King George's War and the Quakers The Defense Crisis of 1732-1742 in Pennsylvania Politics

By Alan Tully

To many observers the political history of colonial Pennsylvania has always appeared to be a contention-ridden affair. During the first three decades of the colony's existence factions apparently abounded; during the 20 years before independence political wrangling seemed to keep the province in an uproar much of the time. But despite modern historians heavy emphasis on the apparent instabilities of politics there is one major example of political contention that has escaped detailed examination: that was the contention between Governor and Assembly that took place in the early 1740's. And that episode does deserve close attention – not only because of the evidence it provides about the character of provincial politics but also because of the long range effects it had on the directions Pennsylvania politics were to take.

Chapter I

Pennsylvania politics in the 1730's were relatively quiet. The unfavorable memories local politicians had of the factionalism of the late 20's, the common danger Pennsylvanians felt in Maryland's attempt to annex part of their colony, and the initially favorable attitudes of provincials to their new proprietors, John, Thomas and Richard Penn, predispossed them to work with the proprietary and

to seek compromises among themselves. As the decade wore on, however, Thomas Penn's land policies gradually destroyed the goodwill extended to him, but the continuation of the boundary dispute prevented the surfacing of that hostility. Pennsylvanians knew that they could only protect their own land titles through Pennsylvania's title to the province. Moreover, Andrew Hamilton, who was the most prominent Pennsylvanian politician during the late 30's was predispossed to work with the proprietors rather than against them. He continually cooperated with Penn on the boundary dispute problems, and advised him on land policy. Thus, despite the subliminal hostility to the propreitary that infected the countryside during the late 30's, there were no obvious changes in popular politics that reflected this.[2]

In the summer of 1739, however, the cracks finally began to show. Earlier that year Andrew Hamilton had pushed through the Assembly a quitrent arrears measure that compensated the Penns for accepting pre-1732 quitrent payments in Pennsylvania currency rather than in sterling.[3] Reckoning that this settlement and the conclusion of a compromise agreement between the Penns and Baltimores over the boundary dispute had solved the important political issues of the day and at last acknowledging his growing physical infirmities, Andrew Hamilton retired from politics. Convinced, like Hamilton, that all of the knotty problems in Pennsylvania politics had been untangled, William Allen, James Hamilton, and four of their Quaker confederates announced in the summer of 1739 that they, too, would not seek re-election.[4] Never had they been so right – and never so wrong. True, the Maryland boundary dispute and the quitrent arrears questions had been resolved; but they failed to remember that in politics a new, disruptive issue might surface at any time, and they failed to see that anti-proprietary sentiment would seep into the vacuum they would leave. Both happened, immediately.[5]

In late August, word reached Philadelphia that war with Spain was imminent and because of the personal pacifism of Quakers and their known reluctance as legislators to provide for the military defense of the colony, war had always been a disruptive issue in Pennsylvania. Immediately William Allen and James Hamilton reconsidered their position but, having publicly announced their retirement they felt that, at such a late date, they could not reverse their decision.[6] Meanwhile, at the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, the annual gathering of Quaker representatives from Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware, Friends adopted a pre-election statement urging Quakers to be "vigilant" in guarding their "peaceable principles" and "in no manner to join" with those who counselled "warlike preparations, offensive or defensive."[7] Although it is impossible to be certain, it is unlikely that this statement had more than a marginal bearing on the choice of candidates for Philadelphia County for when Hamilton, Allen and associates decided to resign they had left the management of Philadelphia County slate of candidates to men who, with the exception of John Kinsey, were "stiffer" Quakers who had never worked very closely with Hamilton or the

proprieter.[8] When the election returns came in, the number of Quakers in the Assembly had only increased by 2, hardly a significant change in view of the fact that 21 of the 30 members of the 1738-39 Assembly had been of that religious persuasion.[9] In the light of the political issues of the 1730's, however, there were several important changes. Andrew Hamilton no longer sat for Bucks County. In Philadelphia County, five new Quaker representatives replaced William Allen and four moderate city Quakers. In Lancaster County, where the inhabitants were worried by the proprietary land policies and were determined to choose those whom they felt could best defend their property interests,[10] an additional Quaker representative replaced James Hamilton. In all, eight of the seventeen assemblymen who had voted for the proprietary quitrent compromise were no longer members. The retirement of Andrew Hamilton and his gang from the Assembly left the proprietary weak and exposed even before the colony's role in King George's War had become a divisive issue.

Once the election had occurred, however, the war quickly came to the front. By the time the new Assembly convened in mid-October, orders from the English government to issue letters of Marque, and a request from John Penn that he try to establish a provincial militia had landed on Governor Thomas' desk. Thomas, an old military officer, needed no further encouragement; he asked the legislature to put the province into a state of defense by providing law and an appropriation to pay for arming the militia and to finance fortifications. As he might have expected the Assemblymen demurred; the majority of the legislators were Quakers and, consequently, they could neither bear arms nor frame a law compelling others to do so. If some residents felt threatened the Governor could always invoke his authority as Captain-General and form a voluntary militia. To the Assemblymen, however, it appeared that the province was in no serious danger for they were well protected by other English colonies to the north, south, and east. Under such circumstances the possibility that a military organization might be used for corrupt and oppressive purposes far outweighed any benefits it might conceivably provide. Lastly, the Assembly mentioned that their 1711 wartime appropriation of £2,000 "to the Queen's use" to "express their duty, loyalty, and faithful obedience" formed a precedent that could be "no great encouragement for future Assemblies to follow," because on that occasion the Governor had appropriated the grant to his own particular use."[11]

From October 1739 through April 1740, the differences between Governor and representatives remained clear. On the one hand, Governor Thomas' *sine qua non* was a militia law; on the other, the framing of such a law was an action the Quaker legislators could not perform. To the Assemblymen, their refusal was a simple matter of liberty of conscience; to Thomas, it was something else. From the beginning of the exchange, the Governor had, apparently, felt that the Assemblymen were insincere, that they were deliberately using religious princi-

ples to impede the normal functioning of government. Although he had no good evidence of the supposed duplicity, Thomas believed the worst, and his conviction that the Quakers were deceitful, coupled with the Assembly's uncharitable attempts to harass the chief executive, soon built up mutually supported walls of anger and resentment.[12]

Before the May session of the Assembly began and the old arguments trotted out again, a chain of events occurred that were to change the nature of the dispute. On April 10, Governor Thomas received further orders from the English Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle, asking him to invite enlistments for an invasion of the West Indies. Four days later the Governor issued a proclamation to that effect. Immediately, a number of indentured servants applied directly to the Governor for permission to volunteer, and Thomas encouraged them, allegedly replying that from that moment they had no master but the King. At this point, however, the recruits could not formally enlist for both commissions and officers had not as yet arrived from England. Thus, the servants entered a peculiar state of limbo – servants but no longer servants, soldiers but not yet soldiers – and they made the best of their opportunity, growing "very saucy to their masters and noisy about the streets."[13] These civil disorders forced the Governor to issue a new proclamation specifying that the giving of one's name as a potential volunteer to a representative of the Governor in confidence did not annul a master's authority.[14]

By the time the Assembly convened on May 5 for a ten day session, order had been restored but, the Governor's intention of enlisting servant volunteers was absolutely clear. The Assemblymen, knew that a number of influential men had disagreed with the Governor's action and that Attorney-General John Kinsey had submitted to Thomas, on his request, a legal opinion that denied the King's right to solicit servant enlistments. Hoping that the Governor's subsequent silence on the servant question indicated intended compliance with that opinion, the Assemblymen did not interject this matter into their exchanges with the chief executive. Rather, in replying to Philadelphia and Chester county petitioners who requested the cessation of servant enlistments and the return of those whose names had been entered as volunteers, they simply stated their position: the King's instructions to enlist "ought not" to have been understood as a power to accept bound servants.[15]

Having made this point, the representatives adjourned and for approximately seven weeks there were no further developments. Then, on June 25, King's officers, commissions, and further instructions arrived in Philadelphia. Immediately, Thomas called the Assembly and presented the latest royal instructions ordering the Assembly to provide food, lodging, transport, and other necessities for the Pennsylvania troops. In addition, the Governor demanded an enlistment bounty for all freemen if servants were to be exempt. On July 7 the Assembly pointedly denied Thomas' specific construction of the royal orders re-

plying that it could not "come into the levying of money and appropriating it to the uses recommended to us in the Governor's speech" because it was "repugnant" to members' "religious principles."[16] Thomas, recognizing his tactical error in interpreting his instructions, simply referred them to the Assembly the following day. After some momentary quibbling the Legislature resolved that a vote of money be given "for the use of the Crown."[17] But, despite this resolution the Assemblymen were seriously divided, for John Kinsey, the Speaker of the House, had to cast the deciding vote. The reason for the disagreement was obvious to all: the officers who had recently arrived were enlisting servants as well as freemen. Although a bill was framed voting £2,000 to the King's use and £2,000 to reimburse the owners of servants, it became increasingly obvious that the agreed upon appropriation would not cover the value of the missing servants. Among some Assemblymen there was an obvious reluctance to give even a penny to the King while the Governor quietly sanctioned the continuing enlistment of servants. Unable to form a consensus on policy beyond resolving to reimburse masters for the loss of their servants, the Assemblymen closed off debate and adjourned until mid-August.[18]

Governor Thomas was not to be so easily put off. Two weeks after their adjournment he again called the members of the legislature into session, informing them that he now had seven companies of volunteers whose needs lay at the Assembly's door. In the exchange that followed the Assemblymen elaborated their views: the enlistment of servants had been an inexcusable infringement by the executive on the freeman's property rights and when the approximately 300 servants who had been accepted into the provincial forces were discharged and returned to their owners, the Assembly would grant money to the King's use; The Assembly also pointed out that such an action would not jeopardize the Governor's good reputation in English court circles. Pennsylvania had only been sent four commissions and even after the servants had been discharged there would still be 400 men – enough to form four companies who, as freemen, had volunteered for the West Indian expedition. Throughout August the Assembly refused to retreat from this position and the equally intransigent Governor Thomas was forced to finance his seven companies with loans from Philadelphia gentlemen.[19]

The early events in this growing dispute are particularly important because they revealed how a predominently Quaker Assembly reacted to war-time demands and because the meaning of the dispute, in terms of a long range political realignment, began to appear. First, it is clear that the Quaker Assembly did not react as a body whose members deeply questioned the consistency of their giving money to the King's use in wartime with their religious principles. The Assemblymen did frame a bill voting money to the King's use when they were actually faced with the Monarch's order to contribute to the cost of a military campaign.[20] Their failure to pass such a bill resulted from an almost equal split in their ranks, between those who would give money to the Crown in addi-

tion to reimbursing masters of enlisted servants, and those who would make such a vote conditional on the servants release. It was during the last two weeks of July when the Assemblymen were out in the country supervising their harvests that the members of the former group realizing how strong provincial opinion was against the servant enlistments, decided to support their colleagues. These, not promptings of conscience, were the circumstances that resulted in the Assembly's apparently intransigent stand not to vote money for the King's use.[21]

Second, with regard to the meaning of the dispute, certain features had become particularly prominent by the fall of 1740. Despite their immediate concern with the Cartagena expedition, Governor Thomas and his Philadelphia supporters saw the real issue as wartime defence. They believed that coastal inhabitants and Delaware River shipping were in immediate danger and no reasonable man could conclude otherwise. The fact that most "ignorant country men" did not feel threatened and placed the onus for Philadelphia's defence on the residents of that city merely underlined the need for strong and independent Assembly representation.[22] In the eyes of the Governor's supporters the members of the legislature assumed an obligation to put the country in a state of defense during wartime the moment they accepted office. That the Quaker members of the Assembly admitted no contradiction between their religious beliefs and their duties as legislators was a measure of their duplicity. Some of the Governor's allies certainly believed that Quaker principles were real enough for the servant enlistment crisis indicated the extremes to which they would go in order to find an issue that would mask such principles. Others believed that the vague pleas of liberty of conscience were an extremely flexible and useful political tool. In either case, the conclusion was the same: Quaker spokesmen were doubledealing, insincere opportunists who should not be allowed to sit in the Assembly.[23]

To the Quaker Assemblymen and their supporters the issue was an entirely different one. The resolution giving money to the Crown proved that they could contribute in their own way to a military venture and if at some future time extreme danger threatened Pennsylvania, it was not at all clear that some similar measure might not be passed even in the absence of royal orders. For most Quaker representatives, this was enough to erase what public self-doubts they shared about their ability to hold seats in the legislature. Similarly, the charges against their legislative suitability that followed from their refusal to frame a militia law were nicely, if only theoretically, o'rleapt by a provision of Pennsylvania's Charter which enabled the Governor to raise a volunteer militia force under his authority as Captain-General. While many Pennsylvanians were willing to accept these reasonings, Governor Thomas was not and by his refusal he flatly challenged a major part of the rationale that had allowed Quaker's to participate fully in Pennsylvania government over the past six decades. Moreover, he did so at a time when, in Quaker eyes, there could be no honest intention, for despite the state of war, it was obvious to them that Pennsylvania was

in no serious danger. To the Quakers, then, it was the Governor who was insincere. His desire for a permanent militia, his flagrant disregard for personal property rights, his determined effort to expose apparent Quaker inconsistencies, and his slippery defense of his own public actions convinced the members ot the Legislature that he was spearheading an attack on the rights of freeholder and legislator.[24] That he was a man of independent means, outwardly impervious to the Assembly's refusal of support and that Thomas Penn publicly and energetically associated the proprietary with all of the Governor's actions reinforced the widespread belief in an executive-proprietary conspiracy against popular priviledges.[25]

Chapter II

As the summer session of the Pennsylvania Assembly drew to a close, supporters of the executive and of the legislature began to prepare for the annual provincial election. Proprietary-executive supporters meticulously lined up tickets for each county, and Quaker Assemblymen countered by substituting solid popular rights men for those who had most favored conciliation. When the votes were finally counted, the old Assembly found that their stand against executive tyranny, their reimbursement of masters for the loss of their servants, and their refusal to pay Governor Thomas' salary had been vindicated. The only changes in House membership were the replacement of one proprietary man and two moderate representatives by three popular Quaker nominees.[26] In the Philadelphia County election, Andrew Hamilton and the defense-minded merchants of the city mobilized support for William Allen, but that ticket failed by some 200 votes;[27] in Bucks, where the Jeremiah Langhoren-Lawrence Growdon-Joseph Kirkbride interest supported the executive, the defense lobbyists failed to elect a single active advocate of their cause;[28] in Chester, defence candidates polled only 15% of the vote, while in Lancaster they attracted a bare 10%.[29] Such an unqualified electoral victory attested to the popular acceptance of the Assemblymen's construction of recent events: the enlistment of servants had been an unquestionable attack on the freeman's property rights and the defense crisis was no more than a deliberate smoke screen, designed to cover-up an assault by the chief executive on the provincial constitution.[30]

Success in Pennsylvania, however, did not mean that the Assemblymen's point of view would meet with equal sympathy in England. The Spanish War was a popular one among the British and the colonies were expected to contribute what they could to campaigns such as the Cartagena expedition. There were, of course, good reasons for the Assembly's intransigence in that affair, and had Speaker John Kinsey and his associates presented them with more clarity and consistency the Assembly could have gained some measure of English support.

As it was, the Assemblymen's strategy, vis-a-vis England, was ill-conceived and badly managed. In their exchanges with Governor Thomas, the Assembly's Quaker spokesmen did not state in a straighforward manner exactly what "in principle" they found objectionable, and as late as February 1741 English Quakers who were looking to lobby in London on behalf of their Pennsylvania friends, still wanted to know what it was that they "must from principle approve."[31] In July, during the deadlock over whether to vote money immediately for the King's use or to make such a gift contigent on the discharge of enlisted servants, Kinsey, rather than admit to disagreement among Assemblymen, covered up the division with a series of excuses for the Assembly's adjournment.[32] As Governor Thomas pointed out and as others could readily observe, such statements reeked of duplicity. When at the end of August a conditional vote to the King's use was finally passed, the literal terms of the grant were impossible to fulfill and the legislature had again laid itself open to charges of fraud.[33] Finally, the Assembly's resort to a petition to the King was the crowning blunder. In it, the Assemblymen requested the monarch to order the release and return of the enlisted indentured servants, who long before the message could reach England had departed for Cartagena; this demand deserved all the derision its opponents heaped upon it.[34]

In comparison with the Assembly's position, that of Governor Thomas looked very strong. He was lauded in England for his patriotic zeal, to the Englishmem who read his exchanged with the legislature he had cast a reasonable doubt on Quaker sincerity. After their electoral failure in October, the Governor and many of his Philadelphia supporters determined to press their case in London where they hoped they would find a sympathetic hearing. On October 20, Thomas sent a scathing report to the Board of Trade defending his actions in the enlistment crisis, arguing implicitly that Quaker principles rendered those who held them unfit for legislative duty, charging that Quakers had acted in collusion with, and deliberately misled, German voters in order to frustrate the real popular will in the last election, and vigorously denounced two customary rights of theAssembly – the appropriation of money by a resolution of the legislature, rather than with the concurrence of the chief executive. At the same time plans were set afoot for Philadelphia city residents to petition the Crown. Although opinion was divided on the wisdom of directly requesting the disqualification of all Quakers from sitting in the legislature, unanimity prevailed about the necessity of asking the King to order that the province be placed in a state of defense. Thomas Penn counselled the necessity of both steps, but he felt the former measure might best be secured by discrete lobbying rather than by formal request. When in August 1741, Penn finally left for England after nine years in Pennsylvania, he carried with him a firm resolve to unseat the Quakers and a representation, signed by many of Philadelphia's leading citizens, petitioning the Crown for an order-in-council demanding defense preparations.[35]

By the time Penn arrived in London, however, many of the strategic ad-

vantages that the executive and proprietary seemed to enjoy had proved illusory. Early in 1741 Thomas Penn sent a warning across the Atlantic to John Penn that such a representation might be forthcoming and that the Quakers were considering their own counter petition urging the Crown to expropriate the proprietary title. The senior proprietor reacted with alarm; he forwarded to Speaker of the Assembly John Kinsey a copy of the proprietary instructions to Governor Thomas in order to refute the rumor that the Penns were authorizing an attack on the Pennsylvania charter. Later he cautioned Governor Thomas that all activities which might push Parliament towards "examining into and altering the Constitution of any of the Colonys or Islands"should, at all cost, be avoided.[36] According to the senior proprietor any political activity that was likely to produce a threat to the Penn family title, whether it be instigated by proprietary supporter or legislative radical, was to be actively discouraged.

In Pennsylvania, too, the proprietary-executive supporters found themselves weaker. When they heard of John Penn's cautions, they began to fall out. Some led by William Allen urgued that their petition should be presented no matter what the chief proprietor decided to do for the desirability of defense and possible disqualification of the Quakers more than balanced the risk of a potential royal takeover; others were prepared to back off on the proprietor's advice. And as they became more divided among themselves, they were confronted with growing public hostility. Richard Partridge, the Assembly's London agent, had obtained a copy of Governor Thomas' outspoken letter to the Board of Trade, and by May 1741 Assembly supporters had published excerpts in Pennsylvania. This letter and Thomas Penn's close association with the Governor until he left in mid-1741 convinced many freemen – John Penn's assurances notwithstanding – that a proprietary and executive plot was well on its way to overturning the constitution.[37]

The 1741 election supplied abundant evidence of both the disorganization and the unpopularity of the defense advocates. While William Allen, James Logan, and a few of their fellows were determined to get together an effective opposition ticket, at least for Philadelphia, others refused, arguing that nothing should be done until the king had answered their petition.[38] As a result no alternative candidates were put forward for any of the three old counties. All the proprietary supporters could do was verbally express their disgust at the changes that the Quakers made in their own slate of candidates.[39] Out in Lancaster, the one county in which there was an organized effort to unseat the Quaker incumbents, results were disheartening. Despite the cooperation of Lancaster notables Thomas Cookson and Conrad Weiser with James Logan and the organization of a campaign in which Weiser made a strong pamphlet appeal for the support of his fellow Germans, proprietary supporters were soundly defeated. Of the 1,150 votes cast in Lancaster, barely 200 went to the defense candidates.[40]

The lack of opposition in the 1741 election confirmed the Assemblymen's

fears; the greatest danger to their position lay not in opposition activities in Pennsylvania but in executive and proprietary lobbying in London. With the election over, the Assemblymen turned their attention to the difficulties of countering the Philadelphia petition asking the Crown to put the colony in a state of defense that, in Thomas Penn's hands, was about to surface in England. Early in the summer, when Governor Thomas' letter to the Board of Trade appeared in print and when rumors of the impending petition may well have first leaked out, the more radical Quaker leaders suggested that they should apply to the Crown to take over the colony.[41] In October 1741 this solution was considered by the Assembly members but quickly rejected.[42] Instead they determined to send a petition to the proprietors blaming Governor Thomas for the state of contention and asking for a replacement.[43] In taking this action, the Quakers gambled that John Penn was in sympathy with their cause and that as chief proprietor he could override the objections that brother Thomas would certainly raise. What encouraged them in this course was the trust the Quakers had developed in John Penn during the Baltimore negotiations; a knowledge of his whiggish principles; an awareness that he had dealt squarely with Kinsey by forwarding a copy of the proprietary instructions; warm, nostalgic memories many had of Penn's visit in 1734-35; and a naive predisposition to rely on the man who was their chief proprietor and an American.[44]

With both the Quakers and their opponents having referred their respective cases for English ajudication, an easing of tension might have been expected in Pennsylvania.[45] But rather than lessen, the spitefulness that had come to characterize dealings between the parties to the dispute, increased. Governor Thomas was determined to revenge himself on John Kinsey, the man who had "publically vilified" him "for two years past."[46] With that end in mind he soundly upbraided Kinsey when the Quaker spokesman was presented as Speaker by the 1741-42 Assembly and then proceeded to strip him of the office of Attorney-General.[47] After the same election the Governor further alienated the Assemblymen by refusing to confirm the Quaker candidate, Mordecai Lloyd, as Philadelphia County sheriff even though he had polled the greatest number of votes.[48] Finally, the Governor started a rumor that he held in his possession an Attorney-General's opinion which supported his authority to prorogue or dissolve the Assembly without the legislature's consent.[49] These tactics provided new fuel for the Quaker Assemblymen who already were burning with anger on account of Thomas' letter to the Board of Trade and the Philadelphia petition for defense. They were determined to dump Governor Thomas, if not by proprietary order, then by rendering his position intolerable, and through the winter and spring of 1741-42, they used their position in the legislature to constantly harass him.[50]

Thus, despite the two pending petitions, the one to John Penn and the other to the Crown, political affairs in Pennsylvania had a peculiar momentum

of their own. Because local political adversaries were preoccupied one with another and because these men were already determined to vent their resentment and bitterness through the 1742 election, the proprietaries answer to the Assemblymen's representation and the Board of Trade's recommendations to the Crown on the Philadelphia petition for defense did not seriously alter the existing pattern of political events. When in mid-May the Assemblymen received a reply to their representation, a reply that completely vindicated Governor Thomas and associated the proprietary with all his activities, the one course of action all could agree on was to hold onto their legislative power until a new long-range plan could be settled on. The Board of Trade report to the Lords Committee of the Privy Council, which was the first indication of what the Crown's response might be, reached Philadelphia in August. In the face of its recommendations that the Crown order the province to put inta a state of defense, the Assemblymen were, if anything, more ditermined to maintain control of the legislature.[51]

Among executive supporters, the Proprietary statement and the Board of Trade report also served to rouse increased interest in the forthcoming election. Early in 1742 there had been some evidence of differences among Quaker supporters as to what tactics their Assemblymen should follow. The proprietor's reply to the Assembly's representation boosted morale and encouraged them to try to exploit those differences. At the same time, many had begun to doubt the wisdom of their petitioning the Crown. Since none of the petitioners could suggest a realistic method by which an order-in-council, to put the province in a state of defense, could be implemented they feared that even if the Crown issued such an order nothing would happen. Alternatively, if the English politicians were seriously stirred up by the case their petition presented, Parliament might intervene to do what the Crown could not. But along with legislation that would ensure the colony's defense might come other measures that would adversely affect personal and provincial rights. Another possibility was that Thomas Penn might refuse to support the petition before the upcoming hearing of the Lords Committee of the Privy Council and there would be no action on it. This seemed possible for by early 1742 brother John had convinced Thomas that the petition might precipitate royal or Parliamentary intervention in Pennsylvania, prejudicial to their charter rights. The best response the proprietary-executive supporters could hope for, then, was a positive but ineffective order from the Crown to put the province in a state of defense. And there they would be still standing on the banks of an undefended Delaware River, without help from England and locked out of the legislature in Pennsylvania. Thus, they were determined to help themselves by gaining some voice in the Provvincial Assembly. For the Proprietary men as well as their Quaker-led opponents, October 1, 1742, was to be an extremely important day.[52]

Preparations for the 1742 election began early. In June, the popular Quaker leaders were already gathering opinions on who should be seated in the new Assembly. By August, executive supporters were puzzling out their own tickets. The Assembly spokesmen, determined to fight the election on the record of their past activities, did not drop a single representative from their slate. As for the proprietary men, they tried to exploit Quaker weakness in each county. In Bucks, influential leaders Joseph Kirkbride, Jr. and Lawrence Growdon were to head a coalition ticket with their Presbyterian, Anglican, and Reformed allies; in Lancaster, James Hamilton was to attempt to revive his old interest and, at least, to split, if not sweep, the Scotch-Irish, Presbyterian vote; in Chester, disaffected Quakers Jacob Howell and Jane Hoskins were to select appropriate candidates; in Philadelphia, strongman William Allen was to join with merchant Jonathan Robeson and others in directing election efforts. By September, the optimism of the defense advocates seemed warranted. Their opponents appeared to be divided and they were organized as never before. One month later, however, the hopes of the executive supporters had been dashed and the influence of that group as a political alliance had been almost totally destroyed. What had gone wrong?[53]

One of the reasons why the proprietary-executive failure seemed so great was that much of the optimism that infused their ranks had been based on false hopes. Prior to the election, they had seen evidence of substantial support among Pennsylvania's freemen because they wanted to see it, not because it actually existed. Nothing had occurred to alter the voter's opinion that the proprietary and the Governor, rather than the Spanish, posed the greatest threat to individual rights, liberty, and property. In Lancaster, James Hamilton and his fellow candidates were sweepingly repudiated, while in Bucks, the defense advocates did not cut into the margin by which they had been defeated in 1740. In Chester and Philadelphia counties, the threatened division between moderate and popular Quakers never developed. Despite their assurances, those who had not approved of the contentious conduct of the present Assemblymen failed to put together an alternative ticket. It was in Philadelphia, however, where the real disaster occured; there, the proprietary disgrace was due not only to lack of popular support but also to the election riot on October 1.[54]

In preparing for the 1742 election, proprietary supporters in Philadelphia remembered well their experiences of two years past. William Allen, who after the death of his father-in-law, Andrew Hamilton, in August 1741, had become the most influential advocate of defense preparations, had attributed his defeat in 1740 to the relative failure of the Governor's friends in mobilizing German voters. Although Allen publically proclaimed his determination to win a share of the German vote and although he took slightly more than the usual steps to in-

fluence German opinion, the most important proprietary preparations for the election were tactical ones which could affect any voter regardless of nationality or religion.[55]

The executive supporters knew that if the contest was to be won they would need a group of men to help direct and control the crowd of voters that would assemble on election day in Philadelphia's market square. The reasons were twofold. Early in the day the freeholders would decide, by gathering around their favorite candidates, who the election inspectors would be. These officers were to determine who was qualified to cast a ballot, a crucial question when political interest was high enough to draw to the polls large numbers of freeholders who ordinarily did not vote.[56] Later in the morning when voting actually began, the outcome could be affected by one other well-known means. At the Court House a crowd could surround the base of the staircase which a voter had to ascend in order to cast his ballot, thereby intimidating any freeholder whose choice of candidates was not favorable to their interests.[57] What the proprietary supporters needed, then, was a group of men who could surreptitiously swell the ranks of voters for the right inspectors and later, muscle out the opposition at the stairs. For men who were merchants the problem of recruiting manpower was not a difficult one; on their ships were sailors ready to do their bidding.[58]

Although the idea of using seamen must have sounded feasible enough to those gentlemen who privately discussed it in Philadelphia's taverns, in practice it was a disaster. The chief problem lay in the execution; the act of mingling with and influencing a crowd of Philadelphia freemen required an adeptness that no unpracticed group of sailors could perform.Sea hands were part of an alien world outside Philadelphia; they felt themselves to be such, they were recognized as such, and from 7 o'clock on election day morning they acted as such. At that time 40-50 sailors "armed with clubs" assembled "on Andrew Hamilton's wharf."[59] From their actions it would appear that they had only been given tentative instructions about what they should do in the morning. After roaming about haphazardly, visiting at least one tavern and facing the complaints of several magistrates, the sailors charged at the assembled freemen just as the sheriff opened the election for inspectors. A short time later, after regrouping, they attacked a second time only to be beaten back to their ships.[60]

Despite the murkiness that always attends such events, several observations are warranted. For some time before the election rumors were rife about the certainty of violence. Both Assemblymen and proprietary leaders believed that their opponents might resort to heavy-handed measures. Just before the election, however, Quaker leaders used their influence to persuade their followers to come to the election unarmed. What could have been a confrontation became an act of aggression. Contemporaries certainly believed that the Governor's friends were responsible for the sailor's actions, and, in face, responsibility may be pinned on two merchants who had the confidence of other important executive sopport-

ers.[61] As for proprietary-executive leader William Allen, it is most likely, if not quite certain, that he knew about the plan. The best that may be said about him was that he did not openly encourage the rioters once they had charged the assembled freemen. His actions of that morning clearly demonstrated that he was incapable of assuming the leadership role for which Andrew Hamilton had carefully groomed him.[62]

Immediately after the election riot it appeared that this violent episode had driven Assemblymen and their antagonists even further apart. Blood had been spilled, bruises counted, and bitterness voiced. Quakers trumpeted how the election events revealed the true depths of proprietary depravity, and the Assembly's investigation into the riot confirmed and publicized Friends' judgment. On the other hand, the maligned executive supporters saw themselves as victims of an elaborate political frameup.[63] But despite the riot and the hostility it engendered, peace was clearly on the way. In January 1743 Governor Thomas struck a bargain with the Assembly spokesmen: the chief executive was to receive a payment of £500 on his arrears and the customary £1,000 annual support for the current year in return for passing certain Assembly bills. Five months later it was generally conceded that an apparently impossible reconciliation had somehow been effected.[64]

In retrospect the working out of a compromise peace between Governor and Assembly immediately after the 1742 riot was not so surprising. Early in June of that year, Governor Thomas had been willing to resume normal relations with the Assembly if the legislature would vote him his salary arrears. When the legislature convened for its August session, the representatives offered to grant his support for the current year on condition that he pass specified pieces of legislation. These preliminary negotiations came to nothing but they foreshadowed furture conversations. Immediately after the election, Provincial Councillor Thomas Lawrence approached Richard Peters and the Governor, hinting that John Kinsey and some of his friends wanted to settle their differences. For his part, Governor Thomas determined to avoid penning angry messages to the Assembly and to pass some legislation in return for part of his support, hoping that this would prompt the Assembly to volunteer his arrears.[65]

There were a variety of reasons why Governor Thomas was predisposed to accept any face saving accommodation the Assembly might offer. The momentum that the Governor had gained during the early months of the dispute had wasted away, and the Assemblymen's growing mastery of political polemics made his personal life increasingly uncomfortable.[66] Then, too, the legislature owed him £2,5000 in arrears; if an opportunity to recoup that sum appeared, the Governor would take it, for money was a major consideration in all his personal decisions. But the most important reason for Thomas' desire for peace was his realistic assessment of his own political position. There were a few strong men who were willing to tie their political fortunes to the proprietary cause, and, of

the few who did, several were so over-bearing as to imply that their advice rather than Thomas' interpretation of the royal and proprietary interest should govern executive actions. From Governor Thomas' point of view, this frame of mind constituted just as great a threat to the independence of the executive as the actions of the Assembly.[67] Even had the situation in Philadelphia been somewhat more reassuring, it is doubtful that Thomas would have remained intransigent in the face of Assembly advances, for the proprietors obviously wanted a settlement. John Penn did not want Parliament to have any possible excuse for interfering in the province, and his coolness towards the Philadelphia defense petition and his correspondence with John Kinsey left no doubt that he favored accommodation.[68] Once Thomas Penn had arrived in London, he, too, was not long in coming around to his brother's point of view. By February 1743 he was convinced that not only did the state of English affairs necessitate an accommodation, but also it might turn out to be of strategic advantage in Philadelphia, splitting Kinsey's followers from the more radical city Quakers and thus making defense preparations possible.[69] What clinched it for Penn were financial considerations. Talk of a royal takeover and anger against the executive had dried up quitrent payments, and John Kinsey's efforts to restrict Loan Office activities were neglected in a sharply reduced revenue flow from warrants and patents. The Penns needed a settlement, and they were determined to have it.[70]

Of course, Governor Thomas and the proprietors alone could not have made peace; they needed and received the cooperation of the Assemblymen.One ground upon which all three parties could unite was their commonly shared recognition that Pennsylvania could not afford many more months of legislative inactivity. The £5 Act, the Inspectors Act, the Excise Act, and the Loan Office trustee appointments were due to lapse before the summer of 1744 and there were other bills that needed attention. Public obligation and self-interest demanded that the disputants attend to those needs.[71]

But, as in the case of Governor Thomas and the proprietors, reasons other than the obvious predisposed the Quaker Assemblymen to move towards a peaceful settlement before the 1742 election had taken place. The truth was that by the summer of that year the Quakers were suffering from divisions that would require time to heal. Difficulties had begun in 1741 when Governor Thomas' letter to the Board of Trade and the impending Philadelphia defense petition caused great anxiety about what Assembly policy should be.[72] A number of radical city Quakers wanted to petition the Crown for a royal takeover, but fear of what the King might exact in return deterred them from this course. The one plausible alternative, an alternative that was particularly favored by Friends who rather naively remembered a kind and affable John Penn, was a representation to the proprietors to remove Governor Thomas. Once the Assemblymen agreed on this course of action, however, the differences between Quakers continued, this time based on tactics and the degree of personal involvement in the existing dispute. Of those who had pressed for the representation, many

were content quietly to await what they thought would be good news from John Penn.[73] This war particularly true of men from the outlying areas. Distance insulated them from the extreme heat of paritsan politics: Others, mainly from Philadelphia City and nearby areas who were fully caught up in the circle of personal acrimony with nearby proprietary supporters, were not so patient. They believed that the proprietary supporters, were not so patient. They believed that the proprietary might pay heed only if the public outcry against Thomas continued.[74] In the polemical battle that ensued, the Assembly, pushed by the legislatures' radicals, was much the aggressor as the chief executive.[75] By March 1742, the more moderate Quakers, some of whom were powerful religious leaders in the counties and closely attuned to Quaker ideals, had become outspoken. They "openly" described the Assembly radicals as "a set of people who act from a spirit of resentment more than the public good."[76] The disaffected Quakers, Jane Hoskins, Jacob Howell, Thomas Fletcher, Henry Reynolds, and Samuel Morris were moderates in that they wanted to tone down the acrimonious debates with the Governor, but they were no less moderate than the Assembly radicals whom they criticized about defense preparations.

In May the proprietary vindication of Governor Thomas, written in response to the Assembly representation against him, burst the buble within which this controversy had developed.[77] The Quakers again considered the old question of whether they should petition the Crown for a royal takeover, but, if anything, this alternative looked less attractive in 1742 than it had a year earlier. The only sensible solution was to maintain control of the Assembly and, bargaining from strength, try to work out some sort of accommodation with the Governor. The Assembly radicals continued to be over-wrought, but they had no acceptable alternative to suggest, and cooler heads could safely begin to assert themselves.

In the 1742 election one important split in Quaker ranks did occur, but this division took place for reasons other than those mentioned above. In Bucks County, Joseph Kirkbride Jr. and Lawrence Growdon, the two leading candidates on the opposition ticket, were moderaate Quakers, not only in that they wished to end the present state of contention but also in that they, like James Logan, sanctioned defense preparations. Despite the prominence of these politicians and the attention that has been paid to Logan's 1741 statement on behalf of defensive preparations, there is no evidence to indicate that those who openly agreed with him constituted more than a small number of Philadelphia Quaker merchants, their old political confederates in Bucks County, and a sprinkling of residents in other outlying areas.[78] But no matter how fragmentary a splinter group such men might have been, this example of dissent, like that of the threatened dissaffection of the other, much larger group of Quaker moderates, was a danger signal to consensus-oriented Friends. The mere existence of these divisions was sufficient to send Quakers searching for an imicable settlement.

Before the election a second important development predisposed the most influential Assembly leaders to seek an accommodation with Governor Thomas. News of the Board of Trade report recommending that Pennsylvania be put into a state of defense reached Philadelphia sometime in August and clearly frightened Quaker spokesmen. Because there was no way for colonial administrators to force a recalcitrant Assembly to appropriate money for defense, it was conceivable that Parliament might intervene. This spectre and all that it suggested in the way of abridged rights and privileges convinced some Assemblymen of the absolute necessity of peace.[79] Their reaction was reinforced by the advice of English Friends who counselled them to bury their differences, strive to keep control of the Assembly in 1742, moderate their strident tones, and unite with them and agent Richard Partridge to present the legislature's case in the best possible light in private and public hearings with British officials.[80]

Prior to the 1742 election then, numerous Quakers were predisposed towards a reconciliation. The events of that election pushed them even further in this direction. With the benefit of five months hindsight Richard Peters put his finger on a generally unrecognized but major result of the election riot. After remarking on how the "storm" of contest had subsided with remarkable speed he went on to observe that "the Governor's friends, by the detestable riot, have put the people so absolutely into the power of their adversaries that they could never hope to become instruments to bring about peace and therefore there was a necessity of it being done some other way.[81] Until October 1742, defense advocates believed that they had the political strength to gain entrance to the legislature and, once this had been accomplished, the influence to direct the course of Assembly policy. Any accurate measurement of their popularity from 1740-1742 would, undoubtedly, have discredited these pretensions, but that was irrelevant. The point was that these men thought and acted as though they had the power, and in the limited Philadelphia environment they did have enough weight to lend some plausibility to their pretensions and enough bravado to cause some apprehension among their opponents. But the election revealed their true strength by exposing their weakness and stripping them of whatever vistiges of popular support they once had. The elections events crushed their hopes and pretensions just as it crushed the Quakers fears.

Carried along by the events of 1742, the popular politicians who wanted peace built up a steady momentum. The most active Quaker radicals, led by James Morris, went along with the balance of Quaker opinion when their own strategy of contention failed. But the personal animosities that had developed over two and one-half years of fighting died hard among this radical group. When, in late January 1743, Kinsey finally engineered the trade with Governor Thomas of partial arrears and current support for the passage of a number of bills, eight radical Quaker members from Philadelphia and Bucks Counties refused to accept it. When the deal was made public, opinion in Philadelphia turned strongly against Kinsey, his city moderates, and county allies. Once both

executive and Assemblymen had committed themselves to a reconciliation, however, the accumulated anger and bitterness gradually began to wear away.[82]

Chapter IV

The two and one-half years of serious contention from 1740 through 1743 were of the utmost importance in the political development of Pennsylvania, for during this period changes in the configurations of politics that had begun to take place in the 1730's were logically extended and then hardened into durable form. Forged in the extreme heat of political conflict, the new patterns of alliances, associations, and ideas were to form the basis for the political configurations that were to characterize Pennsylvania for the next 14 years.

One basic change that the crisis brought about was the almost total loss of proprietary influence in the counties and a serious weakening of that influence in Philadelphia city. The executive's demands for defense measures and Governor Thomas's disregard for the owners of servants, coming, as they did, on top of Thomas Penn's tough land policies, convinced many that the proprietor and his Governor were potential tyrants.[83] With the single exception of Bucks County, where a tradition of proprietary support kept members of the Kirkbride, Growdon, and a few other families loyal, public sympathy for the executive was thereafter almost totally confined to Philadelphia County and city.[84] It would take the bloodying of the frontier during the French and Indian War before the pattern would be much altered. Even in Philadelphia city, where the proprietor and chief executive had their greatest following, the defense crisis and the 1742 election riot shattered their support. By 1743 members of the old city interest lay prostrate, splintered, and weak; during the next twelve years the best they could do was occasionally to offer—unsuccessfully—a candidate for one of Philadelphia city's two Assembly seats.[85]

The other major effect of the 1740-42 crisis was the complete identification of Quakerism with popular rights and legislative privilege. As early as 1740, Governor Thomas and his Philadelphia supporters saw the opposition as a "Quaker opposition" and condemned it as such. Supporters of the legislature made the same connection, seeing the cause they backed as the Quaker cause; it was the Quakers, the freeholders concluded, who were best equipped to protect their rights and anyone of that religious affiliation who joined with the executive's Anglican and Presbyterian supporters was no longer a real Quaker but an "unsteady person."[86] This association of free-holder rights and Assembly privileges with Quakerism led to a new kind of polarization in Pennsylvania politics. The old term "proprietary-Quaker" had lost its relevance; henceforth political

dynamics would involve interplay between a strong "Quaker" co-alition of popular politicians and a diffuse, often divided "proprietary-executive" political interest. □

Notes

[1]For example see Gary B. Nash, *Quakers and Politics. Pennsylvania, 1681-1726.* (Princeton, 1968); William S. Hanna, *Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics* (Stanford, 1964); James H. Hutson, *Pennsylvania Politics, 1746-1770, The Movement for Royal Government and its Consequences* (Princeton, 1972); Benjamin F. Newcomb, *Franklin and Galloway, A Political Partnership* (New Haven, 1972).

[2]Alan Tully "Proprietary Affairs in Pennsylvania, 1726-1739."

[3]James T. Mitchell and Henry Flanders ed., The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682-1801 (Harrisburg, 1896-1915) IV, 322-326, Hereinafter Cites as *Statutes at Large.*

[4]The four Quakers were Jonathan Robeson, William Mongton, Job Goodson, and Morris Morris, all members from Philadelphia County.

[5]William Allen to John Penn, November 17, 1739, March 27, 1741, Penn Papers, Official Correspondence, III. Hereinafter Cited as PPOC. Gertrude Mackinney ed., *Votes adn Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania Archives,* 8th series (Harrisburg, 1931-35), III, 2508, 2657. Hereinafter Cited as *Votes.* Unless otherwise mentioned all manuscripts cited are in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

[6]William Allen to John Penn, November 27, 1741, PPOC. III.

[7]Minutes, Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, 1681-1746, 417. Hereinafter cited as YM. This advice was not formally passed on to the monthly meetings until after the election. For example, see Minutes, Chester Quarterly Meeting, 1683-1813, 155. Friends' Historical Lebrary, Swarthmore College.

[8]Votes, III, 2657.

[9]*Ibid.* See also Alan Tully, *William Penn's Legacy; Politics and Social Structure in Provincial Pennsylvania, 1726-1755.* (Forthcoming, the Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimaor, 1977), Appendix I.1.

[10]Samuel Blunston to Proprietary, November 16, 1740, Lancaster County Misc. Papers, 1742-1772.

[11]*Votes,* III, 2512, 2529-2531, 2535-2538, 2540-2545; Governor Thomas to John Penn, November 5, 1739, PPOC, III; John Penn to Governor Thomas, August 2, 1739, Penn Papers, Thomas Penn Letterbook 1. hereinafter cited as TBLB. *Pennsylvania Archives,* 1st ser., I, 577. Herinafter cited as *PA.* Samuel Hazard ed., *Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia and Harrisburg, 1852-1853), IV 350-351. Hereinafter cited as *CR.*

[12]Governor Thomas expressed his lack of faith in Quaker sincerity as early as November 1739. Governor Thomas to John Penn, November 5, 1739, PPOC, III. See also *Votes,* III, 2551. The Assembly harassed Thomas in a variety of ways. In the January and May sessions, for example, the legislators undertook to frame a bill placing all of the effec-

tive powers of levying and appropriating money in Philadelphia City in the hands of elected officials. Thomas interpreted this bill—correctly—as an attack on the powers of the city magistrates, many of whom were his political allies. *Votes*, III, 2529, 2534,2538, 2553-2554, 2557, 2573-2578, 2579-2585; *CR*, IV, 376-379. The Assembly also omitted the Governor's messages to the Assembly in the January session from the published set of Assembly journals. *Votes*, III, 2572.

[13] John Reynell to Daniel Flexney, April 30, 1740, John Reynell Letter Book, 1738-1741, Coates-Reynell Papers.

[14] *PA*. 1st ser., I, 581-583, 2nd ser., VII 238-239; *CR*, IV, 395-397; *Votes*, III, 2609-2610, 2619-2620.

[15] *Votes*, III, 2564, 2570, 2587, 2620; John Kinsey's Opinion on the Enlisting of Servants, Penn Papers, Assembly and Provincial Council.

[16] *Votes*, III, 2593.

[17] *Ibid*., 2594.

[18] *Ibid*., 2588-2590, 2590-2592, 2594-2596, 2619, 2621, IV, 2755; *PA*., 2nd ser., VII, 238-239, 1st ser., I, 594-595, 616-619; Richard Peters to John Penn, July 31, 1740, Peters Papers, Richard Peters Letter Book. Hereinafter cited as RPLB.

[19] *Votes*, III, 2600-2604, 2617-2627, IV, 2742. Governor Thomas defended his enlistment of 7 companies by referring to the Duke of Newcastle's orders which instructed Thomas to raise "as great a number of men" as he "possibly could." *Votes*, III, 2599.

[20] And several times in the course of the dispute the Assembly spokesmen stated that while they would not appropriate money for wartime use, they could vote a gift to the King's use. *Votes*, III, 2594-2596, 2619, 2658-2659.

[21] *PA*, 2nd ser., VII, 238-239. At a later date Isaac Norris, Jr., observed that the vote created "difficulties" for some members but it is impossible to tell what role these private reservations played in motivating the Assemblymen to take any of the positions that they publicly embraced. Isaac Norris, Jr., to Robert Charles, March 31, 1741, Norris Papers, Isaac Norris Letter Book, 1719-1756. Hereinafter cited as INLB.

[22] William Allen to John Penn, March 27, 1741, PPOC, III.

[23] *Votes*, III, 2605-2611, 2680-2681; William Allen to John Penn, March 27, 1741, PPOC, III.

[24] See the various exchanges between Governor and Assembly during 1739-40 in *Votes*, III.

[25] Governor Thomas to John Penn, March 15, 1739, PPOC, III; *Votes*, III, 2615-2616, 2629-2630.

[26] William Moore, an Anglican who had been an outright advocate of defense preparations met defeat in Chester County; Thomas Edwards, a Quaker turned Anglican, and Benjamin Jones, a Presbyterian, both of whom apparently had been too conciliatory, were rejected in Lancaster and Bucks Counties respectively. Isreal Pemberton, Sr. to John Hunt, November 8, 1740, Pemberton Papers, III. Hereinafter cited as Pem. P. *Votes*, III, 2663.

[27] Of approximately 1,800 votes. Isaac Norris, Jr. to Robert Charles. October 11, 1740, INLB, 1719-1756.

[28] The old proprietary friend Jeremiah Langhorne had managed to secure the last available seat for Bucks for a one vote margin, but he was too sick to attend the Assembly. *Ibid*.

[29] *Ibid*.

[30] Board of Trade Papers, Proprietaries, XV, T43; Samuel Blunston to Proprietor, November 16, 1740, Lancaster County Misc. Papers, 1742-1772; Richard Peters to John Penn, July 31, 1740, RPLB; John Reynell to Daniel Flexney, July 31, 1740, John Reynell Letter Book, 1738-1741, Coates-Reynell Papers; *PA*, 2nd ser., Vii, 238-239; "Logan-Story Correspondence, 1724-1741," ed. by Norman Penny, *Friends' Historical Association Bulletin*, 15 (1926), 84-90.

[31] Richard Partridge to John Kinsey, Israel Pemberton, Sr., Isaac Norris, Jr. and Thomas Leech, February 7, 1741, Pem. P., III. Governor Thomas very skilfully exploited the inconsistencies in the Assembly statements. *Votes*, III, 2605-2611, 2632-2638. Michael Lightfoot, a Pennsylvania Friend travelling in England at that time spent considerable effort selling the Quaker position to English Friends. Michael Lightfoot to Israel Pemberton, Sr., February 26, 1741, Pem. P., III.

[32] *Votes*, III, 2601, 2618. Kinsey's reluctance to admit the disagreement stemmed partly from the importance he attributed to solidarity during the course of a dispute but mainly from his Quaker concern for consensus. It was easier for him to invent excuses for the Assembly's adjournment than to admit division. See Tully, *William Penn's Legacy*, Chapter VIII.

[33] The vote of £3,000 was conditional on the release of the servants and was to be appropriated within 9 months. The Governor and his friends claimed that such a time period was not long enough for a bill of exchange to be negotiated and, consequently, that the vote was another example of Assembly duplicity. The legislators replied that what they had, in fact, meant was that the Governor could spend the money without waiting for the Crown's appropriation. Their failure to state this at the time of the vote allowed the executive spokesmen to represent the terms of the grant to the English as impossible conditions—one more instance of Assembly insincerity. *Votes*, III, 2630-2631, 2632-2638, 2648-2659; John Penn to Thomas Penn, October 20, 1740, John Penn to James Logan, March 9. 1741. TPLB, I.

[34] *Votes*, III, 2631; John and Richard Penn to Thomas Penn, November 20, 1740, TPLB, I. The new colonial agent Richard Partridge pointed out how foolish the terms of the petition were. The only positive step he could think of, was to ask for a censure of Governor Thomas for personally encouraging the enlistment of servants. Partridge kept sending excuses for his delay in presenting the petition and, he never did present it. Mabel P. Wolff, *The Colonial Agency of Pennsylvania, 1712-1757* (Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 1933), 99-100.

[35] Richard Partridge to John Kinsey *et al.*, February 7, 1741, Pem. P., III; Board of Trade Papers, Proprietaries, XV T42; Thomas Penn to John and Richard Penn, March 23, 1741, Penn Papers, Small Letter Book; Thomas Penn to John Paris, March 27, 1741, PPOC, III.

[36] John Penn to Governor Thomas, March 7, 1741, June 21, 1741, John Penn to John Kinsey, March 15, 1741,TPLB; I; Governor Thomas to John Penn, March 25, 1741, PPOC, III.

[37] Richard Peters to Proprietaries, November 14, 1741, RPLB; Richard Peters to John Penn, November 20, 1741, William Allen to John Penn, November 16, 1741, Governor Thomas to John Paris, May 14, 1741, PPOC, III; John Penn to Governor Thomas, October 14, 1741, TPLB, I; Board of Trade Papers, Proprietaries, XV, T54; Wolff, Colonial Agency, 95.

Penn had publicly associated himself with the Governor's actions and shared Thomas' conviction that the Quakers should be disqualified from the Assembly. Thomas Penn to John and Richard Penn, March 23, 1741, Penn Papers, Small Letter Book; *Votes*, III, 2629-2630, 2689-2690, IV, 2738, 2742.

[38] William Allen to Thomas Penn, October 24, 1741, PPOC, III.

[39] *CR*, IV, 532. In Bucks County the deathly ill Jeremiah Langhorne was finally left out and in Philadelphia City the pro-ddfense Anglican, Dr. John Kearsley was replaced by Quaker Sympathized Oswald Peele. The city election for 2 burgesses was a contest, apparently, but a very disorganized one. After it was over, Richard Peters reported that Peele and the Governor had clashed over some matter in the recent past and that his candidacy was "so gross an affront . . . some of us publically voted for Robert Duncan and Edward Plodwold." Richard Peters to Thomas Penn, October 8, 1741, RPLB. In the election for alderman and common councilmen in the Philadelphia Corporation the Governor's friends were determined to keep control out of "their Quaker hands." The Quaker supporters of the Assembly were so effectively and rudely shut out that a number, including Samuel Preston, Israel Pemberton, Sr., Isaac Norris, Jr., James Morris and Samuel Mifflin walked out of the

meeting in a rage. William Allen to Thomas Penn, October 24, 1741, PPOC, III.

[40]Thomas Cookson to Conrad Weiser, September 12, 1741, Correspondence of Conrad Weiser, I, 1741-1756; Richard Peters to Thomas Penn, October 8, 1741, RPLB. Minutes, Philadelphia YM, 1747-1749, 55. Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore College. For Weiser's letters see "Two Addresses of Conrad Weiser to the German Voters of Pennsylvania," *PMHB*, 23 (1899), 516-521; for Christopher Saur's replies see "Answer to Conrad Weiser's published Letter to the Germans," September 29, 1741, PPOC, III.

[41]Governor Thomas to John Penn, March 25, 1741, PPOC, III; John Penn to Governor Thomas, June 21, 1741, TPLB, I.

[42]William Allen to Thomas Penn, October 24, 1741, PPOC, III.

[43]*Votes*, IV, 2709.

[44]For a sample of Penn's whiggish notions see John Penn to Governor Thomas, August 16, 1742, TPLB, I. John Kinsey and his associates were certainly aware that differences of sentiment and opinion did exist between John and Thomas Penn. They probably did not know, however, how great those differences had been. Before the present crisis the two brothers had disagreed over the advisability of selling Pennsylvania and over whether Thomas Penn should become chief executive on Governor Gordon's death in 1736. On the latter issue John heeded the advice of James Logan and of the London Quakers despite Thomas' apparent willingness to shoulder the responsibility. John Penn to Thomas Penn, February 4, 1736, October 10, 1736, June 6, 1737, John and Richard Penn to Thomas Penn, August 10, 1736, John Penn to Andrew Hamilton, February 17, 1737, TPLB, I.

[45]On July 14, 1741 Governor Thomas wrote the following to John Penn: "Nothing can hurt them here but a rupture with France; for they are able to outlie our friends and have, besides the advantage of having opposed the King's measures, cut off the Governor's support and saved the province a very considerable sum of money, not to say anything of their declared emnity to the proprietors who are so unreasonable as to make the people pay their quitrents and the money due for the purchase of theirlands." PPOC, III.

[46]Governor Thomas to John Penn, October 27, 1741, PPOC, III.

[47]*Votes*, IV, 2706-2707; Richard Peters to John Penn, November 20, 1741, PPOC, III; Richard Peters to John Penn, October 20, 1741, Richard Peters to Proprietaries, October 27, 1741, RPLB.

[48]Richard Peters to John Penn, October 20, 1741, RPLB. Local law allowed the Governor to choose one of the two candidates who had received the greatest number of votes.

[49]Richard Peters to John Penn, November 20, 1741, PPOC, III.

[50]*Votes*, III, 2672-2673, 2678-2679, IV, 2752-2763, 2786-2803; *CR*, IV, 496-498, 507-541.

[51]*The Pennsylvania Gazette*, June 17, 1742; William Allen to Thomas Penn, November 20, 1742, PPOC, III; Richard Peters to Thomas Penn, June 7, 1742, June 5, 1742, RPLB.

[52]Richard Peters to John Penn, March 1, 1742, June 5, 1742, RPLB; Richard Hockley to Thomas Penn, March 1, 1742, May 27, 1742, PPOC, III.

John Penn did not want to jeopardize the Quaker right to participate in the government. John Penn to John Kinsey, March 3, 1742, RPLB, I. On the Proprietary determination to fight the election see William Allen to Thomas (?) Penn, July 8, 1742, PPOC, III.

[53]Richard Peters to Thomas Penn, June 5, 1742, Richard Peters to Proprietaries, August 25, 1742, RPLB; Isaac Norris, Jr. to Robert Charles, November 21, 1742, INLB, 1719-1756.

[54]Richard Peters to Proprietaries, November 17, 1742, RPLB.

[55]William Allen to John Penn, March 27, 1741, William Allen to Thomas (?) Penn, July 8, 1742, PPOC, III; Governor Thomas to Conrad Weiser, September 9, 1742, Peters Mss., I, 1697-1743; Richard Peters to Proprietaries, November 17, 1742, RPLB.

[56]Until 1739 freeholders chose election inspectors in each county on the morning

of election day. When the presiding election official called out the names of "substantial freeholders" eligible voters who supported the nomination moved to stand beside the nominee; if a majority of the voters present stood by him the candidate was elected. This procedure continued until the proper number of inspectors had been chosen. In Philadelphia this number was eight. Unfortunately "disorderly person, many of whom not being qualified to vote" had, on occasion" mixed themselves among the electors at the time of choosing inspectors, and (had) by their rude and disorderly behaviour, disturbed the electors and created strife and quarrels." It often happened, too, that all inspectors were chosen from one part of the county and none were acquainted with the qualifications of men who came from remote townships. Consequently, in 1739 the method of electing inspectors was changed. Each township, or ward in the case of Philadelphia, elected a candidate for inspector on September 25. On October 1 the inspectors were chosen by lot from among those candidates. After being in force for three elections, this law expired in May 1742 and the old procedure for choosing inspectors by view on election day morning had to be revived. *Statutes at Large*, IV, (77-80); Richard Hockley to Thomas Penn, November 1, 1742, PPOC, III.

[57]Richard Peters to Proprietaries, November 17, 1742, RPLB. "Voting officials on a balcony at the front of the court house received a ticket from each voter indicating his choice of candidates. Citizens delivered their tickets up a flight of stairs from the street level to the balcony, then walked down the stairs on the opposite side." William T. Parsons, "The Bloody Election of 1742," *Pennsylvania History* 36 (1969), 293. See also Leonard, "Elections in Colonial Pennsylvania," 393-394.

[58]Richard Peters to Proprietaries, November 17, 1742, RPLB.

[59]*Ibid*-

[60]The best contemporary description of the riot is in Richard Peters' letter of November 17, 1742 to the Proprietors, RPLB. The affidavits of numerous witnesses are published in *Votes*, IV, 2947-3009. Two recent articles on the topic are Norman S. Cohen, "The Philadelphia Election Riot of 1742," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 92 (1968), 306-319; William T. Parson, "The Bloody Election of 1742," *Pennsylvania History* 36 (1969), 290-306.

[61]Parsons, "Bloody Election of 1742," 300. According to Richard Peters, Joseph Turner (William Allen's business partner) and John Sober "spoke to some captains to have a number of sailors ready in case they should be wanted." Richard Peters to Proprietaries, November 17, 1742, RPLB.

[62]Richard Peters to Proprietors, November 17, 1742, RPLB; Parsons, "Bloody Election," 290, 295-296,

Three days before the election James Logan warned William Allen "to guard with thy utmost endeavours against all manner of violence whatsoever which I am not without apprehension on the choice of inspectors." James Logan to William Allen, September 27, 1742, Logan Papers, James Logan Letter Book, 1731-1732, 1741-1742. William Allen's behavior on election day is clearly set out in the affidavits that the Assembly published, *votes*, IV, 2957-3009. For other evidence pointing to Allen's approbation if not complicity see Richard Hockley to Thomas Penn, March 10, 1744, PPOC, IV; Thomas Penn to Richard Peters, February 25, 1743, TPLB, I; Parsons, "Bloody Election," 300-303.

[63] *Votes*, IV, 2828-2830,. 2843-2850.

[64]Richard Peters to Proprietaries, January 30, 1743, RPLB; *Votes*, IV, 2851-2852, 2855, 2856, 2864, 2864-2865, 2865-2866; Richard Peters to Thomas Penn, March 4, 1742, RPLB; Isaac Norris, Jr., to Robert Charles, January 22, 1743, INLB, 1719-1756.

[65]Governor Thomas to John Penn, June 4, 1742, November 17, 1742, PPOC, III; Richard Peters to Proprietors, August 25, 1742, November 17, 1742, RPLB; *Votes*, IV, 2782, 2783-2784.

[66]For example see *Votes*, IV, 2786-2803.

[67]Governor Thomas to John Penn, July 14, 1741, Governor Thomas to John Paris, May 14, 1741, PPOC, III.

[68] John Penn to John Kinsey, March 3, 1742, John Penn to Colonel Thomas, May 19, 1743, TPLB, I; Richard Partridge to John Kinsey, February 17, 1743, Pem. P., III.

[69] Thomas Penn to Colonel Thomas, September 17, 1742, February 26, 1743, Thomas Penn to William Allen, February 26, 1743, TPLB, II; Thomas Penn to Richard Peters, August 22, 1743, Penn Papers, Saunders-Coates.

[70] Richard Peters to John Penn, August 30, 1740, RPLB; Richard Hockley to Thomas Penn, June 27, 1742, PPOC, III; Richard Peters to Proprietors, October 17, 1742, RPLB.

[71] Richard Peters to John Penn, March 1, 1742, RPLB; *Statutes at Large*, IV, 360-394.

[72] More than anything else, Richard Peters blamed the Philadelphia defense petition for bringing on the hostilities that culminated in the 1742 riot. Richard Peters to John Penn, March 1, 1742, RPLB.

[73] *Votes*, IV, 2777.

[74] There was the chance, too, that if Thomas was made miserable enough he might resign.

[75] *CR*, IV, 496-498, 507-541.

[76] Richard Peters to John Penn, March 1, 1742, RPLB.

[77] *Votes*, IV, 2739.

[78] For Logan's letter to the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, advocating defensive war see PMHB, 4 (1882), 403-411. It is probable that the Joseph Kirkbride-Lawrence Growdon ticket attracted the votes of some Quaker moderates who were not particularly strong for defense appropriations but who wanted to soften the tone of the old Quaker representatives. John Watson, John Hall, and Joseph Shaw, all confederates of the radical James Morris were from Bucks and if electors did not agree with their strategy the only realistic alternative they had was to vote for some members of the other ticket. Richard Peters to Thomas Penn, January 30, 1743, RPLB.

[79] Kinsey's fears may be traced in the Partridge-Kinsey correspondence, Pem. P. For example see Richard Partridge to John Kinsey, May 13, 1743, July 30, 1743, February 2, 1745, February 14, 1745, Pem. P., III.

[80] Richard Peters to Proprietors, August 25, 1742, RPLB; John Fothergill to Israel Pemberton, Jr., April 8, 1742, Pem. P., III.

[81] Richard Peters to Thomas Penn, March 4, 1743, RPLB.

[82] The eight dissenting votes were cast by James Morris, Joseph Trotter, Oswald Peele, Edward Warner, Robert Jones, John Watson, Joseph Shaw, and John Hall. Those who used their influence to promote accommodation were John Kinsey, Isaac Norris, Samuel Blunston and Israel Pemberton, Sr. Richard Peters to Proprietaries, January 30, 1743, RPLB. The question of personal motivation was raised by contemporaries in the case of John Kinsey, Samuel Blunston and Isaac Norris but unfortunately, the relevant correspondence is no longer extant. Thamas Penn to Colonel Thomas, May 3, 1743, TPLB, II.

[83] For example, Samuel Blunston convinced many that the reason the executive wanted a militia was to enforce land payments and ejectments. Richard Peters to Proprietaries, November 17, 1742, RPLB. See also Isaac Norris Jr. to Robert Charles, May 12, 1741, INLB, 1719-1756.

[84] In 1754, the freeholders of Northampton and Cumberland returned representatives William Parsons and John Armstrong, both of whom had strong proprietary connecctions.

[85] See Tully, *William Penn's Legacy*, Chapter V. With the exception of Bucks County where the peculiar internecine nature of the divisions kept rivalry alive in the 1743 election no opposition ticket appeared until 1754. Isaac Norris to Robert Charles, October 1, 1743, INLB, 1719-1756.

[86] Minutes, Philadelphia YM, 1747-1779, 55. Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore College. □

About the Contributor

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