouts forwarded a stream of information, much of which reached Harrisburg through the Superintendent's office of the Pennsylvania Railroad at Altoona. Couch's command then assembled, sorted, compared and eventually forwarded a finished report almost daily, until the termination of the Gettysburg campaign, to the War Department at Washington. There, officials studied this data, made alterations in the light of other reports, if necessary, and then sent the message to Meade by telegraph or courier together with instructions from General Halleck or the Secretary of War. Scott probably realized that the best defense of his property was not breastworks or local militia but the Army of the Potomac.

Within a few days, after he assumed command of the department, on June 15, 1863, Couch performed his first service as the eyes of the War Department in response to Stanton's query:

What description of force is at Chambersburg: in what numbers, and under whose command? Such particulars are very necessary to be known here in determining the operations of Hooker's force. No pains should be spared to get accurate information in detail and report it here.¹

He informed the Secretary of War that eight hundred of the enemy's cavalry (Albert G. Jenkins' Brigade gathering provisions) were at Chambersburg on the 15th, sixteen miles north of the Maryland line. Captain Boyd, under his command and in charge of about one hundred and twenty men of the 1st New York Cavalry, was keeping a close watch on their progress. The enemy, according to Couch's information, seemed to be moving north in three columns: one toward Chambersburg, one toward Gettysburg, and the other in the direction of the coal mines. With a trace of apprehension, he told his superior that he had an insufficient force to resist them and that "as matters look now, all south of the Susquehanna will be swept."²

On the following day, Major-General Robert Schenck, in command of the military district including Baltimore, had first noticed news of the enemy's presence at Chambersburg in Philadelphia newspapers. He could scarcely trust their veracity and telegraphed Couch for confirmation since his own command had not reported it.

Meanwhile, having a difficult time separating wild rumors from factual reports, Couch notified Stanton that the enemy still held Chambersburg with about seven hundred men; that his scouts from the Gettysburg area forwarded news of the rebels' departure from Hagerstown at 4:00 P. M. on the 15th with fifteen hundred to two thousand cavalry and their subsequent arrival at Greencastle two hours later; that observers who had just arrived at Glen Rock from Westminster via the Northern Central Railroad sent reports of the enemy crossing the Potomac at Sharpsburg and in possession of Hagerstown, Greencastle, Chambersburg, Waynesborough and other small towns. He judged the total strength of the invader to be about twenty thousand and their military intentions to be directed toward Harrisburg.³

To urgent and repeated requests for information upon which the movements of the Army of the Potomac depended, Couch asserted that the only Confederate force in Pennsylvania on the 17th was the one of fifteen hundred that had fallen two miles back of Chambersburg. He also mentioned that the retreating force of Major-General Robert H. Milroy, a Union general who had nearly lost his entire command at Winchester, Virginia, had arrived at Bedford Springs, northwest of Hancock, Maryland. Although many of them were without arms and much demoralized, he thought they could be reorganized and held in readiness north of Hancock.

On the 21st, on information obtained from Milroy's men and the scouts at Chambersburg, the Department of the Susquehanna informed Washington that one thousand rebel cavalry were in the vicinity of Waynesborough and approximately thirty-five thousand men were near

Hagerstown with at least sixteen pieces of artillery. Couch suspected an eastward movement by the enemy since some cavalry units had crossed the South Mountains.

On the 22nd further reports mentioned Robert E. Rodes' division of infantry entering Greencastle with cavalry units advancing on Chambersburg which they entered the following day. On the 24th Couch estimated ten thousand infantry, cavalry, and artillery forces between Shippensburg and Greencastle. At this time Ewell was in Chambersburg and Longstreet and A. P. Hill were approaching Hagerstown.

Lincoln, of course, was extremely interested in the possible objectives of Lee and telegraphed Couch directly on the 24th: "Have you any reports of the enemy moving into Pennsylvania? And, if any, what?"⁴ The answer to the President included the following: that there were seven thousand cavalry at Greencastle; A. P. Hill and Longstreet had crossed the Potomac with forty thousand; ten deserters placed Ewell with thirty thousand at Greencastle; and two Confederate officers, taken prisoner, said that Lee's headquarters at that time were located in Millwood, twelve miles from Winchester.

Telegraph communications from Harrisburg on the 25th informed the War Department that ten thousand infantry, seven hundred cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of artillery had passed through Chambersburg the day before. There were two thousand infantry at Shippensburg and Ewell with twenty thousand men was thought to be between Hagerstown and Shippensburg.

Until the 28th of June several telegraph lines connected Meade's headquarters in Frederick, Maryland with Washington: from Frederick to Washington; via the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to Frederick; and by the way of the main line of the Northern Central Railroad to Hanover Junction and Harrisburg.⁵ However by that date, General J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry had succeeded in cutting all telegraphic communications open to the Army of the Potomac and for several days communication by courier was the only solution.

On the 28th Ewell occupied Carlisle with twelve thousand men and the remainder of his corps, about 4,000, reached Gettysburg. Stanton learned that by evening the enemy would have possession up to the defenses on the Susquehanna River but had not yet made any show of attack in force. They had burned bridges on the Northern Central Railroad.

The Confederate tide swept onward and on the 29th Couch noted more prophetically than either side knew: "My latest information is that Early, with his 8,000 men, went toward Gettysburg or Hanover, saying they expected to fight a great battle there."⁶ He mentioned that Lee, Longstreet, the two Hills and Ewell had been in Chambersburg on the 27th. General Meade learned of the burning of the Columbia Bridge but that the opposite side of the river was still being held in strength. Couch expected a great deal of destruction of railroad property. He also expressed his opinion to Meade that the enemy's demonstration on the Susquehanna was a diversionary movement designed to prevent a junction between his own forces and the Army of the Potomac.

Simon Cameron, who had just returned from his post in Russia to

run for the Senate, in a more imaginative report wrote to Lincoln that Lee had one hundred thousand men and two hundred and fifty pieces of artillery between Chambersburg and Gettysburg poised to strike at Harrisburg. He warned the President that Lee would cross the Susquehanna in forty-eight hours unless Meade attacked.

Let me impress on you the absolute necessity of action by Meade to-morrow, even if attended with great risk, because if Lee gets his army across the Susquehanna, you will readily comprehend the disastrous results that must follow to the country.⁷

Again on the 30th Lincoln appealed directly to Couch: "I judge by the absence of news that the enemy is not crossing, or pressing up to the Susquehanna. Please tell me what you know of his movements."⁸ The reply indicated that troops were moving from Carlisle on the Baltimore Pike while Early's force left York in a "westerly or northwesterly" direction. From this, of course, the President could anticipate a junction of the two forces near Gettysburg.

General Meade, like many others, seemed to rely a great deal on intelligence from the Department of the Susquehanna:

. . . I am without definite and positive information as to the whereabouts of Longstreet and Ewell. The latter I presume to be in front of you . . . I am anxious to hear from you, and get information of the dispositions of the enemy and his movements so far as you know them . . .⁹

Meade, at times, relied upon Couch to forward his own communications to Washington.

On the last day of June Couch notified Halleck that the enemy had withdrawn from near Harrisburg, evacuated York and Carlisle and appeared to concentrate near Shippensburg. A few hours later Couch re-evaluated scouting reports and placed the focal point of Confederate concentration near Gettysburg instead of Chambersburg. He warned Halleck that Meade should be prepared for an instantaneous attack.

On July 1 scouts from different points passed in the results of their observations which, in turn, were forwarded to Halleck. The strength of the enemy force, according to information obtained from Thomas A. Scott, was enumerated as follows: "Ewell, 23,000 men, 48 pieces; Longstreet, 30,000 men, 122 pieces; Hill, 24,000 men, pieces not known; Early, 15,000 men, 26 pieces; total, 92,000 men and 236 pieces exclusive of Hill's."¹⁰ All groups were reported moving in the direction of Gettysburg.

After the battle had begun, Couch continued to send information about the movement of wagon trains, reinforcements including raw troops, cavalry units and whatever else might prove of value to Meade. Letters such as the one from Colonel Henry McCormick, aide to General Smith, were sent out requesting intelligence concerning Lee:

Dear Sir:—I have represented to Gen. W. F. Smith that your mountaineers can be of invaluable service in watching the movements of the enemy across the South Mountain. We are in want of information as to the following points:

1st, Position and force of the enemy.

2nd, Their movements and reports of the result of the fighting in that quarter,

3rd, The position and amount of their baggage train and plunder.

By obtaining early and accurate information of the above you may be of incalculable service in promoting our ultimate success. We rely upon you to furnish information as your position, and the familiarity of your men with the mountains and paths give you great advantages. If you have no horses or means of forwarding information to these Headquarters, send it to Mr. Mullen at Papertown and he will get it in. Time is of great importance.¹¹

From this and similar sources Couch revised his estimates of Confederate strength slightly downward to about 75,000, a figure very near the truth.

The most important correspondence sent by Couch after the battle at Gettysburg concerned news upon which Lincoln built hopes which were never fulfilled. Dispatches reported the Potomac River rising so as to make it unfordable and difficult to cross without a great deal of delay. General Meade did not take immediate action until he was positively satisfied that the enemy was retreating to the Potomac. Then it was too late.

Couch, as a source of information about enemy troop movements, was much less prolific after the Gettysburg campaign. There still came reports of rumors of raids, the capture of enemy spies, and the probabilities of enemy demonstrations toward Pennsylvania. His principle contribution, a very significant one, was made during the critical weeks of 1863.


CHAPTER IV

THE BLOODLESS CAMPAIGN

By the 14th of June, 1863, refugees from the Shenandoah Valley brought word of the retreat of General Milroy from Harper's Ferry into Pennsylvania. The relentless column of horses, the wagons loaded with furniture and other prized possessions, and the people that streamed forward toward the bridges crossing the Susquehanna were tangible evidence of the proximity of the Confederate Army to the Pennsylvania capital.


The great covered bridge across the Susquehanna at Harrisburg presented a scene of ceaseless activity, and never was such a toll business done there before. By night the steady tramp and rumble of the heavy teams lulled the senses of the weary, and through the long hours of the sultry June day, a cloud of dust rose constantly far down the valley, reaching forward and across the stream, as far in the opposite direction as the eye could penetrate. With the fine impalpable particles settling down ceaselessly, rider and horse, vehicle and occupants, flocks, herds, all were enveloped until thick folds wrapped them like a garment.¹

The customary daily business routine of Harrisburg was being rapidly disrupted while the city accustomed itself to new and unfamiliar scenes and activities. Farmers traveled through the streets driving herds of cattle toward Lancaster, Berks, and Lebanon Counties; citizens and Departmental troops threw up fortifications on both shores; recruiting officers posted handbills in prominent places; editors suspended the publication of newspapers periodically owing to the enlistment of compositors;



The Pennsylvania State House, or State Capitol, from 2 January 1822 until its destruction by fire 2 February 1897. Office buildings at the ends of the Capitol were not burned. The Capitol itself cost \$135,000, the Office Buildings \$93,000, and the public grounds and landscaping \$35,000.

(A) State Capitol (B) Arsenal (C) Bethel Church of God (D) Lutheran Church (E) Phila. and Reading RR Depot (F) Penna. RR Depot (G) Salem Reformed Church (H) Lochiel Hotel (I) Presbyterian Church (J) Court House (K) Prison (L) State Capitol Hotel (M) Exchange Building (N) "Telegraph" Newspaper Building (O) Methodist Church (P) Pine Street Presbyterian Church (Q) D. T. Willson (R) Brady House (S) Baptist Church (T) Bolton House (U) Market Square with market sheds (V) Harrisburg Bank (W) Henry McCormick (X) Episcopal Church (Y) United Brethren Church (Z) Morgan House (AA) Lancaster Shops of the Harrisburg, Portsmouth, Mountjoy and Lancaster RR (BB) Gas Works (CC) Pratt's Rolling Mill (DD) Dauphin County House (EE) School (FF) Governor's Mansion (GG) Washington House (HH) United States Hotel (II) Railroad House Hotel.



and the mayor issued proclamations such as the following: "For the preservation of peace and good order in the city it is enjoined on all keepers of retail liquor establishments and lager beer shops to close their bars precisely at 5 P. M. until 5 A. M. the next morning." 2

Darius N. Couch, a capable commander, had little reason to complain of being hampered by lack of freedom to act according to his own best judgment. He was given sweeping military powers to carry out any plans specified by War Department regulations and, in addition, was authorized by express permission from Stanton's office to attempt any operation not inconsistent with good judgment and common sense.

During the threatening days of June 1863, Couch had authority to take over all arsenals and clothing depots to supply any troops placed at his disposal. Procurement of supplies seemed to be a perplexing problem for Couch in spite of the location of his headquarters in one of the richest agricultural areas in the nation.

He frequently petitioned Stanton, Halleck, or Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs to forward supplies from government depots at Philadelphia or Pittsburgh. He was reminded several times of his authority to impress goods from civilian sources to maintain his command.


Halleck ordered Couch to take possession of military supplies in danger of capture by the enemy. Couch sent out commissary details to seize and remove beef-cattle and horses from the path of the Confederate Army but officers were cautioned to give receipts describing the animals and mentioning the service for which they were fitted.

General Meigs offered his advice on the matter:

Harrisburg is in a rich district. Thousands of teams must have fled to it or through it for refuge, and its resources should be made available. The troops at Harrisburg are organized in service for very short times. It will be better to hire than to buy. I think you should impress all the transportation you need, fixing a certain rate of hire or compensation applicable

View of Harrisburg as shown on an old lithograph of the 1860 period. Many structures are identified on page 20.

Photo Courtesy of Dauphin County Historical Society and Gerald Smeltzer



to all teams, wagons, and carts thus taken into service. This price should be lower than the average of the country in peaceful times. The people should have just compensation, but should not be allowed to make speculation out of the Government. I suggest 50 cents a day for each horse or mule; \$1 a day and a ration for each man . . .³

However, in the opinion of various Quartermaster officials, the commander of the Department of the Susquehanna never was able to solve this problem to their complete satisfaction. Lieutenant-Colonel Ambrose Thompson, aide-de-camp to Meigs at Harrisburg, stated that "I have found it impossible, after great efforts, to hire transportation here to any extent. The people seem disinclined to do anything, and General Couch is not willing to use coercive measures."⁴ Brigadier-General Rufus Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, expressed astonishment at the condition of Departmental troops operating near Meade during the retreat of Lee:

They came without supplies, or means of transporting them. It seems incredible that these troops of Generals Couch and Smith should be in such a destitute condition, having had so long a time for preparation in a country of ample resources. Our department at Harrisburg must have acted on a small scale. These troops have, however, but a few days to serve, and were not too happy to march here . . .⁵

The Department took possession of all railroads and bridges in order that priority might be given to military matters. The commanding general had the right to fortify or protect them as he saw fit.


From his headquarters in the second story of the Capitol building at Harrisburg, Couch imposed strict censorship upon all telegrams sent from the city, and issued orders forbidding any reporter to cross the Susquehanna in search of information. The first censor of the Department, Colonel Henry Coppee, a former teacher of rhetoric and English literature at the University of Pennsylvania, prepared two dispatches each day for circulation to newspapers. To the consternation of journalists from big-city newspapers, Coppee was a difficult man to find. "Under no circumstances, he emphasized, would a newspaperman be permitted to deprive him of his rest. Sleep was important to him, and he was determined to retire at ten or eleven o'clock at the latest, news or no news."⁶ After four unrewarding days, reporters were happy to hear that Wayne McVeigh, a former newspaperman, had replaced Coppee and the task of newsgathering became "tolerable."

One of the most important early tasks confronting Couch was the building of defenses and fortifications along the Susquehanna from Conowingo northward. Special Order #3 ordered Captain C. C. Haldeman to assume responsibility for defending Columbia and the bridges and fords in the vicinity.⁷ Special Orders #4 and #6 appointed Colonel Emlen Franklin to defend the fords and bridges below Columbia and the fords and ferries from Columbia bridge to the Dauphin County line and to make certain that rafts, canal-boats, and anything else that would float were taken to the north side of the river.⁸

By means of General Order #1, June 16th, Colonel Franklin requested the citizens of Lancaster city and county to serve in the following areas:⁹

Lancaster County Defense Sectors

1863



The citizens of the townships of Fulton, Little Britain, Coleraine, Bart, Sadsbury, Eden, Paradise, Salisbury, Drumore, Providence, Strasburg, Leacock, Earl, Earl East and Earl West, shall rendez-vous at Peach Bottom Ferry.

The citizens of the townships of Martic, Pequea, East and West Lampeter, shall rendez-vous at McCall's Ferry.

The citizens of Conestoga and Lancaster townships shall rendez-vous at Shenk's Ferry.

The citizens of Manor and Millersville shall rendez-vous at Safe Harbor.

The citizens of Columbia Borough, East and West Hempfield, Manheim, Manheim Borough, Mount Joy township and Borough, Warwick, Elizabeth, and Rapho shall rendez-vous at Columbia.

The citizens of Marietta, East and West Donegal, and Conoy shall rendez-vous at Marietta.

The citizens of Carnarvon, Brecknock, East and West Cocalico, Clay, Ephrata and Lancaster City shall rendez-vous at Lancaster City.

Each citizen shall provide his own arms and ammunition, until a sufficient supply of arms reaches this department, also his own rations for three days to be carried with him; also entrenching tools, either an axe, shovel, or pick.

Couch and his assistants divided the Susquehanna River into defense sectors and assigned commanders:¹⁰

The line of river from Chester County line [sic] to York Furnace bridge, is placed under the command of Major Thaddeus Stevens Jr., 122d P. V.

The line of river from York Furnace Bridge to the line of Columbia Borough, is under Major R. W. Shenk, 135th P. V., Headquarters at Safe Harbor.

Columbia Borough and line of river to Marietta under Captain Haldeman, Headquarters at Columbia.

The line of river from Marietta to Dauphin County under Lt. Johnson, Co. H. 135th P. V.

Engineer forces in and about Harrisburg were extremely busy. In the summer time the water in the Susquehanna was so low that it could be easily forded. Couch hired men from Harrisburg and surrounding towns to throw up entrenchments in Harris' Park across the river from the city in an effort to obstruct passage of enemy troops through the ford just below the large island in the middle of the river.

In the early part of June, 1863, Major James Brady, of the Pennsylvania Volunteer Artillery, began to fortify the height which became known as Fort Washington. These earthworks and defenses, inclosing several acres, occupied a position opposite the city and atop the bluff overlooking the end of the old "camel-back" bridge.

In the first stages of construction citizen volunteers, who were recruited through advertisements placed by W. T. Hildrup, Superintendent of Fortifications, in the local newspapers, did much of the work.¹¹

Laborers Wanted.—\$1.25 will be paid by the QM Department for efficient laborers on the fortifications each day and each night. Let the patriotic instincts of every laborer impel him to this work.

Men wanted for the fortifications.—Citizens, let your love of home prompt you to aid in the erection of proper fortifications. Immediate and energetic labor is required. Those unused to sun can work at night, hardier men by day. Let all respond and crowd the work.

To the Colored Men of Harrisburg.—We want men of muscle, and men who are ready and willing to work on our entrenchments—We have such white men already. But colored men can help in this common cause also, and colored men are needed at this crisis. Liberal inducements are offered to such of those as assist us, and their pay will be \$1.25 per day as long as they work. The night laborers will receive the same compensation—Turn out then men of all classes and colors, if for nothing more, to the assistance of your country, and the capital of the Old Keystone State.

Other notices requested the townspeople to set out empty barrels upon the sidewalks to be used in building the fortifications. By the 29th with the support of the technical assistance of Pennsylvania railroad construction engineers, the townspeople and the militia, the defenses were largely completed in spite of loose shale which made digging difficult. Troops stationed in these areas received their water supply from the Citizen Fire Engine and Hose Company which had been impressed into service. Negroes operated the pumps. It was agreed that the court house bell would be the signal for all men capable of bearing arms in the city to report to the bridge for the defense of the town. Troops severed a span of each bridge and supported the structure with braces so that it could be instantly demolished, should the need arise.

One of the most picturesque accounts of military activities at Fort Washington came from the pen of the biographer of the 23rd New York State National Guard Regiment who, it must be remembered, was most loquacious when singing the praises and overemphasizing the importance of New York troops in this campaign and deriding the efforts and patriotic motives of Pennsylvania citizens and troops. The 23rd Regiment arrived in Harrisburg on June 19 expecting to find the Pennsylvanians industriously at work, but:

In the half-dug trenches were—whom, think'st reader. Thousands of the adult men of Harrisburg, with the rough implements of work in their hands, patriotically toiling to put into a condition of defence this the citadel of their capital? Nothing of the sort. Panic-stricken by the reported approach of the enemy, the poltroons of the city had closed their houses and stores, offered their stocks of merchandise for sale at ruinous prices, and were thinking of nothing in their abject fear except how to escape with their worthless lives and their property.... Hired laboring men were all we saw in the trenches.¹²

And so the 23rd descended into the trenches where they worked for two days.

It must have been amusing, however, to an on-looker of muscle, in whose hands the pick or spade is a toy, to watch with what a brave vigor hands unused to toil seized and wielded the implements of the earth-beaver; and how after a dozen or two of strokes and the sweat began to drop, the blows of the pick grew daintier, and the spadefuls tossed aloft gradually and slowly became spoonful rather.¹³

An account of camp life follows:

The site selected was a rather steep hill-side, where pitching tents involves a good deal of digging. First, you must level off a rectangular plot some six feet by seven as a foundation for your structure.... Then you must set your tent-poles in such positions as that the tent, when pitched shall preserve nicely the rectilinearity of the street and its own equipoise. After that the canvas is stretched into proper position by means of pegs driven firmly into the ground on every side. Then follows carpentry work. Three or four joists, if you can procure them, are laid flat on the ground and half-embedded in the soft earth, and across these is fitted a board flooring. A pole is next adjusted close under the ridgepole of the tent to accommodate a variety of furniture, whose shape or appendages suggest such disposition. And finally, a rack or framework is set up next the rear wall of the tent, for the support of the muskets of the mess.... Room must be found for four to six muskets, according to the number of the mess, and as many knapsacks, haversacks, belts, blankets, rubber-cloths, canteens, sets of dishes, boots or shoes, and a box to hold blacking and brushes, soap, candles, etc. Besides these, there is apt to be.... an assortment of towels, handkerchiefs, stockings and other articles of apparel which the owners thereof have lately washed or have gone through the motions of washing, and have hung up overhead to dry, where they are forever flapping in your face when you stand upright in the end. The blankets and knapsacks are at night used to eke out the appointments for sleep, the first to soften the floor to the bones of the sleepers, the second to serve for pillows.¹⁴

The following is the program published in the General Orders which the troops followed on days when they were not preparing fortifications:

- 4:50 A.M. Drummer's call.
- 5:00 A.M. Reveille:—when roll will be called by the First Sergeant (superintended by a commissioned officer) on the company parade,—the troops passing without arms. Captains will report absentees without leave, to the commanding officer.
- 5:30 A.M. Police call:—when the quarters will be policed, as also the grounds immediately around them.
- 7:00 A.M. Breakfast call.
- 8:00 A.M. Grand Mounting:—at this time the police party will parade without arms and police the grounds.
- 8:30 A.M. Surgeon's call:—when the sick will be paraded by the First Sergeant and marched to the Surgeon's quarters to be examined.

7:00 A.M.	Drill call:—for company drills.
12:00 M.	Dinner call.
4:00 P.M.	Drill call.
5:30 P.M.	Assembly.
5:45 P.M.	Evening parade, when the weather permits; at which time there will be by company an inspection of arms, cartridge boxes, and cap pouches
9:00 P.M.	Tattoo:—roll call without arms—any special instructions to troops published.
9:30 P.M.	Taps:—when all lights will be put out in quarters except the Guard House, the quarters of the officer of the Day and Headquarters. ¹⁵

Another quotation illustrates the balance between tedious routine and pleasant diversion at Fort Washington:

It would be pleasant to rehearse the many scenes and events which filled up our days in camps: — the duties of the guard, alternately roasted under the glaring sun of the parapet, and suffocated in the crowded guard-tent; the varied employments of the police, — the scavengers and involuntary retainers of the day, now scrambling in irregular file down the bluff carrying pails and canteens for water, now bearing from the commissariat huge armfuls of bread, or boxes of hard tack, or quarters of fresh beef, or sides of less appetizing bacon, now “putting things to rights” in the street of the company, and called on all day long for multitudinous odd little jobs; the foraging parties dragnetting the country round for sheep, poultry, eggs, milk, and the like, — and this not to the owner’s loss, be it remembered; the morning wash in the Susquehanna; the evening swim; the drills and dress parades; the half-holiday in Harrisburg, whose baths and restaurants and shops, whose fair ladies (where there were cherry-trees in the garden!), whose verandahs with easy chair and a Havana and quiet made the place to us a soldiers’ paradise.¹⁶

Lockwood’s final estimate of the strength of the fort was as follows:

For though our position was naturally strong, its defences appeared to the uninitiated to be wretchedly inadequate. The number of mounted pieces was only thirteen, nearly all of which were three-inch rifles, carrying about a ten-pound bolt Of the infantry only three or four regiments had been under fire, and these only in light skirmishes The shale of which the parapets were made were thought by some to be a greater source of danger than rebel shot or shell. A ball striking the parapet near the top would have scattered a shower of stones into the faces of the men standing behind it¹⁷

Governor Samuel W. Pennypacker described his experiences at the defenses of Fort Washington when he was a militiaman at the age of nineteen:

During two nights and two days we had no tents. The water supply was of water which had been pumped up from the Susquehanna. The water had been put suddenly into great hogsheads out of which coal oil had been pumped. The result was that the water had very much of the taint of oil, and was exceedingly disagreeable.¹⁸

There were four men in a tent and each had “his tin basin, and a pewter spoon, and we were fed with beans and with rice, and with fresh meat and with salt pork, and had pretty good fare.”¹⁹

A claim for damages forwarded to the War Department in 1883 on behalf of Richard H. and Valentine Hummel, owners of property in the vicinity of Washington, adds further information about the Departmental "war effort." Claims were for:

... destruction of fences and woods; a grove cut down at the hill-top to give the cannon full sweep; roadways cut through the land; two orchards destroyed; 3,000 fence panels appropriated by soldiers; Bridgeport lumberyard entirely depleted of stock; grass and wheat trampled down; several hundred locust trees cut down; and the government's occupancy of the estate for two years.²⁰

Still other evidence of the presence of militiamen at Fort Washington is revealed in a letter written by W. L. Gorgas, whose father's home was located on the outer picket lines of the fort. He noted that:

... the militia were doing great damage to houses in that neighborhood, and it was fortunate for us that someone was left in charge of the house during our night's absence, as it would have been ransacked from top to bottom as others were in that vicinity. In many of the houses not a single piece of furniture could be found; preserves and apple butter were used to decorate the walls, doors broken, chaff and feather beds cut open and their contents thrown around the floor, and everything in a much worse condition than had there been a battle. The contents of the store of David Denlinger, of Camp Hill, were strewn along the picket line running from the Chambersburg Pike to the State Road. Packages of tea, coffee, muslin, calico could have been obtained from the pickets with but the asking for them.²¹

In addition to work on the forts across the river, the men devoted a good deal of effort to protecting railroads. They pierced the walls of the engine-house of the Cumberland Valley Railroad for musket-firing, and barricaded the doors with ties and sandbags, allowing openings for two pieces of artillery. Rifle pits commanded narrow cuts and passes at strategic locations, and rock, earth, and sandbags blocked the passages.

The Pennsylvania Railroad built blockhouses at vital sites to resist attack and many of the locomotives, cars and other valuables were sent to Philadelphia for safety. Fearful officials packed and shipped by railroad the archives of the state government, including the papers of all the departments, the twenty-eight thousand volumes of the state library and five old portraits of state governors, to Philadelphia.

The center of activity in the city was Camp Curtin which had come under the control of the Federal Government. It was a rendezvous point for troops in the North as well as a supply depot and a hospital for sick and wounded.

Orders continued to flow from the pen of the commanding general. All residents of Harrisburg who had recently drawn arms or ammunition from the state arsenal had the opportunity of returning them or attaching themselves to a military organization. Severe punishment awaited those who sold government supplies to civilians. General Order #5 warned officers and men of the penalties for pillaging, disobeying orders, straggling, disrespect for private property, etc.:

If soldiers or officers fail in their duties, they shall at once be arrested and reported to these headquarters, and, besides the military punishments



GENERAL WILLIAM FARRAR SMITH
(1824 - 1903)

West Point 1845, Engineering. In 1859 he became a captain, by July 1861 he was a colonel of the 3rd Vermont Regt. 13 August 1861, Brigadier General USV., 4 July 1862, Major General USV. General Smith was called "Baldy Smith" despite his heavy thatch. His Major General's commission was rejected by the Senate and it expired 4 March 1863. Later it was affirmed.

provided, their names, with the number and designation of the regiment to which they belong, shall, as a further disgrace, be furnished to the adjutant-general of the State to which they belong.²²

Special Order #15 placed Brigadier-General W. F. Smith in command of all Department troops on the south side of the Susquehanna.²³ Special Order #16 assigned Major-General N. J. T. Dana to organize and command the militia in the Philadelphia area.²⁴

On June 15, Couch drew camp and garrison equipage, rifles, and other necessities for ten thousand men together with about two million rounds of ammunition from Philadelphia. He also succeeded in convincing Gideon Welles to send naval cannon from Philadelphia for the protection of Harrisburg.

Many of the New York troops arrived on June 20. Brigadier-Generals Charles Yates, William Hall, John Ewen and Philip S. Crooke supervised work on the side of the river opposite Harrisburg erecting forts, digging rifle-pits, felling trees and performing similar duties.

Couch then began to devote his attention to placing small units in strategic areas. An example of his stubborn resolution may be seen in the retreat of General Milroy from Harper's Ferry into Pennsylvania, where he fell under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Susquehanna. Couch issued orders for him to hold the gaps near McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania, and Hancock, Maryland, against the onthrust of the enemy. Major-General Robert C. Schenck at Baltimore, who had previously been Milroy's superior, now ordered the latter to concentrate at Harper's Ferry. Milroy was about to obey when he obtained instructions from Couch: "You will not obey the orders of any general but myself, no matter what may be his rank."²⁵ Under orders from Couch, he continued watching the rebels. Schenck then appealed to General Halleck who instructed Couch to arrest Milroy and send him to Harper's Ferry for questioning. Couch ordered Milroy to continue harassing the enemy and replied, despite Halleck's unequivocal order, simply, forcefully, and finally to the proposed arrest: "He cannot be relieved at this moment."²⁶

By the 22nd, Couch thought he could prevent a crossing of the Susquehanna from the Juniata River to the Maryland line but cautioned Stanton that his men, except for a sprinkling of veterans, were utterly raw. The New York troops looked well but had little experience and suffered from a lack of confidence in themselves. The artillery and cavalry had not seen action before. For this reason Couch did not boldly take the offensive in the Cumberland Valley. He confined his activities to harassing the enemy at Carlisle and Gettysburg while Milroy threatened to delay any advance around Bedford Springs.

Although the defense of the Susquehanna was Couch's major concern, there remained also the protection of the Pennsylvania Central Railroad westward from Harrisburg, and of the mountainous region between Altoona and Bedford. Near the latter place, of course, was Milroy whose force, supplemented by several hundred emergency men, mustered a total strength of almost 3,000. However, due to the demoralized condition of the nucleus of this detachment, which had suffered a near disaster at Winchester, Virginia, it was not so formidable as its strength would seem to indicate.

Eastward along the Juniata River, men whom Couch described as "an army of bushwhackers, commanded by ex-officers" held the mountain passes. Colonel Joseph Hawley's force of about 1,200 men at Mount Union, including the 11th and 74th New York National Guard Regiments, the 29th Pennsylvania Emergency Regiment and a company of Pennsylvania cavalry, represented another defensive focal point on the Juniata.

To guard the bridges of that part of the Northern Central Railroad which ran west of the Susquehanna, southward from Harrisburg through

Citizens digging trenches and building earthworks near Wrightsville under direction of Captain Haldeman and John Sheaff, Chief Engineer of the Philadelphia & Reading Railway Company.



York toward Baltimore, Couch, on the 26th of June, detailed the 20th Pennsylvania Emergency Regiment under Colonel William B. Thomas.


At Gettysburg, on the 26th of June, Departmental troops encountered the enemy for the first time. Colonel W. W. Jennings' 26th Pennsylvania Emergency Regiment, 743 men, which had been sent to reconnoiter at Gettysburg and "harass the enemy and, if possible, to hold the mountains there," found itself in the path of Jubal Early's division. Major G. O. Haller, Couch's aide sent to command in the area, ordered the 26th to take position and resist the enemy despite Jennings' protests. After firing a few shots from its defensive location along a branch of Marsh Creek, which crossed the Chambersburg road west of Gettysburg, the regiment withdrew and marched toward Harrisburg. However, the retreat turned into near disaster when the men were overtaken by a body of Confederate cavalry who, after about twenty minutes of fighting in which they captured most of Company B, eventually allowed the remainder of the 26th to return to Fort Washington on June 28th. This brief campaign cost the regiment 176 men captured together with most of its equipment and supplies.

The Confederates pushed on toward York on the 26th forcing Brigadier-General Joseph F. Knipe to fall back from Carlisle to a point near Harrisburg. A few days later General Early met a deputation of citizens who formally surrendered the town and agreed to a levy of \$28,000, one thousand hats, pairs of shoes and socks, and three days' supplies.

At Carlisle Barracks on the 28th General Richard Ewell spent part of the afternoon at a Confederate flag-raising ceremony while a brigade of his cavalry pressed on to reconnoitre the defenses at Harrisburg. That evening Confederate skirmishers advanced to Oyster's Point (Camp Hill) where artillery fire from Miller's Battery under General Knipe drove them back. Although many of the defenders must have thought this to be the beginning of a powerful thrust against the state capital, it actually represented only a patrol action. It was, however, the nearest and most serious demonstration against Harrisburg. Later information revealed that if the rebel cavalry unit had reported favorably, Ewell planned to move toward the state capital next day and expected to capture it by July 1.²⁷ Of course, a promising report would probably have been nullified by the threat of the movements of the Army of the Potomac and the request of Lee, dated the 28th, that Ewell move in the direction of Chambersburg.

As a result of the skirmishing, the troops in the fort for the first time began to sense the reality of war. They went into battle position at the breastworks while squads of men labored in a last minute effort to cut down trees and destroy whatever might provide cover for Confederate sharpshooters.

It is an animating sight to watch from the parapet all these various operations going on. The crackling of branches draws attention to yonder tree which comes tumbling to the ground with a crash — others follow rapidly and the axemen's blows resound on every side. On yonder knoll a company of mowers are rapidly leveling the tall wheat. Here inside the fort an artillery officer is drilling a squad in artillery firing; and there a gang of contrabands, now for the first time, very likely, receiving wages for their labor judging by the spirit they throw into their work, are putting the



(Left) Lt. Gen. Richard Stoddert Ewell, CSA, Virginia (1817-1872) West Point 1840. Commander of Lee's 2nd Corps. (Right) Major General Jubal Anderson Early, CSA, Virginia (1816-1894) West Point 1837. Attorney and Whig legislator. Ewell's 1st Division commander.


finishing touches on the ditch and parapet. Outside yonder a squad of men is tearing in pieces a twig hut which workmen have built for their tools.²⁸


At the same time Ewell was in the vicinity of Carlisle and Harrisburg, General Early dispatched General John Brown Gordon with about 2500 men to attempt the capture of the Susquehanna bridge between Columbia and Wrightsville.

The work of defending this important structure had been proceeding for some time. On June 19th the Lancaster **Daily Evening Express** reported that a company, composed largely of Franklin and Marshall College students, had reached Columbia. After being supplied with twenty rounds of ammunition per man, they crossed the river at 2:00 P.M. where they saw men engaged in constructing a semi-circular breastworks. By June 20th there were over 600 militia at Wrightsville and vicinity and by the 22nd a series of entrenchments commanded the valley leading to Wrightsville.

On the Columbia side, Captain W. G. Case superintended the building of extensive works. Part of these defenses was of solid masonry containing positions for two heavy guns and part was composed of heavy timber and earth. Citizens and militia held an ox barbecue, raised a flag, and listened to several orations in honor of these fortifications.

A small conflict at Wrightsville began about 6:30 P.M. on the 28th. Colonel Jacob G. Frick's 27th Pennsylvania Emergency Regiment increased its strength with the addition of three companies of Colonel Thomas' 20th Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel William H. Siddle (Thomas







Colonel Jacob G. Frick, USA, of Pottsville, Pa., was the commander of the 27th Pennsylvania Emergency Volunteers. He was assigned the defense of the Wrightsville - Columbia bridge and surrounding area by General Couch.



Brigadier General John Brown Gordon, CSA, Georgia (1832-1904) University of Georgia. He entered the Confederate service as an infantry captain, and rose to the rank of major general, commanding the 2nd Corps and one wing of Lee's army at Appomattox. At the Pa. invasion, Gen. Gordon was commander of Early's advance brigade. After the war he resumed the practice of law, and served as Governor of Georgia (1886-1890) and U. S. Senator (1872-1880) (1891-1897).


had gone toward Harrisburg with the remainder); the City Troop of Philadelphia; four companies of men, three white and one colored, from Columbia; a detachment of convalescent soldiers from the hospital at York; and several other men unattached to any particular command. In all, Frick's command consisted of about 1500 men.

At Wrightsville Colonel Frick placed the 27th Regiment in the center trenches, the garrison from York in the left trenches, and the three companies of the 20th Regiment on the right. The militia had, of course, prepared the old covered bridge for demolition. The structure, a mile and a quarter long and built of wood on stone pillars, would have been an extremely valuable prize. It contained a railroad track, a passageway for wagons and carts, and a towpath for the canal. General Early revealed that he hoped to cross over, cut the Pennsylvania Central Railroad, march on Lancaster and levy supplies, and then attack Harrisburg from the rear while it was being assaulted in the front by Ewell.

Since Colonel Frick's numerical weakness prevented him from occupying and fortifying the heights flanking his entrenchments, General Gordon placed an artillery battery on the high ground on the Federal right and two other guns opposite the Union center. Therefore, after holding the enemy about forty-five minutes, Frick ordered a retreat to maintain contact with the bridge and avert the catastrophe of a flanking movement. With a loss of nine wounded and eighteen men of the 20th Regiment captured, an orderly withdrawal across the bridge was achieved — using to advantage a line of coal cars drawn across the entrance to the bridge.

After the troops retreated across the bridge, a few men set fire to the

View of the Columbia bridge being burned. It is thought by some historians that the foreground shows the Wrightsville end of the bridge.



structure when dynamite had failed to destroy it effectively. The enemy column turned back. To the credit of the Confederates, when the fire threatened to endanger Wrightsville, two rebel regiments formed a bucket brigade and saved the small town from catastrophe.²⁹ An observer described what must have certainly been a spectacular event:

... the scene was magnificent. Some of the arches remained stationary even when the timbers were in flames, seeming like a fiery skeleton bridge whose reflection was pictured in the water beneath. The moon was bright, and the blue clouds afforded the best contrast possible to the red glare of the conflagration. The light in the heavens must have been seen for miles. Some of the timbers as they fell into the stream seemed to form themselves into rafts, which floated down like infernal fiery boats of the region pictured by Dante.³⁰

By the 29th Couch was still in possession of the region from Altoona, along the Juniata and Susquehanna to the Conowingo bridge. However, he continued to express his fear that his force of about sixteen thousand men could be whipped by five thousand of Lee's veterans in an open battle.

Halleck had, by this time, ordered Couch to place himself under the direction of Meade and to hold the Susquehanna at any price until Meade could bring about a general engagement. Under these tense conditions Couch feared that Lee would cross the river and ordered the Assistant Quarter-master-General to gather turpentine, tar, shavings, and other combustibles in order that the Harrisburg bridge could be fired quickly. Thus, the Confederates would be forced to ford the river if they intended to cross.

Meade indicated the prime importance of Couch's position in a message to Halleck: "If Lee is crossing the Susquehanna, I shall rely on Couch holding him until I can fall upon his rear and give him battle."³¹ It is interesting to consider what might have occurred if this supposition had become reality. It is true that the men in the fortifications across the river from Harrisburg under General "Baldy" Smith were not in an open field, since extensive earthworks afforded good protection; that they might have made a strong stand from such a position and that, as a last resort, they could destroy the bridge. On the other hand, Couch's raw troops at Fort Washington, about 9,000, were likely to be overpowered and outflanked by the 15,000 Confederates he estimated to be in and around Carlisle. Also the river was easily fordable both above and below the bridges. Perhaps it was fortunate that the Confederates never had an opportunity to test the ability of these inexperienced troops.

Since the battle of Gettysburg had already begun, Meade no longer placed priority on the defense of the Susquehanna. Both he and Halleck received from Couch the news of the concentration of enemy troops toward Gettysburg. Both telegraphed Couch on July 1st to threaten Ewell's rear, if possible, providing he could keep his line of retreat toward Harrisburg open. Halleck put little faith in the Corps of the Susquehanna in an emergency.

During the first fateful days of July, Couch formed two divisions from the troops at his disposal. W. F. Smith's First Division included eleven New York National Guard regiments, five Pennsylvania emergency infan-

try regiments, two companies of Pennsylvania emergency cavalry, and two batteries of Pennsylvania artillery. General Dana, recalled from Philadelphia, commanded the Second Division which comprised two New York National Guard regiments, fifteen Pennsylvania emergency regiments, a battery of regular artillery, and a New York National Guard battery. Smith's division numbered about 7,000; Dana's over 12,000; and several units remained unassigned.

General Smith was already enroute from Harrisburg to Carlisle on the 1st with several New York regiments. Although he lost valuable time due to lack of transportation and to the refusal of the 11th New York Artillery to march (this unit declined to be used as infantry), he eventually reached Carlisle in spite of the wearisome march of eighteen miles for the unhardened troops.

The weather was very warm; the men marched with their knapsacks packed, their blankets rolled, their haversacks supplied with two days' rations, and their cartridge-boxes with forty rounds. They suffered greatly from this first march, and were compelled to leave their knapsacks and many other things that were afterward much needed.³²

The chronicler of the 23rd New York National Guard Regiment emphasized the effect of fatigue due to the concentrated marching orders of General Smith on the 1st of July. After only an hour of marching,

Some being exhausted were relieved of a part of their load by officers, or by comrades who were stronger; field and staff officers in several instances gave up their horses to the overworked ones; while other riders picked up knapsacks and blankets before them and behind them till they were almost sandwiched out of sight.³³

Probably one reason for the exhaustion of these green troops was the unfamiliar weight each carried on his back:³⁴

	lbs.	oz.
Musket	10	8
Belt, etc.	1	10
Forty rounds, ball cartridges	3	6
Knapsacks, packed	9	0
Haversack, containing two day's rations, with a few trifling extras	2	0
Woolen blanket	5	8
Rubber blanket	2	8
Canteen, half-filled	2	8
Overcoat	5	0
A half shelter-tent	2	0
TOTAL	44	0

Some men unwisely carried above this required minimum — extra pairs of heavy government shoes, surplus food and clothing, and an assortment of unnecessary eating utensils — and were forced to discard them along the way.

Governor Curtin continued to worry about an attack on Harrisburg especially when several enemy scouts were captured in and about the city. The following is a statement of Corporal H. C. Demming who took part in such a capture:³⁵

I was on duty in Harris Park, below the Cumberland Valley Railroad Bridge, on the night of July 1st, 1863, as one of the corporals of the sentry, stationed along the river bank. At about daybreak on the morning of the 2d, Private C. DeHart, discovered floating down the river, what he at first took to be a log. When it had floated nearly opposite his post, he thought he could see the faint outline of a man aboard what he now discovered to be a flat-boat, although it was about two hundred feet from shore. He cried "halt," but no movement was made by the man in the boat, and DeHart fired. Several of the sentries now aimed at the object, and it dropped within the flat in time to escape one or two additional shots. I immediately ran for a skiff, some distance up the bank, but it was fastened to a large rock. Sergeant Simon Gratz came to my assistance, and we succeeded in lifting the rock into the boat and pushing to the flat. There, crouched in one corner, we discovered a man, who, on seeing us, immediately sprang to his feet. He was armed, but found that resistance was useless, and after a short parley he surrendered. An examination of the flat showed that he had thrown a weight over the stern, fastened in such a manner, that upon floating down the main channel of the Susquehanna and passing over a spot where the water was not over three or four feet deep, it would drag, and the place would be noted. He was floating over the ford below the bridge, when the sentry fired, and just as the man fell to the bottom of his boat, the weight at the stern struck a shoal place and stopped flat.

He was taken to the shore, but protested against his summary arrest, and claimed to be a member of General Couch's staff. He was registered at the Jones House, Harrisburg. When captured, he had on a cavalry jacket, trimmed with orange-colored material, with a cavalry captain's straps. He surrendered to me a new hatchet and revolver, the latter carefully loaded. When searched in the office of Captain John Kay Clement, the Provost Marshal of the District, I am informed a map of the Susquehanna was found on his person, containing a number of fords of the Susquehanna, above and opposite the city. For some reason that I never could understand, he was released on the same or the next day. He was recaptured within forty-eight hours thereafter, in the act of crossing our lines to join the rebels. After his re-capture, he was sent to Fort Delaware.

On the last day of the battle of Gettysburg Halleck ordered Couch to throw everything he could into a movement against Lee's left flank. Smith already had had orders to move from Carlisle but was hindered by Confederate cavalry under Fitzhugh Lee. It was evident that his troops were not a well-oiled military machine when he notified Couch, "My ammunition has not yet come up, and I don't know if my ordnance officer knows enough to bring it."³⁶ He also believed that some of his supply wagons had deserted, making it impossible for him to move that night (July 3) until supplies had reached him. Meade telegraphed:

The sound of my guns for three days, it is taken for granted, is all the additional notice you need to come on. Should the enemy withdraw, by prompt cooperation we might destroy him. Should he overpower me, your return and defense of Harrisburg and the Susquehanna is not at all endangered.³⁷

Couch replied to the foregoing wire that he would move nine thousand men from Carlisle with the intention of striking near Cashtown. Troops in the area of McConnellsburg had orders to harass the enemy and a detachment of the 1st New York Cavalry scouted near Chambersburg. To one general who requested instructions about supplies, Couch exploded:

An order was given to take rations last night. Do troops want me to tell them to breathe? Always have rations in your haversacks. You want no buggy; you are going in the mountains for a few days. Beef-cattle go forward. Now is the time to aid your country. Let trifles go; march.³⁸



(Left) General Robert Edward Lee, CSA (1807-1870) West Point 1829. Commander of the Army of Northern Virginia during Pa. invasion. (Right) General George Gordon Meade, USA (1815-1872) West Point 1830. Appointed Commander of Army of the Potomac during Pa. invasion.

That officer started forward, bewildered, without any supplies or knowledge of the route. Couch's "beef-cattle" never reached him. "We were left to our own resources in a country which had been overrun and exhausted by the rebel forces."³⁹ After stragglers had notified him of the battle at Gettysburg while his men huddled in a barn during a rainstorm, he decided to march in that direction.

Stanton expressed his displeasure at the slow-moving troops: "The delay of General Couch in not pushing Smith forward with more promptness to co-operate with Meade has occasioned some disappointment here. I hope it is susceptible of satisfactory explanation."⁴⁰

Couch explained he was doing everything in his power to hurry Smith along; however, heavy rains had raised the streams in the mountains between Carlisle and Gettysburg and cut his force in two. A large part would be unable to proceed beyond Carlisle immediately. Nevertheless, he expected Smith to strike Lee's flank near Cashtown with the New York militia. Smith later stated that if he had been two days earlier and had succeeded in putting himself between Lee and the river, he would have done Meade a great service even though he knew his militia would have been roughly handled.⁴¹

The 1st New York Cavalry attacked Lee's wagon train near Greencastle on July 5th and captured 653 prisoners, 100 wagons, 300 horses and mules, and one piece of artillery.⁴²

General Meade informed Couch on the 6th that if Lee were slowed sufficiently by bad road conditions and rising streams, he might have the opportunity of attacking him. If this should happen, he hoped that Smith might be of assistance either by directly reinforcing him, or by demonstrating on Lee's flanks. He believed that Lee had suffered sufficiently at Gettysburg to nullify the possibility of any attack against Harrisburg; therefore, it was reasonably safe to send Smith forward.

Couch, still anxious to maintain strength along the Susquehanna, was against the plan of direct reinforcement unless Lee were in full retreat. He pointed out that of Smith's nearly ten thousand men, nearly one-half were so worthless that two thousand cavalymen with a battery could capture the whole party. He continued to enumerate other glaring weaknesses in his defense:

I have 2,000 men here; 500 that ran so rapidly from Gettysburg, much demoralized, and 1 regiment of New York troops that won't march; 3,000 men nearly equipped, and probably 5,000 at Reading are being equipped. Between Bedford and Milroy's men (Mercersburg) there may be 4,000, 1,500 of whom are reported by the commander as utterly worthless. I have about 1,000 men that I did not march, having been demoralized at York.⁴³

Although Lee lost few men at the hands of the Corps of the Susquehanna, he did find them to be a definite nuisance. He told Jefferson Davis on the 7th that since Meade's position was too strong to be carried, and he was prohibited from collecting necessary supplies for the army

**GENERAL
JOHN DANIEL IMBODEN,
CSA
(1823-1895)**

Washington College. Attorney and Virginia legislator. Brigadier General of Jeb Stuart's Cavalry. General Imboden was born of Pa. German parents. In addition to being a courageous cavalry officer, he was one of the most gifted of the military writers. General Imboden, with 2000 cavalry, successfully guarded and escorted 17 miles of wagons carrying the Southern wounded back home from Gettysburg, and across the swollen Potomac.



"by the numerous bodies of local and other troops which watched the passes," he determined to retire.⁴⁴

On the 7th, Lee's position seemed to be precarious. Department of the Susquehanna scouts reported the Potomac bankfull at Williamsport, Maryland, and that Lee's main army had not crossed. The Confederates had only two flatboats at their disposal and were ferrying wagons and troops very slowly. Couch advised Meade that he was throwing troops as rapidly as possible down the valley in anticipation of trapping Lee, that he would send five thousand mounted men from Bedford on the Confederate flank if they should decide to go further west to make a crossing, and that Smith was hurrying toward Waynesborough. The latter expressed doubt, however, that the New York militia would march into Maryland since their service was soon completed.

Colonel Thomas' report of regiments being formed in Carlisle and Reading for service in chasing Lee brought a sharp message from Lincoln in reply:

The forces you speak of will be of no imaginable service if they cannot go forward with a little more expedition. Lee is now passing the Potomac faster than the forces you mention are passing Carlisle. Forces now beyond Carlisle to be joined by regiments still at Harrisburg, and the united force again to join Pierce, somewhere, and the whole to move down the Cumberland Valley, will, in my unprofessional opinion, be quite as likely to capture the "men in the moon" as any part of Lee's army.⁴⁵

General Smith, by this time, was so exasperated about the "incoherent mass" that represented his command that he recommended that his five brigades be distributed among the veteran regiments of the Army of the Potomac, thereby "dispersing the greenness." Two thousand had "straggled away" since he departed from Carlisle and in the short time remaining of their thirty-day period, he was completely helpless in awakening any discipline in his troops. No one heeded his suggestion.

As of July 10, the strength of the Department of the Susquehanna was distributed among several different points. General Smith, commanding the 1st Division with 7,662 men, was at Waynesborough; General Dana, in charge of the 2nd Division with 11,007 men was at Chambersburg; and Colonel Lewis B. Pierce was stationed at Loudon, Pennsylvania with about 4,000 men, making an aggregate of 25,930 troops.

By the 12th of July Meade had occupied Hagerstown still in pursuit of the enemy who were then near Williamsport on the Potomac. Smith, at that time, was at Cashtown following Meade. He was trying to cope with the very unpleasant situation in which he found himself due to the behavior of his troops and to the lack of transportation of supplies.

On the 14th Meade asked Couch to occupy Hagerstown and watch the river in order that his own men would be released from that duty. Although he had authority to do so, Meade would not order Couch's forces to join him. He did not, apparently at that time, wish to shoulder Couch's responsibility for the safety of the Susquehanna and Harrisburg.

Simon Cameron petitioned Lincoln to use his authority and order the union of the two forces since Meade would not do so. Lincoln, who was beset with the prospect of the enemy slipping away safely, retorted with a bitter remark which rankled the sensibilities of those at whom the

comment was directed: "I would give much to be relieved of the impression that Meade, Couch, Smith, and all, since the battle of Gettysburg, have striven only to get Lee over the river, without another fight." ⁴⁶

The effect was electric; Meade immediately offered to resign his command but was persuaded to hold on. An interesting note from Lincoln to Meade bearing the President's inscription, "never sent or signed," reveals his anxious mood and his opinion of the activities of Meade, Couch, and Smith:

I have just seen your dispatch to General Halleck, asking to be relieved of your command, because of a supposed censure of mine. I am very - very - grateful to you for the magnificent success you gave the cause of the country at Gettysburg; and I am sorry now to be the author of the slightest pain to you. But I was in such deep distress myself that I could not restrain some expression of it. I had been oppressed nearly ever since the battles at Gettysburg, by what appeared to be evidences that yourself, and General Couch, and General Smith, were not seeking a collision with the enemy, but were trying to get him across the river without another battle. What these evidences were, if you please, I hope to tell you at some time, when we shall both feel better. The case, summarily stated, is this. You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg; and, of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated; and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him; till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him. You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg; while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit; and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at his leisure, without attacking him. And Couch and Smith! The latter left Carlisle in time, upon all ordinary calculation, to have aided you in the last battle at Gettysburg, but he did not arrive. At the end of more than ten days, I believe twelve, under constant urging, he reached Hagerstown from Carlisle, which is not an inch over fifty-five miles, if so much. And Couch's movement was very little different.⁴⁷

It is true that Smith had not pressed Lee closely; however, very little could have been expected under the unfavorable circumstances especially when previous training of his troops was, for all practical purposes, nil. One of Smith's subordinates summed up the difficulties of campaigning in July:

The command in fifteen days were marched over 100 miles, most of the time in the rain, without proper clothing or shoes for many of the men, with scarcely half the ordinary rations of soldiers, and those irregularly supplied. With little or no covering at night, not even blankets or shelter tents, it is not to be wondered at that many have suffered and that others have died from sickness contracted in this short campaign; . . .⁴⁸

The remainder of Smith's troops continued to watch over Hagerstown and protect the line of the Potomac. The Pennsylvania militia continued to make matters unpleasant for their commander. Dispatches to Couch were so frequent describing the refusal of men to go on picket duty, inability of regimental commanders to enforce orders, the dissatisfaction on the part of the men generally with being held in detention in Maryland after the threat to Pennsylvania had ceased, and their general clamor to be released from service, that Couch, on one occasion, cautioned Smith to avoid a mutiny.

During the retreat of Lee from Gettysburg, many militia units performed sundry non-combatant duties. The 36th Pennsylvania Emergency Regiment under Colonel H. C. Alleman gathered abandoned equipment around Gettysburg for future use by the Union army, searched for any remaining wounded and collected stragglers from both armies. The 36th picked up "26,664 muskets, 9,250 bayonets, 1,500 cartridge-boxes, 204 sabres, 14,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 26 artillery wheels, 702 blankets, 40 wagon loads of clothing, 60 saddles, 60 bridles, 5 wagons, 510 horses and mules, and 6 wagon loads of knapsacks and haversacks." ⁴⁹ It also collected from the various corps and field hospitals on the battlefield, and in the surrounding country, "12,061 wounded Union soldiers, 6,197 wounded rebels, 3,006 rebel prisoners, and 1,637 stragglers." ⁵⁰ These casualties were sent to various northern cities.

Governor Curtin was one of the first to urge the mustering out of emergency volunteers according to the original agreement:

. . . You will remember that I pledged my faith to the men enlisted for the emergency, to return them to their homes so soon, as, in my judgment, it has ceased to exist, and that a telegram from the Secretary of War was received confirming that authority. Many of the regiments called into service for the emergency and for three months, are very desirous to return to their homes, and in some parts of the State the interests in which they are engaged are suffering from their absence. In some instances, the men called into this service are receiving wages from their employers, whilst the furnaces, workshops and mines in which they were employed are standing idle, and in many of the agricultural counties of the State the presence of the men is important to both private and public interests . . . ⁵¹

He continued to protest against holding men in the Corps of the Susquehanna now that the emergency had ended. He rejected Stanton's request to order emergency troops to discontented areas in Pennsylvania to enforce the regular draft and maintain order, and he pointed out that the President had himself declared the emergency over. Therefore, Curtin said the emergency troops must be discharged.

Since the United States Government had not yet offered to pay the emergency men, Curtin had to borrow money from Philadelphia banks. Therefore, he argued, he had no right to use this money for any other purpose than paying troops engaged in defense of the state against a rebel invasion since this was a stipulation of the loan from the banks. In a message to the state legislature in 1864 he stated that he had to spend about half of the \$700,000 raised to pay troops serving during the emergency for paying those detained by the Government for the purpose of enforcing the draft.⁵²

Appeals from Pennsylvania citizens begging and demanding that Curtin adhere to his promises made in June were frequent:

Immediately on the appearance of your Proclamation calling for the militia to repel a rebel invasion of our State then threatened, the works of my firm (W. Sellers & Co. of Philadelphia) were closed — we devoting ourselves to the object of your call.

By written notice posted conspicuously we offered our men in addition to the Government pay a bounty of \$20.00 each, and \$13.00 per month during the time of service — until honorable discharge which we assured

them would be granted as soon as the emergency for which they enlisted had passed away . . .

. . . I therefore suppose there can be no objection to the immediate discharge of these men. They comprise Company "C" of the Corn Exchange Regiment⁵³

Mr. Sellers also pointed out that his plant was engaged in making "mechanical tools" for arsenals and armories and that he had suspended the work of assembling heavy gun carriages due to lack of manpower.

A letter from Davis Pearson, John Rommel, and W. H. White, officials in the Philadelphia coal trade, contained the same type of request:

Understanding that the Rebel army have retreated to the Rappahannock and that there is no probability of their again, if ever, trying their dear experiment of invading our glorious old State, and as the Army of the Potomac is being daily increased in strength, by volunteers, conscripts and substitutes, and as the necessity appears to have passed by, for any longer keeping the Militia on our frontiers — we respectfully ask that you return the two Coal Regiments to our City, Philadelphia, and have them mustered out of the service, and paid off⁵⁴

In August Brigadier-General B. F. Kelley, commander of the new Department of West Virginia, relieved Couch from the duty of guarding the Potomac and within a few weeks the majority of the Army Corps of the Susquehanna were mustered out. Probably, General Smith, after all his unpleasant experiences, heaved a quiet sigh of relief.

During the remainder of 1863 Couch studied the rumors and possibilities of enemy troop movements toward the Mason and Dixon Line. However, the Confederacy had no serious plans for attacking Pennsylvania; the tactical phase of the history of the Department ended — the bloodless campaign was over.

CHAPTER V

THE DEPARTMENT IN 1864

In 1864 General Couch once again joined Governor Curtin in organizing a voluntary group of militia for the defense of Pennsylvania soil from rebel invaders. On July 4, 1864, Stanton warned Couch that a Confederate force had appeared in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry and might attempt an extended raid into Pennsylvania. The Secretary advised Couch to confer with the state authorities and take whatever measures necessary to provide an adequate defensive force. As before, Stanton pledged that the War Department would do everything possible to transport, subsist, and equip the militia raised under state authority. Stanton's communication three days later was an example of how a departmental commander's authority might expand during an emergency: "In present operations you will not restrict yourself to departmental lines, but do what is proper to be done, with the means at your command, without reference to departmental boundaries" ¹

On July 5, the War Department informed Curtin that no troops would be spared from the national armies for Pennsylvania's defense and that he would have to rely upon local militia which could be called for one hundred days or any other similar period according to his own discretion.

After urging prompt action to meet any sizable raid, Stanton, at the direction of the President, called upon Pennsylvania to supply twelve thousand militia or infantry volunteers to serve for one hundred days, unless sooner discharged, to be organized according to customary regulations into the United States service.

A circular from the Department of the Susquehanna ordered all responding to the call west of Johnstown and the Laurel Hill range of mountains to report to Camp Reynolds located near Pittsburgh; all east of that line to and including Reading were to report to Camp Curtin at Harrisburg; and those in the remainder of the state were to rendezvous at Camp Cadwalader in Philadelphia.² Colored troops were accepted for service, if commanded by white officers, and were to assemble at Camp William Penn near Philadelphia.

Again, as he had during the previous year, Curtin objected to the stipulation that the militia be mustered into the service of the United States. In a joint dispatch with General Couch he reserved the right to muster men into state service if it should be deemed expedient; however, the Secretary of War rejected the suggestion because there was no authority for paying troops not mustered into United States service.

This time, Curtin yielded and troops entered Government service for one hundred days to serve in the District of Columbia, Maryland and Pennsylvania.

General Order #38 of the Department of the Susquehanna represented a special request for one thousand mounted men for special service. Volunteers had to provide their own horses and equipment for which they would be paid forty cents per day. Horses lost in service would be replaced or reimbursement would be made.³

In early July Couch believed that results would be more favorable if he would be allowed to muster men by companies instead of waiting for regiments to form. This project also seemed doomed to failure because Stanton abruptly commented that the original way was the most efficient. "The Western Governors organized sixty thousand men in two weeks. Governor Curtin should be able to do what Governors Brough, Morton, Yates, Stone, and Lewis accomplished."⁴

However, in a few days Couch and Curtin persuaded Stanton to permit the mustering not only of cavalry by companies, since they were employed in that form for scouting, but also of artillery units providing cannon were available. But, if the latter were to be used as infantry due to lack of artillery equipment, Stanton insisted on mustering by regiment. On July 9th Stanton capitulated and authorized mustering by companies into United States service with the reservation that date of service be counted from the time such companies were formed into regiments.

In early August Curtin issued a new call for thirty thousand men. Couch reported on August 8th that according to his information not even five hundred men had responded and he was extremely doubtful if the

figure would ultimately reach three thousand. However, he reported that men had organized for home defense at York, Carlisle, Altoona, Johnstown, Harrisburg and several other important cities. Couch ordered all able-bodied citizens of Allegheny County to be enrolled, because all of Pennsylvania was now within his jurisdiction since the Department of the Monongahela had been abolished in April.

The following is a summary of troops from Pennsylvania serving during 1864:⁵

Reenlistments in old organizations for three years	17,876
Organized under special authority from the War Department for three years	9,867
Organized under the call of July 27 for one year	16,094
Organized under the call of July 6 for one hundred days	7,675
Volunteer recruits forwarded by the superintendent of the recruiting service	26,567
Drafted men and substitutes	10,651
Recruits for the regular army	2,974
Total	91,704

It would seem from the total in the table above that Couch should have had an adequate force to meet the emergency for which he received warning as early as July 4th. However, in his defense, the great majority of the 91,704 were serving with the Regular Army under Grant. Only two categories could contribute to a significant force for Couch: the calls of July 6th and 27th. Since McCausland entered Chambersburg on the 28th, the 16,094 who responded to the call of the 27th were not organized until after the raid was over and the threat of enemy invasion had subsided. Therefore, they were sent out of the state.

Concerning the call of the 6th, Curtin intended to raise 12,000, according to Lincoln's request, for duty near Washington and 10,000 more for service with Couch. The response was weak and the 7,675 who answered the call were sent on orders of the War Department to Baltimore and Washington to protect those cities against a possible raid by a sizable rebel force reported at Harper's Ferry. Thus, recruiting of volunteers for Departmental service did not even begin. Even a Provost Guard Regiment organized for duty in the Department was taken from Couch for duty with Grant.

After the burning of Chambersburg in July 1864, the daily work of the Department was usually uneventful except for the difficulties caused by continued resistance to the draft laws in Pennsylvania. According to the draft system, the Enrollment Board called from its roster of enrollees the requisite quota plus a fifty per cent overstrength to report at a designated rendezvous. After the completion of a physical examination, the Board would make its final selection. Couch often had to cope with the problem of finding the draft deserter — one who had been chosen by the Board and who, to avoid the draft, went into hiding.

Couch revealed his dilemma about upholding the draft laws in a message on July 26 to the Adjutant-General in Washington.⁶ He declared that while district provost-marshals were besieging him with requests for troops, he had none to give since the one hundred days' men were on orders for Baltimore and few volunteers were offering their services. Penn-

sylvanians were generally apathetic to all kinds of appeals and only sufficiently large bounties could overcome their aversion to military service. Leaders in several counties maintained that the draft should not apply to miners, since their vocation was necessary to the war effort; other counties soon ceased to cooperate until the draft laws could be universally enforced.

The Knights of the Golden Circle was an alleged pro-Southern secret order in the North. It originally had been organized by Dr. George Bickley, before the Civil War, for the purpose of extending slavery into Mexico and Central America. After the war began, it shifted to support of the Confederacy. Although most of its membership was confined to Indiana and southern Illinois, there were reports of the organization existing in other states.

General Couch evidently believed the Knights had begun operations in Columbia County on August 1, 1864. On that day, Lieutenant J. Stewart Robinson, assistant provost marshal in that area, rode into the Fishing Creek Valley with eight Union soldiers. Robinson was shot and killed and a number of his men were wounded. Who assaulted the squad of troops has never been satisfactorily answered; however, the shooting had important repercussions. Some citizens of Columbia County called the attack an unprovoked ambush against military personnel while others considered it an authorized challenge of innocent citizens by Robinson.

Men who mildly supported or opposed the administration were aroused and those who were charged with draft-dodging hurled back complaints of unfair enrollment. Wild rumors and reports began to circulate and eventually reached Couch's headquarters. As a result, Couch believed that the Knights of the Golden Circle had possibly begun operations in the Fishing Creek area and that there might be some truth to tales of a Confederate stronghold complete with a big brass cannon somewhere on North Mountain.

On August 13, 1864, on orders from General Couch, the first detachment of soldiers arrived in Bloomsburg, encamped on the fair grounds, and was shortly supplemented by enough reinforcements to make up a force of about one thousand men.

The presence of this force, which many citizens of Columbia County considered unwelcome, might have had a dangerous effect on the county if most of the suspicions had not been largely groundless. There were rumors of secret anti-draft meetings but evidently, if there were any, the calmer residents persuaded the most vociferous to abandon any plans of active resistance.

After a conference in Bloomsburg with some of the influential Republicans and Democrats, who assured Couch there was no fort or, indeed, no organized resistance and that ten men were sufficient to handle any possible sporadic demonstrations against the draft, General Couch appointed J. G. Freeze on August 16 to carry an offer of amnesty to any drafted men who failed to appear.⁷

Since there were no replies to this offer, Lt. Col. Stewart marched up the valley with a small force to search for delinquent men. Scouting parties sent out along the line of march made no arrests but finally on the 31st at dawn the small "army" arrested about a hundred citizens. As soon

as the original one hundred had been taken into custody, General Cadwalader, summoned from his post in Philadelphia, assumed command, searched in vain for the fort and finally returned to Bloomsburg concluding that the whole thing was a "farce!"

Couch's men questioned the prisoners at a preliminary informal hearing in a meetinghouse near Benton and forty-four were detained for further interrogation. On orders from Couch a "Military Commission," composed of four Army officers, convened in Harrisburg on October 17th. The prisoners learned they were being interned because they

. . . did unite, confederate, and combine with . . . form or unite with a society or organization commonly known and called by the name of the "Knights of the Golden Circle," the object of which society or organization was and is to resist execution of the draft, and prevent persons who have been drafted under provisions of the said act of Congress, approved March 3d, 1863, and the several supplements thereto, from entering the military service of the United States⁸

Seven were convicted of obstructing the lawful operation of the draft and received sentences up to two years. One paid a fine of five hundred dollars; one was pardoned by President Lincoln; and five were pardoned by President Johnson.

In some instances ill-humored, impatient, or harassed local provost marshals appealed directly to Washington for troops to aid in supporting draft laws since help did not seem to be forthcoming from state headquarters.⁹ Major Richard Dodge, acting assistant provost-marshal in western Pennsylvania, petitioned Washington for ten companies of men to be sent into Clearfield and Cambria Counties where, according to his information, twelve to eighteen hundred deserters and delinquent drafted men had not reported to be mustered into national service. Although he outlined detailed plans for stamping out these groups and included an additional most persuasive argument that, if not captured, they would vote for the opposition, General Halleck replied, "No troops to spare for this purpose now. Let them go till after the election."¹⁰

Schuylkill County was another troublesome sector where, according to reports received at Couch's headquarters, the Irish caused most of the difficulty. Col. T. S. Mather, Acting Assistant Inspector General of the Department of the Susquehanna, informed Department Headquarters of the report of Captain James W. Bowen, local provost marshal, who was attempting to enforce draft laws. His account of Irish activities in Ashland Township included such crimes as breaking into homes and destroying furniture, beating soldiers, insulting women and even murder:

A few evenings since they turned out in a body and paraded the streets, breaking the windows and doors of the houses. Mr. Green, superintendent of the shops at Ashland, had his house broken into and furniture destroyed. At Mahanoy City the rioters entered a house last week and wounded a man by a pistol shot, without the least provocation, insulted an old lady and her daughter, and beat a wounded soldier severely . . . trouble at Heckscherville. Meetings . . . broken up, the election interfered with, and several families driven out of the place . . . A large number of the persons who commit these outrages are men who have been drafted and who have not reported, joined with laborers at the mines. It is very difficult to catch them . . . they flee to the hills. The cavalry at Pottsville are out in detachments of six and eight almost every night . . . They are fired upon quite often by par-

ties of men who secrete themselves near the roadside or among the rocks on the sides of the hills . . .¹¹

The worst localities were Mahanoy, Cass, Ashland, Reilly, Rush and New Castle townships where Captain Bowen estimated that four or five hundred "draft-dodgers" were still at large.

Very few men drafted from Luzerne, Wyoming and Bradford Counties had reported for duty. Frequently, Departmental authorities apprehended and arrested men who evaded the draft and imprisoned them in the Department's military prison at Fort Mifflin. However, General Couch was never able to discourage completely evasion of the draft laws.

General Couch always relied most heavily on the cavalry to preserve order in the Department. In many of the sparsely settled districts infantry was of little or no use since evaders of the draft fled into wooded areas as soon as the army appeared. Toward the close of 1864, Couch had to employ nearly one hundred per cent of his mounted troops for this purpose.

In the early part of November 1864 the mayor of Erie forwarded a warning he had received from the captain of a steamer concerning the danger of rebel sympathizers coming across the border into Pennsylvania from Canada for the purpose of voting against the administration in the coming election. Couch considered this warning serious enough to accompany troops to that area and prepare for such an eventuality but on November 3rd he was able to report that all was quiet in that district.

This threat together with the approach of a general election led to the promulgation of General Order #65 from Department Headquarters:

. . . all refugees, deserters from the rebel lines, and citizens of States in rebellion, who are now within this department, or may enter it before the 8th day of November instant, shall report to the nearest district or town provost-marshal, that they may be registered, their residence and description recorded, and to receive proper certificates and passes. Persons . . . who do not comply will be regarded as spies . . .

In view of the approaching election, deserters from the army and the draft may return to their homes, and every effort must be made to arrest and hold them to the service they owe their Government . . .¹²

During the seventeen months' history of the Department of the Susquehanna, it would be an overstatement to say that its recruiting program had been a success. In spite of the enrollment of thousands of men there were many defects inherent in the plan. First of all, requests for volunteer militia accelerated only when the enemy was near the Mason and Dixon Line. Then, it was too late to draw up a comprehensive plan for enrolling troops efficiently and time did not permit an intensive training program to prepare recruits to measure up to Lee's veterans. As Couch put it, too often the Pennsylvania militia were a "raw, disorganized, undisciplined mass" of men.

Governor Curtin frequently expressed his dissatisfaction with the system and anticipated the day when he might be able to inaugurate something similar to a modern National Guard unit. He hoped to form fifteen regiments of "Minute Men" with appointed rather than elected officers, who would assemble and drill periodically, and be equipped at state expense. Such a unit, already trained and organized, would be sworn into

state service to be called into action at the discretion of its commander-in-chief, the governor.

The last opportunity for the Department of the Susquehanna to marshal its strength to thwart an enemy invasion came in July 1864. Four months earlier Couch had reassured Governor Curtin that a full-scale invasion was highly unlikely and a raid would be extremely improbable since a small party of men would run the risk of being cut off. Couch must certainly have regretted that advice in July.

Brigadier-General John McCausland's attack on Chambersburg did not come without warning. On July 4th Couch had knowledge of an enemy force, estimated to have a strength of from ten to twenty thousand, moving toward Williamsport. Two days later in Special Order #154 he declared martial law in Chambersburg and called upon all its citizens capable of bearing arms to assemble for the purpose of organizing companies to resist the approach of the enemy. He forbade all citizens to go beyond the limits of the town without a pass.¹³

In response to a request from Halleck, Couch submitted a report of his strength on July 28, one day before the burning of Chambersburg. He listed sixty infantrymen, forty cavalry, and two guns in the vicinity of Chambersburg; two sections of artillery and forty infantrymen at Harrisburg; one cavalry company in the Lehigh District; forty independent and unpaid horsemen near Emmitsburg; twelve companies of Veteran Reserves guarding hospitals at Petersburg, York, and Philadelphia; a Provost Guard at Philadelphia; one company of veterans at Pittsburgh; eighty men at Carlisle; and six companies, one-hundred days' men, between Harrisburg and Pittsburgh.¹⁴

It seems difficult to comprehend how the commander of a department, whose border had been raided several times in the past, who knew of the enemy's advance, could have failed to arrange for a protecting force. Several points may be made in his defense: he had organized a Provost Guard Regiment, twelve-hundred men, for duty near the border but the War Department ordered it to the support of General Grant after the battle of the Wilderness; he formed six regiments of one-hundred days' men who were ordered by the War Department to Washington shortly before the attack on Chambersburg on July 29; Curtin had offered to call for volunteers to be armed and paid by the state if the Government would furnish uniforms — this was declined; and a cavalry unit, six-months' men intended for border defense, joined the Army of the Potomac on orders from Washington. Thus, there remained with Couch a company of cavalry slightly in excess of one hundred men to defend Chambersburg.

When General McCausland drew near, Couch attempted to solicit the aid of Brigadier-General William W. Averill, of the Department of West Virginia, who had encamped near Greencastle, ten miles away. This message was sent at 3:00 A.M. on the 30th. Couch sent two more messages but received no reply. Averill later said he received no word of the plight of Couch until 3:45 A.M. The telegraph operator at Greencastle, Thomas R. Bard, receiving no reply from Averill and anticipating no other wires from Chambersburg, set out to deliver the messages himself. He found the general asleep. After Bard fulfilled his obligation, Averill, "without

rising to put his troops in motion, or without the slightest manifestation of interest in the condition of General Couch . . . merely said, 'Tell Couch I will be there in the morning.'"¹⁵ It was then about 4:00 A.M.

Meanwhile Couch with fifty-nine men yielded the town in the face of twenty-six hundred of the enemy. The Confederates entered Chambersburg, with approximately four hundred men at 5:30 A.M.

The Confederates later arrested several of the leading citizens and demanded a ransom of \$100,000 in gold or \$500,000 in currency. Because the citizens did not meet this demand, the Southerners burned and destroyed most of the town. At about 11:00 A.M. McCausland withdrew toward McConnellsburg; Averill arrived from the direction of Fayetteville at 2:00 P.M.

Because of this unhappy episode, Couch faced some of the most scathing criticism during his tenure as commander of the Department. Cameron petitioned Lincoln to ". . . send us a general fit to command, and we will take care of ourselves."¹⁶

The Harrisburg Committee of Safety of which Cameron was a member wrote Stanton that:

. . . We unanimously consider that the interests of the service and safety of this place and of the Cumberland Valley require that General Cadwalader or some other efficient officer be placed in command of this department immediately. The people will organize for defense under the command of an officer in whom they have confidence.¹⁷

Secretary Stanton calmly reminded Cameron that the decision for removing Couch was Lincoln's and tried to relieve his concern for the safety of Harrisburg by sending Cadwalader from Philadelphia to that city. In a few days after the enemy threat had passed, Cadwalader returned to his former post at Couch's request.

The Department of the Susquehanna devoted most of its attention during the remainder of 1864 to avoiding a repetition of the Chambersburg fiasco. Circulars sent from headquarters at Harrisburg to the southern tier of counties asked citizens to fortify the roads leading over the mountains or through passes and advised inhabitants of these areas to form units of local armed militia which would be supplied from Department Headquarters. Couch advised them not to resist passively but to fire on the enemy from forests, thickets, buildings, cornfields, and any other form of cover.

Fortunately no serious raid occurred. Couch freely admitted that there was little protection for the rich agricultural area between Hagerstown and Shippensburg. The only evidence of rebel activity in the Department was the capture of several Confederate spies. General Sheridan had a few words to say to Couch concerning treatment of spies: ". . . If you have arrested spies, hang them; if you are in doubt, hang them anyway. The sooner such characters are killed off the better it will be for the community."¹⁸

On November 9, 1864, Couch was able to notify Halleck: "This department is perfectly quiet. I would like to take my leave granted October 17th."¹⁹ It was approved and later, on November 23rd, Special Order #414 of the War Department relieved him from command and assigned him to the Department of the Cumberland for duty.

On December 1st, he issued his last General Order (#74) as head of the Department of the Susquehanna:

. . . I hereby relinquish command of the Department of the Susquehanna.

In so doing I desire to express my sincere thanks to the officers in charge of the several staff departments and those in command of districts and posts for the able and satisfactory manner in which they have discharged their duties, and to the chief executive of the State, the heads of the different State departments, and to the citizens generally, for their hearty cooperation in my endeavors to maintain law and order, and their cordial support to the measures adopted for their protection.²⁰

On December 7th General Order #293 of the War Department terminated the existence of the Department of the Susquehanna. It was thereafter known as the Department of Pennsylvania.

CONCLUSION

The Department of the Susquehanna made a significant contribution to the defense of Pennsylvania during the Civil War and, in spite of much unjust criticism, its achievements were sufficient to justify its existence. General Couch, a capable and efficient military leader, rendered excellent service in his capacity as commander of the Department.

The Department cooperated with the national government and with Governor Curtin in recruiting a military force for the federal campaigns and for the defense of the Commonwealth. Although confronted by formidable obstacles, Couch succeeded in persuading both Stanton and Curtin to resolve their differences concerning terms and methods of enlistments so that results could be obtained as quickly as possible.

Perhaps, in what constituted its most important service, the scouts under Couch's command were the eyes of the Army of the Potomac and the War Department during Lee's advance toward Pennsylvania. They passed along much vital information, with a high percentage of accuracy, to a stronger, more efficient force.

Although very few of the entire militia force fired a shot in earnest even though a large enemy army maneuvered within a few miles of Harrisburg, Departmental troops performed various other duties which were also important to the war effort. Cavalry units either hired horses and bought cattle for Departmental use or ordered farmers to drive them across the Susquehanna and into mountainous districts beyond the reach of Confederate foraging details. Lee himself admitted that he could not satisfactorily gather supplies and thus could not remain in Pennsylvania after Gettysburg because of local troops guarding the passes. During the unhappy days of late July, Meade could assign the problem of guarding railroad lines, hospitals, and prisoners to General Couch and use his own veterans in pursuing Lee. Other militia, dispersed throughout the state, assisted provost marshals in upholding the draft laws. Although there was a lack of cooperation in the draft, in some cases its seriousness was over-emphasized.

Finally, the Department gave Meade the opportunity to divert most of his attention and much of his own army away from the problem of guarding the Susquehanna for several hundred miles in order to concentrate on the main body of the enemy. It is pure conjecture to imagine what might have happened had not the bridges at Harrisburg been strongly guarded and the Columbia Bridge been burned but it is reasonably certain from Early's dispatches that, otherwise, the Susquehanna would have been crossed. With the enemy on the north side of that river, Gettysburg might never have occupied its lofty niche in the annals of American military history.

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APPENDIX I

STRENGTH REPORTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE SUEQUEHANNA

Abstract from the returns of the Department of the Susquehanna for June 20, 1863:¹

	Aggregate Present	Aggregate Present and Absent
General Headquarters	9	9
Harrisburg	490	716
Philadelphia	403	519
York	419	428
Total	1321	1672

Abstract for June 30, 1863:²

General Headquarters	11	11
Bloody Run	2855	3273
Camp Curtin	1304	1304
Fenwick	1200	1219
Mount Union	1174	1730
Philadelphia	194	228
York	1113	1118
Waynesborough	6845	7490
Invalid Corps	340	636
Total	15,036	17,009

Abstract for July 10 (Does not account for seventeen regiments of Pennsylvania Militia):³

General Headquarters	12	12
Bainbridge	939	1003
Camp Curtin	3338	3711
Fenwick	1135	1206
Harrisburg	2351	3195
Huntingdon	1612	1659
Loudon	2373	3199
Mount Union	1174	1332
Philadelphia	277	1388
York	399	412
1st Division (Smith)	7593	8271
Total	21,203	25,388

Abstract for the month of July:⁴

General Headquarters	8	8
Carlisle Barracks	230	252
Chambersburg	1753	2194
Hagerstown	8093	9383
Harrisburg	4632	4709
Hopewell	1036	1147
Maryland Heights	5242	6163
Philadelphia	3513	4906
Pottsville	1016	1109
Reading	6522	6635
Scranton	1509	1560
York	78	88
Total	33,632	38,154

	Aggregate Present	Aggregate Present and Absent
Abstract for the month of August: ⁵		
General Headquarters	11	11
Carlisle Barracks	287	310
Gettysburg	140	186
Harrisburg	108	666
Philadelphia	1202	2013
Reading	9191	9968
York	1059	1204
Total	11,998	14,358
Abstract for the month of December, 1863: ⁶		
Department staff	9	9
Philadelphia	708	780
Reading	680	771
Harrisburg	2144	2318
Chambersburg	189	198
Gettysburg		
York	85	88
Harrisburg commissaries of subsistence	8	8
Total	3823	4172
Abstract for the month of May, 1864: ⁷		
General Headquarters	9	9
Philadelphia	275	828
Pottsville	3	3
Harrisburg	152	152
Pittsburgh	16	23
Chelton Hill	395	444
Total	850	1459
Abstract for the month of June, 1864: ⁸		
General Headquarters	9	9
Philadelphia	228	857
Pottsville	3	3
Harrisburg	218	248
Pittsburgh	13	20
Chelton Hill	629	689
Total	1100	1826
Abstract for the month of July, 1864: ⁹		
General Headquarters	9	9
Chambersburg	24	98
Chelton Hill	83	84
Greencastle	86	100
Harrisburg	255	401
Philadelphia	658	873
Pittsburgh	12	19
Pottsville	2	2
Total	1129	1586
Abstract for the month of September, 1864: ¹⁰		
Staff and infantry	1132	2580
Cavalry	392	461
Artillery	197	299
Detachment of Signal Corps	60	69
Total	1781	3409

	Aggregate Present	Aggregate Present and Absent
Abstract for the month of November, 1864: ¹¹		
Staff and infantry	1094	1677
Cavalry	82	123
Artillery	113	203
Detachment of Signal Corps	61	70
Total	1350	2073

APPENDIX II

TROOP DISTRIBUTION, JULY 10, 1863

The following report¹² is included to illustrate the distribution of Couch's troops on July 10, 1863 during the retreat of Lee. Although it is nearly complete it does not account for several independent organizations and the following militia regiments: the 34th and 59th on duty at Philadelphia; the 36th at Gettysburg; the 48th and 53rd at Reading; the 51st and 52nd at Chambersburg; and the 60th, unattached.

Bainbridge, Pa. (Col. W. B. Thomas)
20th Penna. Militia

Camp Curtin, Pa. (Col. J. A. Beaver)
67th New York Nat'l. Guard
37th Penna. Militia
44th do.
47th do.
49th do.
50th do.
4th New York Nat'l Guard Arty. (one company)
Three Penna. Batteries
One Provost Battalion (five companies)

Fenwick, Pa. (Brig. Gen. C. Yates)
5th New York Nat'l Guard
12th do.

Harrisburg, Pa. (Brig. Gen. W. Hall)
Three companies New Jersey Militia
4th New York Nat'l Guard Arty. (four companies)
8th do. (Company I)
One company of Penna. Militia
26th Penna. Militia
Philadelphia Union Btty.
U. S. Veteran Reserve Corps (detachment)
4th New York Nat'l Guard Arty. (three companies)
One New York Battery.
Anderson Troop (cavalry)
Chester County Troop do.
Curtin Horse Guards do.
Harrisburg City Troop, do.
Johnstown Troop
Lancaster Troop
Lancaster City Troop
Luzerne Rangers
Russell Light Cavalry
Wissahickon Cavalry

Huntingdon, Pa. (Col. Nelson Miles)
29th Penna. Militia (five companies)
46th do.
Penna. Militia (seven unattached companies)
Penna. Cavalry Company

Loudon, Pa. (Col. Lewis Pierce)

18th Conn.

5th Md., Co. D.

1st New York Cavalry (detachment)

116th Ohio

122nd Ohio, Company D

123rd Ohio, Company D

12th Penna. Cavalry

87th Penna.

1st West Va. Cavalry, Company K

3rd West Va. Cavalry, Companies D and E

12th West Va. Infantry

1st West Va. Artillery, Company D (detachment)

Mount Union, Pa. (Col. Joseph Hawley)

65th New York Nat'l. Guard

74th do.

29th Penna. Militia

Penna. Cavalry Company

Philadelphia, Pa. (Maj. Gen. N. J. T. Dana)

19th Penna. Cavalry

Penna. Militia (one company)

Provost-Guard (Companies A, B, and C)

York, Pa. (Capt. T. S. McGowan)

Patapsco (Maryland) Guards

The following organizations were near Hagerstown attempting to join Meade:

First Division (Brig. Gen. W. F. Smith)

First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Knipe)

8th New York Nat'l. Guard

71st do.

Second Brigade (Brig. Gen. Cooke)

13th New York Nat'l. Guard

28th do.

Third Brigade (Brig. Gen. Smith)

23rd New York Nat'l Guard

52nd do.

56th do.

Fourth Brigade (Brig. Gen. Ewen)

11th New York Nat'l. Guard

22nd do.

37th do.

Fifth Brigade (Col. Brisbane)

68th New York Nat'l Guard

28th Penna. Militia

32nd do.

33rd do.

Sixth Brigade (Col. Frick)

27th Penna. Militia

31st do.

Penna. Cavalry (two companies)

Penna. Artillery (two batteries)

Second Division (Maj. Gen. N. J. T. Dana, as of July 13)

First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Yates)

5th New York Nat'l Guard

12th do.

20th Penna. Militia

26th do.

35th do.

45th do.
 5th U.S. Artillery
 Second Brigade (Col. James Nagle)
 30th Penna. Militia
 37th do.
 38th do.
 39th do.
 41st do.
 New York Nat'l. Guard Battery
 Third Brigade (Col. Franklin)
 40th Penna. Militia
 42nd do.
 43rd do.
 44th do.
 47th do.
 50th do.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

THE FORMATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE SUSQUEHANNA

1. U. S. War Department, *War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, XXVII, Part III, 55. (Hereafter cited as O.R.)
2. Frederick Phisterer, *Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883), p. 26.
3. Became part of the Department of the Susquehanna after April 6, 1864.
4. Edward S. Farrow, *Farrow's Military Encyclopaedia* (New York: Military - Naval Publishing Co., 1895), I, 759.
5. In spite of almost universal approval of Couch, there was at least one dissenting opinion registered by the *Harrisburg Patriot and Union* on June 15, 1863: "We should like to know which of President Lincoln's military commanders is our master? As we subject to arrest by Schenck, Couch, or Brooks, or all of them?"
6. Couch to Brig. Gen. S. Williams, O. R., *op. cit.*, XXV, Part II, 93.

CHAPTER II

BUILDING THE ARMY CORPS OF THE SUSQUEHANNA

1. Frank H. Taylor, *Philadelphia in the Civil War* (Philadelphia: Dunlap Printing Co., 1913), p. 268.
2. Couch's report to War Department, July 11, 1863, of Departmental activities from June 11 to July 5, O. R., *op. cit.*, XXVII, Part II, 211.
3. General Order #1, Department of the Susquehanna, O. R., *op. cit.*, Part III, 68-69.
4. *Ibid.*, 79-80.
5. Curtin to Stanton, *Ibid.*, 76.
6. *Ibid.*, 76-77.
7. *Ibid.*, Part II, 217.
8. Stanton to Couch, *Ibid.*, Part III, 185.
9. *Ibid.*, 1077.
10. *Ibid.*, 140.
11. *Ibid.*, 142.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, 143
14. *Ibid.*, 144.
15. Couch to War Department, *Ibid.*, 212.
16. Parker to Curtin, *Ibid.*, 1078.

17. Curtin to Parker, **Ibid.**, 1079.
18. Parker to Curtin, **Ibid.**, 1080-81.
19. Curtin to Parker, **Ibid.**, 1081.
20. **Ibid.**, 347-48.
21. **Ibid.**, Series III, III, 217-18
22. Couch to Stanton, **Ibid.**, Series I, XXVII, Part III, 408.
23. Stanton to Fry, **Ibid.**, Series III, III, 458.
24. **Daily Evening Bulletin** (Philadelphia), June 16, 1863.
25. **Ibid.**, June 18, 1863.
26. **Ibid.**, June 17, 1863.
27. Samuel P. Bates, **History of Pennsylvania Volunteers** (Harrisburg: B. Singerly, State Printer, 1871), V, 1224-25.
28. William H. Egle, **History of the Counties of Dauphin and Lebanon** (Philadelphia: Everts & Peck, 1883), pp. 144-45.
29. Couch to J. B. Fry, **O. R.**, loc. cit., 629.
30. Pennsylvania, Governor, **Executive Correspondence** (Harrisburg: State Museum and Historical Commission, 1863), I, 235.
31. William H. Egle, **An Illustrated History of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania** (Harrisburg: DeWitt Goodrich & Co., 1876), p. 270.

CHAPTER III

SCOUTING AGAINST LEE

1. Stanton to Couch, **O. R.**, op. cit., Series I, LI, 1059.
2. Couch to Stanton, **Ibid.**, XXVII, Part III, 129.
3. Couch to Stanton, **Ibid.**, 162-63.
4. Lincoln to Couch, **Ibid.**, 295.
5. William R. Plum, **The Military Telegraph during the Civil War** (Chicago: Jansen, McClurg & Co., 1882), II, 16.
6. Kenneth P. Williams, **Lincoln Finds a General** (New York: The MacMillan Co., II, 679.
7. Cameron to Lincoln, **O. R.**, loc. cit., 409.
8. Roy P. Basler (ed.), **The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln** (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953), VI, 310.
9. Meade to Couch, **O. R.**, op. cit., Part I, 67-68.
10. Hermann Haupt to Halleck, **Ibid.**, Part III, 476.
11. Col. Henry McCormick, Carlisle, to W. M. Watts, Esq., Pine Grove Furnace, Pa., July 3, 1863. Dauphin County Historical Society, Harrisburg, Pa.

CHAPTER IV

THE BLOODLESS CAMPAIGN

1. Samuel P. Bates, **Martial Deeds of Pennsylvania** (Philadelphia: T. H. Davis & Co., 1876), p. 170.
2. Egle, **History of the Counties of Dauphin and Lebanon**, p. 145.
3. Meigs to Couch, **O. R.**, op. cit., Series I, XXVII, Part III, 411.
4. Thompson to Meigs, **Ibid.**, 495.
5. Ingalls to Meigs, **Ibid.**, 677.
6. J. Cutler Andrews, **The North Reports the Civil War** (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955), p. 415.
7. **O. R.**, op. cit., 132.
8. **Ibid.**, 160 and 186.
9. **Evening Telegraph** (Harrisburg), June 17, 1863.
10. **Ibid.**
11. **Patriot and Union** (Harrisburg), June 16, 1863.
12. John Lockwood, **Our Campaign around Gettysburg** (Brooklyn: A. H. Rome & Bros., 1864), p. 23.
13. **Ibid.**, 24.

14. *Ibid.*, 25-27.
15. *Ibid.*, 31-32.
16. *Ibid.*, 35-36.
17. *Ibid.*, 48.
18. Samuel W. Pennypacker, "Fort Washington in 1863" *Transaction of the Historical Society of Dauphin County*, I, Part III (August, 1905), 242-43.
19. *Ibid.*, 243.
20. *The Patriot* (Harrisburg), April 7, 1939.
21. W. L. Gorgas. *Dauphin County Historical Society*, n. d.
22. *O. R.*, *op. cit.*, 511.
23. *Ibid.*, 330.
24. *Ibid.*, 347.
25. *Ibid.*, 236.
26. *Ibid.*, 263.
27. Douglas S. Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935), III, 34.
28. Lockwood, *op. cit.*, 43.
29. After the fire there was considerable worry about the credit of the Columbia Bank which owned the bridge. Although insured at \$50,000 the estimated value of the bridge was \$100,000.
30. Frank Moore (ed.), *The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1864), VII, 322.
31. George G. Meade, *With Meade at Gettysburg* (Philadelphia: John C. Winston Co., 1930), p. 31.
32. Report of Brig. Gen. Jesse C. Smith, 11th Brigade, New York State National Guard, *O. R.*, *op. cit.*, Part II, 245.
33. Lockwood, *op. cit.*, 60.
34. *Ibid.*, 61.
35. Bates, *History of the Pennsylvania Volunteers*, 1228
36. *O. R.*, *op. cit.*, Part III, 507.
37. *Report on the Conduct of the War*, I, 490.
38. Couch to Brig. Gen. Philip S. Crooke, 5th Brigade, Second Division, New York State National Guard, *O. R.*, *op. cit.*, Part II, 242.
39. Report of Brig. Gen. Philip S. Crooke, *Ibid.*
40. Stanton to Thomas, AG at Harrisburg, *Ibid.*, Part III, 525.
41. Smith's indorsement on dispatch from Meade, *Ibid.*, 539-40.
42. Col. Lewis Pierce to Couch, *Ibid.*, 580.
43. Couch to Meade, *Ibid.*, 577-78.
44. *Ibid.*, Part II, 299.
45. *Ibid.*, 612.
46. *Ibid.*, 703.
47. Roy P. Basler (ed.), *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953), VI, 327-28.
48. Report of Brig. Gen. Jesse C. Smith, 11th Brigade, New York State National Guard, *O. R.*, *op. cit.*, 247.
49. Bates, *History of the Pennsylvania Volunteers*, p. 1229.
50. *Ibid.*
51. Curtin to Couch, *Executive Correspondence*, *op. cit.*, 201-03.
52. *Ibid.*, 315-16.
53. *Ibid.*, 241-42.
54. *Ibid.*, 246-47.

CHAPTER V

THE DEPARTMENT IN 1864

1. *O. R.*, *op. cit.*, Series I, XXXVII, Part II, 117.
2. *Ibid.*, 132.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Ibid.*, 130.
5. Egle, *op. cit.*, 270.
6. *O. R.*, *op. cit.*, 462-63.

7. General Halleck quickly criticized Couch's imprudence for offering to pardon deserters from the draft in Columbia County if they would report by the twentieth of the month. Couch defended his position with the explanation that the deserters were "misguided men" influenced by opposition propaganda that the draft was unconstitutional.
8. J. H. Battle (ed.), **History of Columbia and Montour Counties** (Chicago: A. H. Warner & Co., 1887), p. 130.
9. It was the duty of General Couch to support local provost marshals in the enrollment of men for the draft although in his defense it must be said that he lacked troops for this purpose and repeatedly begged Washington for aid.
10. **O. R., op. cit., Series I, XLIII, Part II, 526.**
11. **Ibid., 481.**
12. **Ibid., 523-524.**
13. **O. R., op. cit., Series I, XXXVII, Part II, 96.**
14. **Ibid., 491.**
15. Jacob Hoke, **The Great Invasion of 1863** (Dayton: W. S. Schuey, 1887), pp. 131-34.
16. **O. R., op cit., 526.**
17. **Ibid., 541.**
18. **Ibid., Series I, XLIII, Part II, 588.**
19. **Ibid.**
20. **Ibid., 724.**

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