



*The Idealist  
as Opportunist*

*An Analysis of Thaddeus Stevens'  
Support in Lancaster County  
1843-1866*

By Andrew Robertson

*Introduction*

*I*n 1858, Lancaster county voters performed an act that is unique in American history: in the election that year, they made the President of the United States, their adopted son, James Buchanan, a constituent of his mortal enemy, Thaddeus Stevens. Other Presidents have often had to contend with representatives from their home districts who were members of the opposition party but never before or since has such a representative risen so meteorically to the pinnacle of opposition leadership. while his most renowned constituent continued to reside in the White House. When President James Buchanan stood by and watched the South secede from the Union, his representative in Congress wrote to a friend about his prominent constituent, "Buchanan is a very traitor."<sup>1</sup>

It would seem surprising that two such vastly different men could be elected to high national office and become so bitterly opposed when they resided in the same small city. The contrast between the two men has been

drawn many times—Buchanan was tall, handsome, and gregarious while Stevens was clubfooted, bald, and possessed a malignant wit.

Buchanan was a defender of the immigrant's rights and of white supremacy; Stevens had been a nativist and would become the champion of the rights of the ex-slave. Buchanan died in Lancaster in obscurity, suitably mourned by his neighbors and forgotten, while his enemy died at the peak of his career and was remembered across the nation for a long time.<sup>2</sup> Stevens left a legacy of bitterness in the South but he also bequeathed to Americans the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, which he, more than anyone else, relentlessly drove toward enactment. Buchanan's lasting accomplishments, at least as President, would be more difficult to expound upon.

It is extraordinary that a city the size of Lancaster should have contributed these two men, of extreme opposite political persuasions, to the front ranks of their respective parties in the space of one decade. (Lancaster at the time was not even among the 50 largest cities of the United States.) The extraordinary careers of Lancaster's two leading citizens prompted this investigation into Stevens' support. Though Buchanan had little strength outside of his home city (and never received a majority of Lancaster county votes), Thaddeus Stevens was re-elected every time he ran for Congress by considerable margins.

The question that spurred this investigation was: how did the foremost Radical Republican come to receive the overwhelming support of a constituency on the Mason-Dixon line, a constituency that has always been noted for its stability, its prosperity and its conservative politics?

The answer is relatively complex and covers a period of time long before Stevens' arrival in Lancaster in 1842 at the age of 50. To give an adequate perspective to Stevens' political career in Lancaster, some attention must be paid to his previous political career—as Assemblyman from Gettysburg, as a leader of the Antimasonic party, and as a leading strategist in the Buckshot War.

Stevens was a conniving politician and an opportunist. He gave evidence of his opportunism in his espousal of the nativist cause. Yet Stevens was also a brilliant political strategist—he used nativism first to achieve recognition from, and later to destroy, the formidable Whig conservative (or Silver Grey) organization in Lancaster county.

Through his whole career, Stevens subordinated his means to his ends. Yet when those ends were noble, as in his defense of the Pennsylvania public school system and in his agitation for an end to slavery, his talents of persuasion were astonishing. He was a unique character in American history, his malevolence and propensity for meanness toward his enemies has scarcely been equalled, though when he engaged them in debate, even his most bitter opponents had to laugh at their own expense, spurred by his black wit, a wit that somehow always seemed to possess a certain charm.

Who were the people of Lancaster county that voted for this remarkable man? Part Two of this investigation deals with his electoral support in Lancaster county from 1843 as a new resident and leader of a small faction, until 1866, when he was "the Great Commoner" and the virtual prime minister of the United States.

This period covers the complex realignment of political parties in 1854-1856 and to clarify the realignment and how Stevens benefitted from it, the first section of Part Two deals with the consistency of voting behavior in Lancaster county jurisdictions.

The second section of Part Two deals with economic, ethnic, and religious correlations<sup>3</sup> to the consistencies of voting behavior that showed up in the first section of Part Two.

This paper is an attempt to explain how Thaddeus Stevens appealed to the people who voted for him—how he moved from being an object of suspicion to a position of respect and finally how he came to hold the affection, even of Lancaster city's Democrats, who would point out to visitors his house at Queen and Vine Streets as "Old Thad's house."<sup>4</sup> This paper deals with how Thaddeus Stevens became "Old Thad" to the people of Lancaster county.

## *Part One.*

### *Stevens the Politician*

#### *Chapter 1*

Without going into detailed biography of Mr. Stevens, a sketch of the pertinent details of his political career is in order. Thaddeus Stevens first arrived in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania in September, 1816, and opened a law office there. He was born in Vermont and had grown up there, attending Burlington College and Dartmouth, graduating from the latter in 1814. He read law in York, Pa. for a year and passed his bar exam by going to Bel Air, Maryland—half a day's journey—and expounding on Coke, Blackstone and Gilbert (after first presenting the judge with the traditional gift of two bottles of Madeira).<sup>1</sup> In this way he evaded a York County Bar rule, enacted specifically against him, which forbade an examination to be given to a law student who had not read for more than a year full time.<sup>2</sup>

By 1821, Thaddeus Stevens had become a prosperous attorney, with enough extra capital to invest in real estate and iron foundries. This did not prevent him from taking fees where he could get them. In his first appearance before the State Supreme Court, he argued a case for a slaveowner to retrieve his hired-out slave. Two years later, however, he proposed a Fourth of July toast to "the next President. May he be a freeman, who never riveted fetters on a human slave."<sup>3</sup> He was fairly consistent thereafter in his low opinion of slave-

holding politicians and their supporters in the North.

In 1829, he became an enthusiastic supporter of the new Antimasonic movement.\* He called a meeting in the Gettysburg Courthouse to oppose secret societies. The result of the meeting was the foundation of the Adams County Antimasonic Party. Soon afterward, he launched a new weekly in Gettysburg, the *Anti-Masonic Star*, which he published until he moved to Lancaster. The *Star* helped to carry Adams County for Joseph Ritner when he ran for Governor on the Antimasonic ticket. At the Antimasonic National Convention in 1831, Stevens wielded considerable power. Two years later Stevens was elected to the first of six terms in the State House of Representatives. In 1836, Ritner was elected to the Governorship and a favorable legislative majority resulted from a coalition of Antimasons and Whigs. Stevens became chairman of a legislative committee appointed to investigate Freemasonry, a committee which conducted itself, in the eyes of some newspapers, in the manner of a "Star Chamber."<sup>5</sup> Even after a House vote curtailed the committee and most other Antimasons had given up the ghost, Stevens proclaimed that it would soon be obvious to people that "there was no other question than Masonry and Anti-Masonry."<sup>6</sup>

Yet despite his partisan rhetoric, Stevens had collaborated in 1834 with then-Governor George Wolfe, a Democrat and a Freemason, to secure passage of a free school bill. It passed with only a single dissenting vote. When the legislators returned to their constituents, however, they found themselves in trouble. Thirty-two thousand people throughout the state signed a petition to repeal the law. Only 2500 petitioned to sustain it. On April 11, 1835 a vote was scheduled for repeal of the free school law. It was deemed political suicide to oppose repeal. Both Gov. Wolfe and Stevens stood their ground. Stevens, without preparation, gave a speech of such eloquence and intensity that members of the Senate came running from the other side of the Capitol to hear it. When Stevens finished, the galleries and floor were packed and the room erupted in cheers and shouts of "Vote! Vote!" Instead of repeal, Stevens' substitute amendment fortifying the Free Public School Act was passed by a vote of over two-to-one.

Two other escapades in Stevens' early political career merit attention. He tried in 1836 to obtain a charter for Nicholas Biddle's United States Bank in a bill entitled "An Act to Repeal the State Tax on Real and Personal Property, and to continue and extend the Improvements of the State by Railroads and other purposes." After three previously opposed Democrats changed their votes in favor of the bill, opponents raised the question of bribery. The Committee found no evidence of corruption, but then the Committee appointed to

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\* The Antimasonic party was originally formed to oppose the alleged political power wielded by members of secret societies, particularly the Freemasons. President Andrew Jackson and many influential Democrats were active lodge members. The Antimasonic party was, therefore, a party opposed to the Democrats, Jackson in particular.

investigate the charges was chaired by Stevens himself. Among other provisions in the bill was one providing that since its profits were to be untaxed, the bank would give a \$675,000 contribution for public improvements, and \$500,000 for the public school system. Also, \$200,000 would go for construction of a Gettysburg Railway which (not entirely by coincidence) ran by iron foundries owned by Stevens. Its circuitous route past the iron foundries earned it the nickname, "The Tapeworm Railroad."

*I*n the fall of 1838, Stevens became involved as a leading general in the Buckshot War—one of the seamiest election disputes in Pennsylvania's history. According to his biographer Korngold, when the election of 1838 drew near, the Whig-Antimasonic coalition looked to Stevens as their chief strategist. His reward would be a place in the U. S. Senate. Korngold cites a rumor that he wagered \$100,000 on a favorable outcome<sup>7</sup> (which attests not only to Stevens' reputation as an inveterate gambler, but also to his material success at the time). He got Governor Ritner to appoint him to the Board of Canal Commissioners and he proceeded on what he referred to as a "missionary tour" of the state.<sup>8</sup> He visited contractors engaged in public works and persuaded them to contribute to Ritner's campaign fund—cynically disguised as an education fund for canal workers' children. He convinced them, furthermore, to enlarge their crews around election time and insure by whatever means necessary that the men voted for Ritner. He apparently suggested that a good means of securing their loyalty was to get the workers to wager on Ritner. Although these charges were made by his opponents, even Korngold, the most sympathetic of Stevens' recent biographers, acknowledges that the charges "contained a fair amount of truth."<sup>9</sup>

When it came time to count the ballots, it looked as though the Governorship had fallen into the Democratic candidate's lap. The outlook for the lower house of the legislature was more hopeful and the Whig-Antimasonic coalition remained in firm control in the State Senate.<sup>10</sup> With a majority in both houses, it would still be possible to elect Stevens to the U. S. Senate. The contest to control the assembly was intense and there were well-substantiated charges of massive fraud on both sides. In Lycoming County a convenient break in the canal gave Stevens an excuse to pour in workers, resulting in a Whig majority of over 500 votes—more than the number of eligible voters in the entire county.<sup>11</sup>

The real contest, though, centered in Philadelphia in what was called the Northern Liberties district—an outlying part of the city that contained the social outcasts, which was notorious for granting its vote to the highest bidder. The Democratic-controlled Board of Election Returns had thrown out the Northern Liberties vote while the Whig minority on the Board had sent them to Harrisburg with the Sheriff, which was the legal procedure. The Democrats later sent their own returns by courier.

Stevens and Thomas Burrowes, the Secretary of State, then planned a

strategy. The House would seat only those applicants certified upon the “. . . returns furnished by the Secretary of the Commonwealth,”<sup>13</sup> who was none other than Thomas Burrowes. With a headstart in seating, the strategists felt they might organize the House and elect Stevens Senator before they could be overturned.

When Stevens arrived in Harrisburg, however, he recognized that the ensuing events would not be that simple. When the House convened on December 4, 1838, the galleries were packed with what he later described as “brothel-keepers, journey-men butchers, professional boxers, and discharged convicts.”<sup>14</sup> They spilled over from the gallery onto the floor where, as Stevens later described it:

My seat had the honor of being guarded by eight or ten of the most desperate brawlers of Kensington and Spring Garden (districts in Philadelphia). Most of them wore coats with outside pockets in which their hands were generally thrust, and it was afterward ascertained that they were armed with double-barreled pistols, bowie knives and dirks.<sup>15</sup>

This was not a time for the Whigs to play—or overplay—their hand. Stevens suggested both factions should elect a Speaker “until the law decided between them.”<sup>16</sup> The Democrats agreed. When it came time for the Whig-dominated Senate to recognize one speaker or the other, the Senate galleries were packed with the same visitors from Philadelphia, who had finally realized that “the law” in this case was the Whig-controlled Senate. After the first attempt to swear in the Whig contestants, the crowd in the gallery began shouting, stamping, and clapping until they finally “had complete possession of the place.” At this point the crowd grew so menacing that Stevens and the Whig leaders (after hearing from reliable sources that they were to be “stabbed or knifed”) were obliged to leave—via a window in an anteroom.<sup>17</sup>

Governor Ritner called in the militia to keep order, with rounds of buckshot to be supplied to the troops, thus prompting the name “Buckshot War” for this whole affair. But Ritner, fearing a mutiny of the troops, instructed them not to enter the State Capitol grounds. With order restored, the Democratic House sat in its chamber while the Whig-Antimasonic “Stevens’ Rump” met in a nearby hotel. But three Whigs went over to the Democratic “Hopkins” house (named after its Speaker, William Hopkins), thereby unquestionably legitimizing this body. On Christmas Day, the Senate recognized the Hopkins House by 17 to 16 and the “War” was over. Stevens refused to join the “band of rebels”<sup>18</sup> until the pressure from his constituents forced him to do so. The Democrats did not oblige him in his return, however. When Stevens took his seat in the second session, he was declared to have been in contempt of the House by a committee which noted his failure to occupy his seat during the first session. They decided that he had forfeited his seat and they declared a special election to fill the vacancy. An unforeseen circumstance had not helped Stevens’ defense. The daughter of a Gettysburg acquaintance gave birth to a child out of

wedlock and her father brought out a civil suit against Stevens, charging him with "bastardy and fornication."<sup>19</sup> Stevens suspected Democratic leader Thomas McElwee of perpetrating what later turned out to be an obvious slander (McElwee was expelled from the Senate soon after this for slandering another). He heard that the father of the girl had been offered \$20,000 for bringing suit.<sup>20</sup> The father later dropped the suit and Stevens was triumphantly re-elected to the House in a special election on June 14, 1839—after first stating in a letter to his constituents that it was against his inclination to run,

But I will not execute that settled intention when it will be constructed into cowardice and despondency . . . I present myself to you as a candidate to fill that vacancy which was created to wound my and your feelings. . . The question now to be decided is above party consideration, and would be disgraced by sinking it to the level of a party contest.<sup>21</sup>

In 1839, Stevens was out of power in state government but he still had some power among the Antimasons, who had now virtually merged with the Whigs.<sup>22</sup> He expected to lead the Pennsylvania delegation to the Whig National Convention that was to be held in Harrisburg in December 1839. Stevens had also planned to run for another term as State Legislator when he received a letter from William Henry Harrison asking for his support in return for a cabinet position (one source says it was the Postmaster Generalship).<sup>23</sup> Stevens abandoned his re-election plans and set about securing Harrison's nomination. Alexander McClure in his book, *Our Presidents and How We Make Them*, relates a story about how Stevens destroyed Presidential aspirant Winfield Scott's chances of becoming President. Scott had written a confidential letter to Francis Granger of New York in which he proposed certain assurances to be given to New York anti-slavery forces concerning his stand on slavery. Stevens asked for the letter and conveniently dropped it on the floor of the Virginia delegation headquarters—where it was quickly discovered. The Virginians were key supporters of Scott's nomination.<sup>24</sup> Naturally, this ruined Scott's chances and Harrison was elected.

*T*he plum that Stevens expected never fell to earth. Ironically, the Postmaster-Generalship went to Francis Granger. Apparently Stevens struck the Whig hierarchy (especially his old conservative enemies Webster and Clay) as "a leetle too savage a politician," as Horace Greeley put it in 1840.<sup>25</sup> This sentiment was echoed by Harrison himself in a letter to Webster on December 27, 1840, in which he said that he was determined not to bring Stevens into the Cabinet. "We should have no peace with his intriguing, restless, disposition. We will have nobody of that character. . ."<sup>26</sup> Stevens was understandably bitter but he said nothing publicly.

In October of 1841, Harrison was dead and Stevens was becoming increasingly disgusted with Tyler. He made an overture to Winfield Scott on the possibilities for the Whig nomination in 1844. Scott replied politely and, if he knew anything about Stevens' machinations in Harrisburg in December of 1839, he never let on.

Stevens' support of Scott revealed his pragmatism on the slavery issue. A friend, the Rev. Jonathan Blanchard, suggested in a letter that he join the anti-extensionist Liberty Party. Six weeks later Stevens replied that while he agreed with their views, "the only question is as to the means to accomplish it. I have believed that could best be done by declining, *as yet*, to organize a distinct political party." After informing Blanchard of his correspondence with Scott, Stevens noted that Scott had little sympathy with slavery. Better to win with Scott than to lose "with a still more thorough anti-slavery man."<sup>27</sup>

In 1842, Stevens was at the nadir of his political life. He was 50 years old, his power in the Whig party had waned and even in the once-solidly-anti-Democratic Adams County the Whig-Antimasons were defeated at the polls. His financial losses, furthermore, could no longer be borne. He had lost heavily in election bets, especially the one on Ritner's re-election during the "Buckshot War" and his ironworks were near bankruptcy due to his inattention and his partner's incompetence. He wrote to Rev. Blanchard:

I have failed for ninety thousand dollars. I know of no way out of such things than to pay to the uttermost farthing. I may be forced to take advantage of the bankruptcy laws in the next world, but I will never do so in this.<sup>28</sup>

In August, 1842, he left for Lancaster.

At his half-century mark, Stevens had shown himself to be a lawyer of great skill and a politician ready to get his hands dirty (if not ready to wallow knee-deep in mud). He had shown the former attributes in his legal battles, often on behalf of fugitive slaves, which won him the foremost place in the Adams County Bar. His less admirable qualities had revealed themselves in the "Tapeworm Railway" and his legislative inquisitions of the Masons, but he had permanently sullied his reputation in the vile campaign of 1838 and the ensuing Buckshot War.<sup>29</sup> The Harrisonians, while delighted with his aid in their 1840 campaign, were leery of having the commanding general of the Buckshot War in their Cabinet. His political ethics, which thus far seemed to lack any standard of means to pursue an end, had cost him national office.

Yet Stevens had also shown courage in his political career. As a leading delegate to the State Constitutional Convention, he opposed extending the franchise to universal manhood suffrage and he equally vehemently opposed the introduction of a clause limiting the franchise to universal *white* manhood suffrage. He refused to sign the document because of the inclusion of the latter clause. After the Buckshot War he stood up to the slanderers who accused him of seducing a neighbor's daughter and won reelection to his seat. His composure was easily pricked and he sued for libel many times. In one case the damages awarded Stevens required an editor to sell his newspaper at a sheriff's sale to pay them. Stevens bought the newspaper, returned it to the editor, and assigned the remaining unpaid damages to the editor's wife.<sup>30</sup>

His most outstanding accomplishment at this point, however, was his

salvation of the free school system when it was most threatened. Stevens was not an equalitarian—as he demonstrated in voting against extending the franchise—but he believed all men, regardless of race, should have an equal opportunity to have a material stake in the world. Free education for all, he felt, was the best means of accomplishing this end.

Thus it seems that Stevens (like most of humanity) was a complex mixture of good and evil—only more of a complex mixture, perhaps. He could be farsighted and altruistic in his view of education, and yet be mean enough to persecute his Masonic enemies simply to further his own career.

## *Chapter II*

**W**e cannot determine for certain why Stevens went to Lancaster other than out of simple financial necessity. Ms. Brodie believes Stevens was deeply wounded by the slanders perpetrated against him in Gettysburg (one favorite and recurrent rumor had it that Stevens at one time murdered a black girl nine months pregnant with a lightskinned child, reported of course to have been Stevens' offspring).<sup>1</sup> Woodley, on the other hand, feels that Stevens had always harbored a desire to go to the richer, more aristocratic (Woodley calls it "impregnable") inland city which Woodley says intimidated and challenged the young club-footed lawyer on his first journey to Gettysburg.<sup>2</sup>

This author's impression is that Stevens may have wished to escape to Lancaster, to leave his reputation behind. He may also have wished to transfer his political power base to the only area in Pennsylvania with an intact Antimasonic organization.

Stevens, in coming to Lancaster, had put his trust in fate and his own talent. Though he was at first eyed with suspicion by the established members of the bar, Harris, his least sympathetic biographer, notes:

In six months after Mr. Stevens arrived in Lancaster, there was no member of that bar that dared to dispute his intellectual and legal kingship. He was crowned by common consent, and wore the diadem to his grave . . . A success such as this has scarcely a parallel in history.<sup>3</sup>

In May 1843, nine months after arriving in Lancaster, Stevens appeared in four of the six cases from Lancaster County that were before the State Supreme Court. Two years later he appeared in six of the eight cases from Lancaster County before the Supreme Court as well as two from Adams County and one from Franklin County.<sup>4</sup> His strength, Alexander Harris observed, was not in the fine points of the law—he only quoted directly applicable points and those he quoted from memory.<sup>5</sup> He was able to argue a case on a simple and crucial point and he had the ability to recognize immediately on what point it was that the case turned.

Despite his legal virtuosity, Stevens had little political clout in his new

home, except among the unregenerate Antimasons. The Whigs in the County, many of them Masons, could not forget his excesses against them in the legislature. In 1842, Stevens wrote to Winfield Scott:

The Clay men are taking courage again. They soon forget their defeats. It is best to let them have undisturbed sway until after the next election so that they cannot deny that that is a test of their power. They, of course, will be annihilated everywhere, but whether that will teach them wisdom remains to be seen. Our true course seems to me to be to remain on the turf and await events.<sup>6</sup>

While waiting, Stevens attended to his debts. According to Alexander Hood, Stevens in 1844 was able to pay interest on his debts which amounted to \$217,000. His practice was very successful and by 1848, when he first ran for Congress, he had reduced his debts to \$30,000.<sup>7</sup> During this time, he had more young lawyers studying under him than under any other member of the Lancaster Bar. There are many anecdotes that attest to his generosity to his students<sup>8</sup> and most of them became devoted to him. Later, because of his kindness to them, these men would be loyal political supporters and some would be his political proteges (one of his students, Oliver J. Dickey, was his successor in Congress in 1868, and another student, Alexander Hood, would be a charter member of the Republican party and Stevens' most sympathetic contemporary biographer).

In 1843, Stevens decided he had awaited events long enough. He attempted to revive the Antimasonic party. Most of the regular Antimasons, including the influential newspaper, the *Lancaster Examiner*, had defected to the Whig organization in 1842, recognizing that the Antimasonic party was moribund outside Lancaster County.<sup>9</sup> The regular Antimasons also feared that they might again be left out of any victor's spoils at the state or national level as they had been in the 1840 campaign for Harrison. Thus the regular Whig-Antimasonic organization, and its organ, *The Examiner*, supported Henry Clay in 1844. The Stevens Antimasons supported Scott for President, Stevens himself bitterly remembering the treatment he had received from the regular organization Whigs in 1840.

The Stevens Antimasons ran a separate slate of candidates for the Whig State Convention. Among the men nominated to go to this convention was Emmanuel C. Reigart, a prominent lawyer and long-time Stevens associate. Reigart had been an Antimasonic member of the State Legislature in 1835–1837. In 1835, he gave a speech in favor of the suppression of Masonic oaths, a bill introduced by Stevens. In 1837–1838, Reigart generally supported Stevens in the State Constitutional Convention, in which Reigart played a prominent part.<sup>10</sup>

The Regular Whigs informed the State Central Committee that if the Stevens Antimasons were given any seats at the Whig State Convention, the Regulars would bolt the party and refuse to support the ticket.<sup>11</sup> The State Convention rejected the Stevens delegates. Undaunted, the Stevens Antimasons

nominated a full slate within the County, including Anthony E. Roberts, for Congress (Lancaster County had an estimated population of 90,000 in 1844 which entitled the County to its own Congressional seat).<sup>12</sup> Roberts was another Stevens protege who, like Reigart, would figure in later Stevens campaigns. Alexander Hood, mentioned previously as one of Stevens' students, was a candidate for Assembly in this campaign.

Despite the supposed latent strength of Antimasonry in Lancaster County the voters supported the regular organization. Stevens' faction was trounced, polling only fifteen per cent of the vote (see Part II)<sup>13</sup> in the Congressional race—not enough to deny the prize to the regular Whigs and give it to the Democrats. Under the title "Thaddeus Stevens," the *Examiner* wrote a scathing political obituary:

The result of yesterday's election has prostrated this pestilent demagogue beyond the power of resurrection. . . He has been deaf alike to the cause of patriotism and the requisitions of justice. His overthrow is a proof of healthful moral action in the body politic and is one of the most auspicious signs of the times. . . Without the memory of one good deed in his whole political life to cheer his forced retirement, he is destined to chew the bitter cud of disappointed hopes the rest of his days.<sup>14</sup>

"His forced retirement," in the eyes of the Regulars, did not last long. In the following year, 1844, the Whigs nominated Henry Clay for President. The leaders of the party felt it would be in their best interests to reconcile all factions of the party to Clay. It was no secret that Stevens had never been a great admirer of Clay. He held Clay (along with Webster) partially responsible for his being denied a place in the Harrison Cabinet in 1840, and his feelings toward Clay in the interim had not mellowed. He had, moreover, been "grooming" Winfield Scott for the Presidency in 1844 and when the nomination went to Clay, he advised some of his New England supporters to vote for James G. Birney, the candidate of the Liberty Party.<sup>15</sup>

After the nomination, Clay, through his supporters, informed Stevens that "atonement would be made for past wrong"<sup>16</sup> and Stevens accepted the vague promise. He reluctantly campaigned for Clay throughout the state in 1844, surely hoping he would receive an office on the basis of this promise. Polk, of course, defeated Clay in that year, and Stevens found himself again denied national office. He had also lost any veto power he might have had in local Whig politics: John Strohm was nominated as a Congressional candidate by the Lancaster County Whigs in 1844. Strohm was a principal opponent of Stevens in the Whig party; he had been one of the State Senators who voted to recognize the "Hopkins House" in the Buckshot War and later became the Speaker of the Senate—noted, according to Harris, "for his impartiality."<sup>17</sup>

Stevens never again cooperated with the Whigs, except on his own terms. In fact, he never ran again for office as a regular Whig. Realizing that without

electoral support he was lost, Stevens returned to his strategy of "divide and conquer."

Antimasonry, as Stevens recognized, was deadlier than a doornail, but another third party had emerged from the ashes. This was the Native American party. The *Lancaster Examiner* believed it to be a direct descendant of the renegade Antimasonic party.<sup>18</sup> They noted that some Antimasons seemed disturbed by the fact that Presidential candidate Henry Clay had once been a Mason (Clay had been interrogated in 1843 about his connection with Masonry by none other than Emmanuel C. Reigart).<sup>19</sup> David Keller also believes that "(t)he rebel Antimasons of 1843 seem to have composed the backbone of the Native American party a few years later. Its ranks were swelled by some Whigs, supporting it because of economic reasons or simple dissatisfaction with the Whig organization, but it was never a serious threat to Whig hegemony in the county."<sup>20</sup> As Keller also notes, however, the newly-formed Native Americans polled seventeen per cent of the vote in the Congressional election of 1844 and twenty-five per cent of the vote in the Lancaster city municipal elections of 1845.<sup>21</sup> (A discussion in greater detail follows in Part II). In the latter election they outpolled the Whigs in the City by over seven per cent.

While the *Examiner* and the Whig regulars declined to take much notice of the Native Americans,<sup>22</sup> Thaddeus Stevens did. Whether he had been involved in the party from the beginning is a matter for speculation. The Democratic *Lancaster Intelligencer*, unlike the *Examiner*, took up the battle against Nativism in its pages, but it makes no mention of Stevens' involvement with the Nativists at this time.<sup>23</sup>

Whatever his involvement in third party politics, there is some indication that in 1846 Stevens wished to heal his breach with the Whigs. In that year the United States went to war with Mexico. In June a meeting was called to protest President Polk's treatment of General Winfield Scott—Stevens' perennial favorite for the White House. The meeting was chaired by Emmanuel C. Reigart and Thaddeus Stevens was the main speaker. He used the occasion to speak about the desirability of having Scott as the next President of the United States. Scott, Stevens said, would urge a protective tariff because of his "love for native labor and native laborers."<sup>24</sup> This was music to the *Examiner's* ears. It noted that "as all concerned in this meeting have heretofore been looked upon as leaders of the Native American party, we infer that they have wisely abandoned their old organization."<sup>25</sup> Stevens, while mentioning native laborers, went on at much greater length about the tariff, devoting most of his speech to the economic benefits of protectionism. This must have seemed like an overture to the Whigs. Stevens and the Nativists were supporting Scott, whom the *Examiner* happily observed was a regular Whig. Stevens, moreover, had spoken mostly on the tariff, the "ONE GREAT QUESTION" as far as the Whigs were concerned.<sup>26</sup>

In August, however, the Native Americans held their own convention for

nominating a separate ticket. The man they nominated for Congress was none other than Emmanuel C. Reigart, Stevens' long-time supporter.

Perhaps the failure at reconciliation occurred because Stevens was enraged at John Strohm's renomination to Congress by the Whigs. The *Examiner* lamented the Natives' heresy, wishing aloud for the friends of protection to unite and conquer,<sup>27</sup> since "every man of ordinary intelligence (knows) that there is not the slightest chance of the Native party ever succeeding in effecting anything, either at Harrisburg or Washington;—why then, should they persist in maintaining a distinct organization?"<sup>28</sup>

*The Examiner* proved to be right. In the election of 1846, Reigart received eleven per cent of the total vote in the county and eighteen per cent in the city (see Part II). The Whigs, moreover, comfortably outpolled the Natives in the city. Yet Reigart persisted; in 1847 he ran for Governor. He received only 11,000 votes statewide and less than three percent of the vote in his native county. But in that particular gubernatorial race, Francis Shunk, the Democratic candidate, won by less than 18,000 votes. Another 2,000 votes went to J. F. Lemoyne, the Abolitionist candidate for Governor (he did not run in Lancaster County, however). Clearly, if the Whigs were to win statewide office, their first imperative was to unify the anti-Democratic parties into a coalition. That is why Stevens in 1848 received the Whig nomination for Congress. Considering the bitter animosity between the Whigs and the Stevens men, this was not an expected event. Stevens and the Natives had decided to support Zachary Taylor for President. On June 17, 1848, a "monster" rally in support of Taylor was held. At that gathering Emmanuel C. Reigart nominated Stevens for Congress. This sent shock waves through the Whig organization. Quickly they persuaded Abraham Herr Smith to stand against Stevens for the nomination. The latter was a young lawyer from an old Lancaster family. Primary elections were held in each township prior to the Whig County Convention to be held on August 23, 1848. Stevens went throughout the County, campaigning for Taylor. Harris claims that the returns indicated a clear majority of Smith supporters throughout the County, but this claim is not verified.<sup>29</sup>

At the County Convention, Stevens was nominated for Congress on the third ballot, which, in by now overwhelmingly Whiggish Lancaster County, was tantamount to being elected to that office. There were some irregularities in the nomination—Drumore Township elected two sets of delegates to the convention, Whig and Native. When the convention decided to admit one delegate from each set, the Whig delegates withdrew. The Native state obliged by withdrawing also, leaving the township unrepresented.<sup>30</sup>

The *Intelligencer* cited reports that "many of the disappointed applicants complain that there was much 'cheating at the board' and that they were refreshed with many more promises than performances."<sup>31</sup> Alexander Harris

left-handedly accused Stevens of bribery in this campaign, quoting Alexander Hood: “. . . Mr. Stevens was always, but more particularly when he was a candidate, most unmercifully fleeced.” He further quotes Hood’s observation that since 1848 it was impossible to be nominated without spending large sums of money, and the winning candidate was the one who “forks over” the greatest amount.<sup>32</sup> But Stevens had more than money. He was a power among the Nativists and they could divert enough votes to prevent the election of a Whig governor.

The balloting went as follows: on the first ballot, Dr. S. Duffield (a local clergyman) received seven votes, Abraham Herr Smith received seventeen votes, and Thaddeus Stevens received eighteen votes. On the second ballot Duffield received three votes, Smith received nineteen, and Stevens twenty. On the third ballot the votes were one for Duffield, seventeen for Smith, and twenty-three for Stevens.<sup>33</sup> Stevens almost certainly won the nomination because the more astute Whigs recognized the need to consolidate the Nativist vote.

Stevens would at last go to Washington, but his journey had not taken the “high road.” After 1840, Stevens realized the national Whigs would never reward his efforts on their behalf. While he nominally retired from politics from 1844–1848, there is no reason to doubt that he was behind the Native American splinter movement of Emmanuel C. Reigart—especially considering his espousal of “pure” Anti-Masonism in 1843 and later, Know-Nothingism in 1854. It was Reigart, furthermore, who nominated him for Congress after acting as a “spoiler” in the gubernatorial race of the previous year. The *Intelligencer* reported his nomination on August 28, 1848. The article noted that this honor was “the homage paid at all times and by all men, to pre-eminent and distinguished talent,” but there was “little genuine affinity” between the man and the party:

He has frequently exercised himself in the enviable amusement of “whipping in” this tractable party (the Whigs) but beyond the infliction of his *lash*, he has never extended to them any especial mark of his favor. Whilst that Infatuation lasted, Stevens was an *Anti-Mason*, but when (it) had fulfilled its purposes. . . he turned *Native*, by whom his name was introduced at the eleventh hour into the Congressional Canvass and to whom he is indebted for this triumph over the “established church” of Whiggery.<sup>34</sup>

The “established church” knew they could not allow any more disunity in the bright year of 1848. The *Examiner* swallowed its pride, and less than five years after it wrote his political obituary, it hailed his nomination in a quote from another newspaper as “a most excellent one.” They went on to praise “his great and active mind,” useful in “combatting the political heresies and wild schemes of governmental policy” and they praised Stevens as “the uncompromising opponent” of the extension of slavery into free territory.<sup>35</sup>

Stevens was elected to Congress overwhelmingly on October 10, 1848 and to the great relief of the Whig “established church,” the unified anti-Democracy elected a Whig Governor.

From the beginning of the Thirty-first Congress, which met on December 3, 1849, Stevens was a man to be reckoned with. On December 17, he received 27 votes for Speaker—quite an achievement for a freshman representative. He wasted no time in taking the offensive against slavery. He opposed its extension into the territories and he bemoaned the Constitutional compromises that prevented any interference with slavery in the states. He said, nonetheless, he would “stand by all the compromises of the Constitution.”<sup>1</sup>

His constituents knew full well his attitude toward slavery. He was re-nominated in 1850 by acclamation at the Whig County Convention on August 14, 1840. But his dogged opposition to the Compromise (to the detriment of a proposed high tariff bill) reduced his support at home (see Part II). After his first term, Howell Cobb, Speaker of the House, summed up Stevens' impact, saying: “Our enemy has a general now. This man is rich; therefore, we cannot buy him. He does not want higher office; therefore, we cannot allure him. He is not vicious; therefore, we cannot seduce him. He is in earnest. He means what he says. He is bold. He cannot be flattered or frightened.”<sup>2</sup>

In his second term, however, Korngold feels that Stevens “did not distinguish himself.”<sup>3</sup> Stevens felt discouraged about the Compromise settlement of the slavery issue—especially the new Fugitive Slave Law. In September of 1851, an event occurred in Stevens' own district that largely nullified the intent of the bill. The event was the Christiana Riot. A Maryland slaveholder by the name of Edward Gorsuch, his son, and a United States Deputy Marshall arrived in Christiana on September 11, having first obtained a federal warrant for the purpose of arresting two of his fugitive slaves. They surrounded the house where the fugitives were, but the surrounding free black community had been forewarned and forearmed. About fifty black men surrounded the Marylanders and the deputy. Gorsuch was determined nonetheless to retrieve his property and dashed into the house. He was killed and his son was wounded. Four white Quakers from the surrounding community and twenty black men were arrested and charged with treason.<sup>4</sup> The men were brought to Lancaster for preliminary hearings. The U. S. District Attorney insisted on charging the men with treason while the local District Attorney wished to try them for “willful and deliberate murder.” A compromise was worked out “whereby each party was allowed to dispose of its own arrests.”<sup>5</sup> The men charged with treason were delivered into custody of Anthony E. Roberts, now U. S. Marshall for Eastern Pennsylvania. Thaddeus Stevens, who had represented all the prisoners at the preliminary hearings, now prepared to handle the defense of the alleged traitors. During the trial at Philadelphia, Stevens maintained a discreet presence, feeling that his reputation might hurt his client's case. A Democrat, John M. Read, was the principal defense attorney, “although without doubt, Mr. Stevens was the brain

of the defense in this trial." So says Alexander Harris.<sup>6</sup> The judge in the case instructed the jury that while the defendants were undoubtedly guilty of aggravated riot and murder, this riot did not "rise to the dignity of treason or levying war."<sup>7</sup> The jury returned a verdict of not guilty in 20 minutes. In Lancaster, a petit jury ignored a grand jury indictment for murder. The Fugitive Slave Law was a "a dead letter" in Pennsylvania.<sup>8</sup>

But the Christiana riot engendered a backlash against Stevens. Despite his low profile at the trial, Stevens was identified with the violence of the incident, which was too close to home to sit well with the Lancastrians. Also the Silver Grey Whigs\* were displeased that Stevens continued to speak against the Compromise of 1850. In August, 1852 the Whig County Convention nominated Isaac E. Hiester for Congress. Stevens' attempt to get Emmanuel Reigart nominated failed miserably. In the primary election for delegates in the city, Reigart's supporters received 122 votes while Hiester's supporters received 729.<sup>9</sup>

Stevens bade farewell to his fellow Representatives: "It is more than probable that hereafter I shall never meet any member here or anywhere else officially, and I desire to part with no unfriendly feeling toward any."<sup>10</sup> Stevens returned to his practice in Lancaster and to bailing out his iron works.

In November, 1851, Stevens' faction of the party began to publish another newspaper, the *Independent Whig*. E. C. Reigart was among the members of its superintending committee.<sup>11</sup> It printed abolitionist and nativist columns and it was viewed with no small amount of fear by the Silver Grey *Examiner*.<sup>12</sup> Both factions nonetheless supported Scott for President (though for different reasons, of course). Keller finds, however, that the Stevens faction may have thrown their support that year to the Temperance Party in the state election increasing their strength from eight per cent in the previous year's election to eleven per cent in 1852. In 1853, the *Independent Whig* took up the cause of Charles Baughter, a candidate for the Whig nomination for County Treasurer, who claimed the nomination was stolen from him. This pointed up the *Independent Whig's* charge that Whig nominations were made in an unrepresentative fashion.<sup>13</sup> Stevens admitted his support for Baughter<sup>14</sup> and the *Examiner* accused the Stevens faction of throwing temperance party support to Baughter. The Whigs won the race but by a small margin (see Part II).

In August, 1854 another newspaper came out which called itself the *Inland Weekly*—the *Examiner* feared Thaddeus Stevens was behind this newspaper too. On September 16 it printed the banner headlines: "KNOW—NOTHING." In each issue it proclaimed its nine-point platform which included a 20-

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\* Whigs indifferent to, or in favor of slavery. The name comes from the conservative wing of the Whig party in New York State. Francis Granger was a leader of this faction and it was the color of his hair that led to the name "Silver Grey." The opposing abolitionist Whigs were known as "Wooly Heads."

year residence requirement for naturalization (it was five years at the time), more restrictive immigration laws (to eliminate foreign paupers and convicts) and opposition to the attainment of political power by the Catholic Church. A major issue seized upon by the Know-Nothings was the Roman Catholic agitation to divide school funds so that the taxes Catholics paid would go toward support of parochial schools. This was seen as a threat to upward mobility by the Protestant middle and working classes.<sup>15</sup> The Lancaster *Inland Weekly* echoed these fears in its first "KNOW—NOTHING" issue:

Who commenced the controversy and first blended religious with political affairs? To these questions every unprejudiced person must answer that the Roman Catholics are the answerable party. The attack was first made by them upon the school fund. They were resolved that the money levied upon the people for general education. . . should be applied to sectarian schools, and thus to have the children of the poorer classes of society either uneducated or educated only under the direction of Catholic priests.<sup>16</sup>

The *Inland* was devoted to "Agriculture, Mechanics, Science, Literature, Sabbath Reading, Temperance, Youthful Instruction, Housekeeping, General News, Markets & C." They devoted a great deal of space to Prohibition, on which a referendum was to be held in the election. In August, the two major Lancaster newspapers began to realize that Know-Nothing Lodges were being formed.<sup>17</sup> By that time, the lodges had enough members to hold a convention. Nineteen lodgers—four of these from the city—were represented. There was a three-way contest for the nomination to Congress between A. E. Roberts, E. C. Reigart, and a man named Lambert. Roberts received 600 votes, Reigart 400, and Lambert 200. At first the *Intelligencer* claimed Roberts denied being a candidate<sup>18</sup> and assumed the nomination would go to Reigart, the runner-up, who was a member of a lodge in the northeast ward of the city.<sup>19</sup> The *Examiner* later acknowledged Roberts' candidacy:

Inconsistent in everything else, he is consistent only in his blind obedience to Thaddeus Stevens. If it were possible for him to be elected we should be represented by the shadow of Mr. Stevens without the brains.<sup>20</sup>

That same issue of the *Examiner* reported that Stevens had been inducted into a Know-Nothing Lodge in the Southwest Ward.<sup>21</sup> The article observed that he must have been impelled to join the order because he could not control it "through his instruments, as effectually as was desirable." They also noted the inconsistency of being an Antimason—opposed to secret societies—and then joining a secret lodge for political purposes.

In the election, Roberts won with 39 per cent of the vote. The Whig party, like its Antimasonic predecessor, had held on in Lancaster County longer than anywhere else in the state, but now it was on its death bed in Lancaster as well.

Stevens had at last found a third party that could defeat the Whig organization. That he could ride the waves of bigotry to power is a blot on Stevens' character, especially since he himself was not a bigot. Since 1848, he had em-

ployed a black woman by the name of Lydia Smith, who was a devout Roman Catholic. That he held her in the utmost respect would be called by some an understatement.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, after 15 years of Antimasonic crusades, Stevens had joined a secret lodge. One might say in his defense that he was partially motivated to join the Know-Nothings to keep his favorite project—the public schools—away from clerical interference. The earlier quote on the Catholic Church and the schools received primary treatment at the outset of the *Inland's* Know-Nothing conversion. This does not explain away his flirtation with Nativism in the forties, however. He joined a party that was inconsistent with his principles on secret societies and equal opportunity for all men. No further defense can be mustered. His actions to gain political power in Lancaster were of the basest political nature.

In early 1855, Republicanism reached Lancaster. About 17 people attended the first Republican meeting in Fulton Hall and Stevens was nominated to go to the National Convention in Philadelphia the next year. At the State Republican Convention, Theophilus Fenn, an associate of Stevens, succeeded in arranging the nomination of a Know-Nothing for Canal Commissioner—the only important elective post to be filled in 1855.<sup>23</sup> But by 1856, Stevens himself would be taking the opposite tack. He wrote to the Republican State Committee:

I negotiated with the leading American (Know-Nothing) editor of York who was doing much mischief. . . He was to change his course and have \$350. I have advanced \$50 of it. As I have already expended \$4000 in securing presses I have resolved to go no further. Now if your friends could send \$300 it would secure York County—If not it must slide. It is mortifying to need money for the public and not have it<sup>24</sup>

In the 1856 Republican Convention, Stevens supported John McLean for the Presidential nomination (as he would in 1860), chiefly because he admired McLean's independence while in Jackson's cabinet.<sup>25</sup> Stevens and his candidate Roberts were now fully in the Republican camp. Roberts had displayed anti-slavery sympathy before—as a U. S. Marshall he had sat down with his erstwhile prisoners and celebrated a victory dinner over their acquittal in the Christiana Riot trial.<sup>26</sup>

In the fall election, there were ominous signs. Fillmore was running as a Know-Nothing candidate for President and his platform did not mention slavery. The Republicans and Know-Nothings had met in Harrisburg in January to discuss the possibility of a united front. The Republicans, with Whig support, dominated the meeting though they threw a few nativist and anti-Romanist sopps to the Know-Nothings.<sup>27</sup> The Know-Nothings postponed the fusion until their state convention met in August. The proposal was rejected at that time by a vote of 72–18. On the county level, Stevens' withdrawal of support for the Know-Nothings and Silver Grey Whig bitterness over their disloyalty left them little hope for victory. They did not oppose the state Republican or "Union" ticket.<sup>28</sup> Stevens had credentials in both camps—he proposed in a meeting in

Harrisburg on October 8 that both parties fuse their Presidential tickets—giving Fillmore and Fremont their respective share of the electoral vote. The Know-Nothings refused and Buchanan carried the state.<sup>29</sup>



*Mr. Stevens at age 70.*

The Republicans had won a great victory in the county. Stevens was now in firm control. Even the *Examiner*, the bulwark of the Silver Greys, accepted reality and supported Fremont, the Union ticket, and A. E. Roberts as a Republican for Congress over Isaac Hiester, Democratic ex-Silver Grey Whig—exactly reversing their endorsement of 1854.

The *Examiner* did not so quickly do an about face on Stevens—in the 1858 Republican County Convention, the *Examiner's* Silver Grey editor since 1841, Edward C. Darlington, was mentioned as a candidate for the Republican Congressional nomination. Stevens had made himself available for this post and was nominated on the second ballot in a field of five candidates. He won with 72 out of 139 votes (Abraham Herr Smith, the runner-up, received only 28 votes). The *Examiner* then supported the Democrat nominee, James M. Hopkins. After Stevens' victory, the *Examiner* said it hoped "in all sincerity that the choice of the majority would be the wisest one and the results which we thought could best be obtained through the election of Mr. Hopkins, will be had as well if not better through Mr. Stevens."<sup>30</sup> Darlington sold the paper in the following week.

The *Intelligencer* had not been so temperate. They were incensed that Stevens could again be elected from President Buchanan's home district. In a speech before the County Convention, Stevens had said:

If I should be elected, perhaps I may come in contact with the worthy President, who claims this city as his home, and oppose his measures (although I hope not to be especially noticed by him for it), and also say something against him; but if saying that he is the *meanest* man that has ever occupied the Presidential chair, in having violated all the pledges he has ever made, and that he is the greatest despot we have ever had—fully equal to the most despotic of the Satraps of Asia, brings his displeasure on me, *then I shall say it.*<sup>31</sup>

Under the heading, "Niggerism Triumphant," the *Intelligencer* called Stevens a "worse plague than the cholera" and a "pestiferous political demagogue" and accused him of stealing votes (as it would again in succeeding weeks).

Stevens' last real campaign for election was in 1858. In 1860, 1862, 1864, and 1866 he was given the Republican nomination to Congress by unanimous acclamation. In 1860, the Democrats did not bother to oppose him and in 1864 election contest, they prematurely conceded defeat.<sup>32</sup> In 1866, the *Examiner* crowed: ". . . his re-election by an increased majority will be more of an honor to his constituency than to him."<sup>33</sup>

The tide had turned. Fifty years earlier Stevens had been intimidated by the "impregnable" inland city. From 1843 until 1856, he fought tooth and nail to destroy Lancaster County's conservative Whig organization as he previously had fought all his enemies. He gave them no quarter. When his political base became secure, he could turn his attention to the divided nation. Again, he gave his enemies no quarter, only this time his goal was not personal power but the abolition of slavery. As before in the public school battle, his stubbornness to admit defeat as well as his nasty eloquence and his pessimistic view of mankind, were necessary to achieve anything but the most superficial progress. Stevens' relentlessly pushed Lincoln toward emancipation, prompting at least Korngold to credit the Proclamation to the Old Commoner as much as Honest Abe.<sup>34</sup>

Stevens fought the Southern Congressmen and later the Confederacy with the same subordination of means to ends that he used in the Buckshot War. The

mastery of parliamentary procedure which he used in the Buckshot War, he put to good use in the days immediately after the secession of the Cotton States. He used his ability to form another "Stevens' Rump" in Congress to oppose massive concessions to the South.

The people of Lancaster County recognized statesmanship in wartime Washington from that had been "a *leetle* too savage" in peacetime Lancaster. When Stevens died in August 1868, his body was brought back to Lancaster for burial in the only racially unrestricted cemetery in the city. When the train came into the station, the excitement was just as great as it had been when Lincoln's funeral train passed three years before. It completely overshadowed ex-President Buchanan's funeral held two years previously.<sup>3 5</sup> The Republicans of Lancaster paid one final tribute to the Old Commoner. Four days after his death, when they were to nominate a candidate for Congress, they unanimously named their dead Congressman to resume his place.

### *Part Two.*

### *Stevens' Support in Lancaster County 1843--1866*

#### *Chapter I*

**P**olitical parties in the eighteen-forties and eighteen-fifties were in a state of flux. Third parties appeared suddenly, flourished briefly and subsided as quickly as they appeared, only to be re-born a few years later under a different name. These splinter movements were caused by eruptions of popular sentiment on the two issues that the major parties refused to address--nativism and slavery.

The Democrats had both slaveholders and large numbers of immigrants within their ranks and they refused to consider any policy curbing either slavery or immigration. The Whigs, on the other hand, had less support among these groups, but they could not afford to offend immigrants or slaveholders without losing vital support in the large cities and in the South. Large segments of the Whig constituency, however, were among those most vehemently opposed to immigration and unrestricted slavery. This made the Whigs vulnerable to schism. In the 1840's and 1850's, the nativists formed a number of third parties such as the Native Americans and the Know-Nothings, while the Free Soilers, the Woolly-Head Whigs, and the Republicans split off into factions representing those opposed to the extension of slavery. It is true that the Democrats lost some support to these third parties also. The Know-Nothings, Free-Soilers, and the Republicans all stole away substantial Democratic support. Nevertheless, the splinter parties seemed to be a more potent danger to the polygot Whig party and they eventually proved to be its destruction.

In Lancaster County, the chief engineer of this destruction was Thaddeus Stevens. Using his support among the staunch Antimasons in 1843, he managed

to retain enough support in the succeeding splinter Native American party to force the Whigs to concede to him the Congressional nomination in 1848. In 1853, he supported the Temperance party, while in 1854, he again used a nativist appeal and this time succeeded in electing a member of his organization to Congress. Always the idealist and the opportunist, it was a Congressional seat that Stevens coveted for himself and his supporters. He wanted to have a voice in Congress to oppose the extension of slavery. He used nativism as a means to an end.

This is an investigation of the consistency of Stevens' support in Lancaster County in this time of shifting parties and constituencies. It is credit to the genius of Stevens' opportunism that he managed to hold on to his support in the fickle political breezes of that period.

While party loyalty was quite fickle during this period, intra-party loyalty was not. The custom of voting the party line remained quite strong throughout the period. Table 1 demonstrates the consistency of party voting, comparing the county vote of each party for Congressman with that of County Commissioner. In only a few cases is there more than a ten percent deviation between the size of the vote for the two offices. In only one case is a candidate for Congress elected from a different party than that of the County Commissioner. In 1854, Know-Nothing Anthony Roberts won election to the Congress while the Know-Nothing candidate for Commissioner lost. Roberts was also the only non-Whig candidate to be elected in the period prior to 1856.

Strict party discipline was enhanced by the practice of having each party print their own ballot, which made "split tickets" difficult. This resulted in the voters paying more attention to the party than to the candidate, which may be another reason for the frequency of schisms.

In 1843, one year after moving to Lancaster, Stevens began his practice of political opportunism. He retained a segment of Antimasonic support in the County which undoubtedly gravitated to him because of his earlier leadership of the Antimasons in the legislature. These Antimasons never allowed themselves to be absorbed into the county Whig organization. Throughout his career in Lancaster County, Stevens would use this hard core support to build a "new majority." The consistency and composition of this support will be the subject of this investigation.

In 1844, the die-hard Antimasonic party had expired and its demise ushered in a new third party that absorbed much of the strength of the old party. Table 2 shows the comparative strength of the Antimasonic party and the Native American party in the Congressional races of 1843, 1844 and 1846 and in the gubernatorial race of 1847.

Antimasonic strength, to a great extent, lay in the rural areas, settled by the German Pietistic groups.<sup>1</sup> Marietta Borough was the only urban area in which the Antimasons polled more than fifteen per cent of the vote. The Anti-

masonic vote formed a core of third party strength in rural areas which reappeared in the Know-Nothing campaign of 1854. In 1844 some of this rural support drifted away from the Native Americans, only to be replaced by a stronger showing in highly nativist rural areas such as Conestoga, Little Britain and Mount Joy Township and in urban areas, most notably Lancaster City as well as Lititz (Warwick Township), Strasburg Borough and Washington Borough. In 1844, because of this new support (and because it was a biennial election year) the Native Americans received a greater proportion, and nearly twice the actual number, of votes than their predecessors had. There is, nonetheless, notable consistency between the 1843 and 1844 votes.<sup>3</sup>

Despite his support for Clay in 1844, Stevens must have at least tacitly aided the new party, which was anchored so solidly on the bedrock of his Antimasonic faction. In 1845, he must have been delighted when the Natives trounced the Whigs in the city municipal elections by 25.7 to 18.1 per cent.<sup>4</sup> In 1846, however, the bedrock began to erode.

In the Congressional race the next year, the Whigs made a comeback. They polled 33.3 per cent of the City vote to 19.3 per cent for the Natives. In the County support began to slip away, in some cases dramatically, in the southern townships of Martic, Bart and Paradise, and Little Britain. Support also vanished in Strasburg Borough and Strasburg Township.

*I*n 1847, Reigart's gubernatorial campaign caused hardly a ripple in his native county. With the exception of Marietta, Reigart retained only a fragment of his earlier support.

Interestingly, the 1847 campaign sparked the Whig concession to Stevens of the nomination for Congress in return for a united front against the Democrats. It might appear that the Whigs would have been more prudent if they had allowed the Nativists to be annihilated at the polls in 1848 rather than to have made a deal with Stevens. This was not the case, however. The 1847 gubernatorial race had been an extremely close one statewide and Francis R. Shunk, the Democrat, won by a margin that was only a few votes more than the vote gained by Reigart.

The year 1848, moreover, was full of high hopes, for Whigs both in the nation and in Pennsylvania. President Polk, a Democrat and a lame duck, had just concluded the expensive war with Mexico that had increasingly been unpopular in the North. With a lame duck in the White House and war hero Zachary Taylor as the front-runner for that office, things could not have looked better for the Whigs in Washington. In Pennsylvania, the future looked equally bright. Governor Shunk had died in office and the Whigs were determined to win the race that death had granted them. Prospects were much too good to allow them to be fouled up by Stevens, Reigart, and the Nativists.

Stevens, at least prior to 1847, may have hoped to lead the Native American party to victory under his control. Obviously by 1848, however, the Natives were not going to be led anywhere other than to oblivion. In striking his bargain with the Whig organization, Stevens made the best of a bad situation.

Though Stevens had managed to strike a bargain in 1848, this does not deny the fact that his nativist party's popularity had suffered a disastrous decline. Undoubtedly, most of its supporters by 1847 had become reconciled to the Whig party. Nativism had at first fed on the soil of Antimasonry. Large numbers of German Pennsylvanians, many of whom were Calvinists or Mennonites, distrusted ritualistic organizations.<sup>5</sup> Both the Freemasons and the Catholic immigrants were feared and distrusted for practicing their unfamiliar rites and for being too clannish. The hard-core Antimasons eventually overcame their antipathy to the Whigs after the demise of ex-Freemason Henry Clay's candidacy in 1844. Perhaps the Mexican War's unpopularity propelled many into the Whig camp. Probably many also soon recognized the futility of running a candidate in Lancaster County without the endorsement of the Whig organization.

In 1848, Stevens ran for the first time with the aid of this Whig organization. With the Whig endorsement, he won an impressive victory. Table 1 shows Stevens' majority was at least 700 votes greater than the Whig majority of the previous year, though the Democratic vote increased nearly three-fold. Most of the remaining areas of Nativist strength in 1846 (see Table 2) were also areas of large Whig majorities in 1848.

In 1850, Stevens' re-election support was greatly diminished. Table 1 indicates that while the Democratic vote declined only slightly in an off-year election, Stevens' majority was cut by nearly 45 per cent, and he ran behind the County Commissioner and the Whig ticket in general.<sup>6</sup>

The major reasons for the decline in Whig support were political. As usual in an off-year election, the opposition to the Administration increased their representation as voters became disenchanted with the administration. Taylor, moreover, was dead and Fillmore was a much less popular figure. Stevens, in particular, lost support because of his intransigent stand against the Compromise of 1850, which most voters saw as the only possible peaceful settlement of the slavery issue. His unflinching pessimism on the possibility of long-term compromise seemed to the voters of Lancaster County to be shortsightedness on his part.

In 1852, the Whig organization took his shortsightedness to task and he was not renominated for Congress. His supporters were not organized well enough to put up any serious opposition to the organization's nominee, Isaac E. Hiester. For the first time since he moved to Lancaster County, Stevens was completely without a political power base. The Whigs recouped some of their more conservative support, but they did not approach the strength they had in 1848. In the southeast, Whig strength eroded still further.

The year 1853 did not catch Stevens napping. In that year he supported Charles Baugher for County Treasurer (as did the Democrats) and he lent his support to the Temperance party.

In 1854, Stevens was able to realize his longterm goal: to defeat the Whig organization in the Congressional election. Again he supported a nativist third party, this time it was the Know-Nothing party. Anthony E. Roberts, the splinter Antimasonic candidate for Congress in 1843, ran again for Congress.

In that same year, 1854, Stevens had dealt a mortal wound to the Whig organization. Stevens had fought against the organization and had used the Nativist issue before, but suddenly in 1854 his faction was winning pluralities. Of course it was not Stevens who ultimately accomplished the Know-Nothing victory, but the voters of Lancaster County. Why all of a sudden did the voters favor this new nativist party when ten years earlier the Native American party could not muster even twenty per cent of the total vote in a county election?

The most obvious explanation for the dramatic upsurge in nativism would be an influx of large numbers of foreigners. Table 3 shows the number of foreign born residents of each township according to the Census of 1850. The table shows that the number of immigrants in Lancaster County was relatively small even in the urban areas. Table 3-A demonstrates that those immigrants most likely to have recently arrived (i.e. those under forty years of age) constituted an even smaller proportion of the city population. Table 4 shows the percentage of foreign-born residents in the population of each of the jurisdictions of Lancaster County in 1850 and 1870. As we can see, the percentage of foreign-born residents remained fairly stable even in extremely strong nativist areas such as West Hempfield, East Lampeter and Marietta.

*I*n an area of strong German cultural influence such as Lancaster County, the natives would not be likely to react with hostility to new German arrivals, even those who were Catholic. The Irish presence may have propelled some voters into nativism in Lancaster City and in the area of Conestoga Township surrounding Safe Harbor, but this does not explain the stronger nativist vote elsewhere.

There undoubtedly were other reasons for an upsurge in nativist sympathy. In an article entitled *The Politics of Impatience: The Origins of Know-Nothingism*, Professor Michael F. Holt cites popular indignation aimed particularly at Whig politicians as a primary cause for the rise of the Know-Nothing party.<sup>7</sup> He mentions breakdowns in party discipline and economic dislocation as other causes of the party's sudden rise. Holt also points to the democratic and secret methods by which the Know-Nothings nominated candidates for office in their lodges. These may have been attractive to rank-and-file voters who were disgusted with the machinations of the open ballot party nominations.

In speaking of economic dislocations, Holt mentions inflation stemming from the California gold rush and the downturns in business activity in late 1851 and 1854, and in early 1855. He also mentions as causes of nativism the concentration of industry in the larger cities and the effect of the railroads in importing foreign labor and bringing cheaper Midwestern foodstuffs to the East. All of these possible causes require more study in depth than a paper of this scope would allow, and they have been brought up only to point out what may have been general and less obvious causes for the popularity of Know-Nothingism throughout the country.

*I*n regard to the effect of the railroads on nativism, the Main Line of the Pennsylvania Railroad ran from Sadsbury in the East, through Lancaster City, and then northwest through Elizabethtown and then on toward Harrisburg. There does not seem to be any correlation between the proximity of the railroad and nativist strength.

In the final analysis, it may have been the appearance of a deluge of immigrants rather than the reality of such a deluge that contributed to the popularity of Know-Nothingism in Lancaster. David Keller in his study of Know-Nothingism in Lancaster County, notes that in 1849, 902 immigrants entered Lancaster County—an increase of 86 per cent over the previous five-year period. In the years 1850 to 1854, the figure rose to 1056 immigrants arriving—those five years saw the record number of arrivals in the nineteenth century. Of the foreigners who entered the County between 1851 and 1859, 74 per cent entered the city.<sup>8</sup> This resulted in a decline in economic prosperity among city workers.

Keller points out that in 1830, 53.2 per cent of the working men were making less than \$80 per year, the lowest economic category in the tax records of the time. This declined to 33.8 per cent in 1840 and to 25.0 per cent in 1847. In 1857, however, the percentage of workers making less than \$80 per year rose to 28.0 per cent and those making over \$200 per year declined from a high point of 15.4 per cent of the work force in 1847 to 15.2 per cent of the work force in 1857.<sup>9</sup>

More than likely the perceived threat of foreign labor combined with economic dislocations had convinced voters in Lancaster city and in Adams-town, Marietta, and Columbia to vote for the Know-Nothing ticket in 1854. Fortunately for Stevens, economic discontent coincided with a wave of indignation against established politicians and during agitation for such measures as termpeance reform. Stevens, a Whig rebel and a reformer, rode the wave to victory.

In 1856, Stevens' organization had switched allegiance to the new Republican party. The Whig party was nearly dead and the staunch Know-Nothings (perhaps acknowledging the power of Stevens' organization in Lancaster county)

did not run a slate of candidates in Lancaster. Yet in the two-way Congressional race in 1856, the Republicans did not do as well as the Whigs had done in the three Congressional elections before 1854.

The Republicans in Pennsylvania, though, campaigned in 1856 at a great disadvantage. The man who headed the Democratic ticket in 1856 was native son James Buchanan. Buchanan received an astounding 43.8 per cent of the vote for President in solidly anti-Democratic Lancaster county, and he helped the whole Democratic ticket in 1856.

Other possible reasons for the less-than-outstanding performance of the Lancaster Republicans in 1856 remain unconvincing. The Republican party was not seriously hurt by the fratricidal warfare in the previous two years. In Pennsylvania, the Republicans, the Know-Nothings, and the remaining Whigs agreed to a fusion slate of candidates to be called the "Union ticket." The fusion slate was only on the state level, however. The Republicans and Know-Nothings ran separate tickets in Pennsylvania for President. The Republicans nominated John C. Frémont and the Know-Knothings nominated Millard Fillmore. While a few staunch Silver Grey Whigs and Know-Knothings may have considered that Stevens, Roberts, and the Republicans were traitors, the vote on the Union ticket for Roberts was only 222 votes less than the combined votes for Fillmore and Frémont in Lancaster county.

<i>Congress</i>	<i>President</i>	
Roberts (Union-Republican) 10,001	Frémont (Rep.)	6608
	Fillmore (Know-Nothing)	3615
		<hr/> 10223

Graph I compares the support received by Fremont and Fillmore in 1856 with that received by Anthony E. Roberts as a Know-Nothing in the 1854 Congressional election. Frémont tended to run closer to Roberts' strength than Fillmore did. This is not surprising since without the support of Stevens and Roberts, Know-Nothing support depended on a few staunch nativists and anti-Republican Silver Grey Whigs who had never previously supported a third party.

Another possible reason for the less-than-overwhelming support received by the Republican party might have been a result of its adamant stand against the extension of slavery. This is not borne out, however, in the election returns. The two southernmost townships in Lancaster County had sizable Southern-born minorities (over 11 per cent in both townships) as did Columbia borough (9.3 per cent). It would seem likely that there would be less enthusiasm in 1856 especially in these areas for an anti-slavery party. On the contrary, there was greater support in 1856 for the Republicans in Little Britain and Columbia than there was in 1852 for the Silver Grey candidate. An explanation would be the presence of many Quaker residents in the southern townships; their opposi-

tion to slavery was manifested in an active "Underground Railroad" system in that region. Dissatisfaction with the Republicans on their platform was not the reason for a relatively low Republican vote. Native son James Buchanan simply brought an unprecedented number of his fellow-Lancasterians into the Democratic ranks.

In 1858, Stevens himself ran for Congress. The Republicans majority increased in comparison with the Republican support in 1856. Much of this increased Republican support was a negative reaction to the Buchanan Presidency. Buchanan seemed to be incapable of dealing effectively with the deepening sectional crisis and he alienated many northern voters by his recognition of Kansas as a slave state under the Lecompton constitution. The Dred-Scott decision sent even many heretofore ardent Democrats into Republican ranks. Economic prosperity, moreover, had plummeted since the Panic of 1857.<sup>10</sup> Stevens the radical was sent to Washington in what must have seemed to Buchanan to be the ultimate slap in the face by the people of his own county.<sup>11</sup>

In 1860, the sectional crisis had deepened to the point that the Democrats felt it would not be worthwhile to nominate anyone to oppose Stevens for Congress. Stevens had assumed a position of leadership in the Congress in 1859 and as he increasingly assumed the role of an elder statesman in Congress, his support and that of the Republican party tended to increase and solidify throughout the 1860s.

Table 5 illustrates the remarkable consistency in voting that prevailed throughout the Civil War and Reconstruction period from 1862 to 1868. Only in Sadsbury, Leacock, Clay, Springville, and in Sporting Hill are there deviations in the vote that are greater than 10 per cent. This is all the more remarkable considering that the events that occurred during this period would seem almost certain to shake the stability of Stevens' support.

A comparative study of election returns for 1862, 1864, and 1866 illustrates clearly the stability and respectability that the Republican Party had gained in less than a decade. While Republican strength was still not as great as Whig strength had been in 1848, the traditionally Silver-Grey townships—the Lampeters, Pequea, Conestoga, Strasburg township, and southern Manor township all came to support Stevens overwhelmingly—which they had not done since 1848. Stevens, moreover, had ameliorated his losses in the southeast. Only the ultra-Democratic townships of Bart and Colerain voted against him in the southeast and Brecknock and East Cocalico in the northeast. Of the municipalities, only three wards of Lancaster city and Washington borough did not return Republican majorities. To his staunch supporters in Adamstown and Marietta, he added new support in Columbia and once fiercely-Democratic Strasburg borough.

Throughout the Civil War and the early Reconstruction, Stevens was free to stand up for his radical policies toward slavery and the South, knowing that

he had a safe constituency back home.<sup>12</sup> During this tumultuous period, this relatively placid and conservative region elected a firebrand to Congress. Stevens, who recommended immediate emancipation of the slaves and opposed Lincoln's policy of conciliation toward the South, was supported in Lancaster county by almost the same margin as was Lincoln himself.<sup>13</sup>

Stevens was re-elected in 1866 despite his calls for negro equality and suffrage. Finally in 1868, Stevens was renominated for Congress after his death. It was not necessarily Stevens' policies that endeared him to Lancastrians but perhaps his constituents appreciated his genius in promoting them. As the *Intelligencer* had said of his nomination in 1848, "it is the homage paid at all times, and by all men, to pre-eminent and distinguished talent."<sup>14</sup> That talent is what eventually secured Thaddeus Stevens a safe seat in Congress and the most powerful voice in the policies of Reconstruction.

**T**haddeus Stevens, with good luck and the aid of his talents, transformed himself in 20 years from the leader of a minority faction into the leader of the Lancaster County Republican Party, commanding overwhelming support. He was able to accomplish this impressive feat because of the extraordinary fluidity of the political parties prior to the Civil War.

Despite the lack of consistency in some areas (notably the northeastern townships before 1862), there were certain patterns of consistency that this investigation has uncovered. Endorsement by the Whig organization entailed extensive support in the rural areas surrounding Lancaster city, in the Earls and in the northcentral townships of Penn, Elizabeth, and Clay. The townships adjacent to the Susquehanna river and Marietta borough were only slightly less dependable, and the Cocalicos and Brecknock were quite fickle. The Democratic townships Paradise, Bart, and Colerain, could never be counted on for anything except opposition nor could the intensely Democratic city be looked to for support. Endorsement by the Whigs, then, provided a fairly consistent indication of areas of support.

Without that support, Stevens was forced to lend his aid and talent to issues that would appeal to the township groups opposed to the Whig organization: reform-minded Whigs and Democrats. For this reason he always seized on a reform issue — an issue that would unite Democrats and Whigs. Of course he most frequently chose nativism as an issue with appeal to urban workers and farmers alike. In these campaigns Stevens gained support in the Democratic townships and municipalities (with the exception of Paradise and Colerain), while he held on to the more reform-minded Whig townships such as Conoy, Conestoga, and in 1854 Sadsbury, Salisbury, Fulton, and Clay. In the campaigns of 1843 and 1853, Stevens seized on other reforms. In 1843 he ran his last campaign against Masonry and it served as the model for the later Native-American campaigns. In 1853 he lent his endorsement to a coalition support-

ing the renegade Whig Charles Baugher, the Temperance Party, and the Democrats. Perhaps this experience helped him gain Democratic support in 1854 when he engineered the victory of his protégé Anthony E. Roberts. At any rate, fortuitous events such as the demise of the national Whig party and the rise of a more sympathetic Republican party enabled Stevens to inherit and build upon the organization he had finally conquered in 1854. Again he demonstrated his talent in rebuilding support and healing the rancor within the new party until he could once again count on the same sort of strength in the same areas that the Whigs had once enjoyed. An investigation of the composition of that strength follows.

## *Chapter II*

Over the years, many socio-economic factors have been discovered to have an effect on American voting behavior. Although there is disagreement among historians and political scientists as to the degree of their importance, there is nonetheless a general consensus regarding the relevance of these factors.<sup>1</sup> Among the most important are: occupational status, economic position, educational attainment, ethnic background, and religious affiliation. Lancaster county in the mid-nineteenth century unfortunately kept little information pertaining to the educational attainment of its citizens. Moreover, Table 4 shows that Lancaster county's population was almost entirely native-born.<sup>2</sup> Ethnic background, in this period, then, can only be determined by its relation to religion and by extrapolating ethnicity from the time of settlement, which is in many cases a dubious method for even the most straightforward quantitative analysis.

There is, however, more data available on religious population and economic and occupational attainment<sup>3</sup> from the Census and the tax records of the time. Table 5 shows the various jurisdictions of Lancaster county grouped into five classes, according to the median vote they gave to Stevens between 1862 and 1866 (these years were selected because of their extraordinary voting consistency). An investigation follows of the religious and economic backgrounds in each of these five voting categories to determine whether there is any correlation between religion and economic prosperity and the support Stevens received in each of these five categories.

In Table 5, the jurisdictions have been grouped as follows:

Class A jurisdictions gave Stevens a median vote of at least 80 per cent of the votes cast in the Congressional elections of 1862, 1864, and 1866. This is the category of overwhelming support.

Class B jurisdictions gave Stevens a median vote between 70 and 80 per cent of the votes cast in that same period. This is very strong support.

Class C localities gave Stevens between 60 and 70 per cent of the vote.

This is the strong support category.

Divisions in Class D gave a majority of their votes to Stevens but less than 60 per cent of their vote went to him. This is mild support.

Class E gave Stevens less than a majority of their votes in this period. This is the non-support category.

Table 6 shows the assessed property value per capita of jurisdictions in Lancaster county.<sup>4</sup> The total assessed property value is simply the total assessed value of all property (both real and personal) in each jurisdiction (as it was reported by a federal census taker in the Censuses of 1850 and 1860). The total assessed property value *per capita* is the total property value divided by the jurisdiction's population.

The total property value reported in the Censuses was usually taken from tax records. Property was usually undervalued,<sup>5</sup> so these figures cannot be used as any indication of the average property value of each person in a particular township. These figures can only be used in a relative sense, that is, as an indication of wealth relative to the other jurisdictions. For example, if East Lampeter has an assessed value of \$603.91 per capita in 1860, that means it is relatively wealthier than Fulton township with an assessed value of \$174.26 per capita. This does not mean that the average resident of East Lampeter possesses \$603 of land, livestock, and furniture, while his neighbor in Fulton township possesses only \$174 worth of such property. It does mean that the township of East Lampeter, based on the value of the land and property and the number of people living there, has three times as much wealth distributed among its people as Fulton township has.

This index of relative wealth makes two assumptions. First, it assumes that property was assessed at an equal rate in all jurisdictions. Second it assumes that property was distributed equitably in each jurisdiction. These are large assumptions. In defense of the first assumption, though, Table 6 shows that per capita valuation in these townships and municipalities was generally consistent between 1850 and 1860 and the per capita valuation in the county varied over a narrow range for the most part. There are glaring exceptions to this generalization about range: Adamstown, Rapho, and Upper Leacock all show per capita property valuations that were preposterously high.<sup>6</sup> The other valuations seem more accurate.

The second assumption is harder to defend; there is justification in assuming, though, that in the townships where property was mainly in the form of land, it was distributed among large numbers of small farmers. That has always been the case in rural Lancaster county.<sup>7</sup>

Taking these assumptions for granted, Table 6 shows that the wealthier townships tended to be classed in the categories that showed the strongest support for Stevens. The less wealthy townships, on the other hand, were more

likely to be lukewarm at the most in their support for Stevens.

There is a correlation of wealth to Republican support at the extremes of the scale—the wealthiest townships are rarely found below Class C while the less affluent jurisdictions are mostly in Classes D and E. There are certainly many exceptions to these tendencies, even in the highest and lowest categories. Lancaster city, for example, tended to vote Democratic (except for the Northwest Ward) despite its comparative wealth (there was perhaps a greater concentration of wealth in the city, however). Conestoga and Mount Joy boroughs are in the categories of strongest support for Stevens (Classes A and B, respectively), yet they are not among the wealthiest jurisdictions. Clearly, there are other factors involved here, but there is definitely a pattern of stronger support among the more prosperous areas.

Stevens' strongest support was south and southeast of the city, the richest part of the county. Similarly, the Democratic areas such as Columbia, Washington borough, and the townships in the northeast and southeast are among the poorest areas of the county.

The townships with the least wealth were concentrated in the south and southeastern parts of the county. One reason for this may have been the relatively large numbers (by northern standards) of black freemen located in the southern townships of Lancaster County. Over ten per cent of the population of Fulton, Little Britain and Drumore townships was black—a statistic that prevailed in the river boroughs of Marietta and Columbia as well. While there actually was an out-migration of blacks between 1850 and 1860 in these areas, many had come up earlier, mostly from Maryland, as slaves or as free blacks to escape the slave system and the oppressive laws against free negroes. Though they were welcomed by the Quakers who had settled in this region, very few began their lives in the North with any capital, and so they became a population of landless agricultural laborers, mostly male, often unmarried and usually poor.<sup>8</sup>

Despite the chaos of the Civil War and Reconstruction, the middle 1860s were a period of political stability and consistency in Lancaster county. Therefore, most citizens voted with some attention to the dictates of their economic situation. Since Lancaster County had a strong constituency of prosperous farmers, they voted for the Republicans as they had previously voted for the Whigs, not so much because of specific Republican economic policies, but because they identified with the party and prosperity it brought them.<sup>9</sup> These rich farmers were also voting against the urban interests, which the Democrats represented pro forma in Lancaster county (since much of their support was in Lancaster city). The Democratic townships supported their party probably because of a traditional antagonism toward their more prosperous neighbors. Lancaster city voted Democratic because that party traditionally and insistently represented the northern urban interests as against those of the rural areas surrounding them.

When political stability was low, there was hardly any correlation of

wealth to party support. The Know-Nothing campaign of 1854 is the prime example of this—areas as economically disparate as East Lampeter, Fulton, and Lancaster city all found themselves supporting the same candidate. It was only after the Republican organization became the heir to the interests and support of the Whig party (after that party's demise in 1856) that voters once again resumed their traditional electoral behavior.

A vitally important aspect in the moulding of traditional voting behavior in Lancaster county was the matter of religious affiliation. This was particularly important in this county because of the wide variety of religious communities that settled within its boundaries, beginning in the earliest migrations of Europeans to the area.

With the exception of Strasburg borough,<sup>10</sup> all the townships and municipalities show strong support for Stevens at the outset. In 1850, there is a slight decline in support except in Warwick, Penn, and Strasburg borough. In 1854, there is a further dip in support in most of the townships. Only in Sadsbury, West Hempfield, Adamstown and Upper-Leacock did Roberts attain the support of a majority. Earl, East Hempfield, Manheim Township, Rapho, Ephrata and Strasburg Borough gave Roberts pluralities, but there is no correlation of religious affiliation. The jurisdictions that gave Roberts the least support were Providence and Penn. Both were Lutheran and Mennonite areas. Martic township and Manheim Township also gave the nativists little support, though Martic had a large Presbyterian congregation. Roberts picked up support in 1856 except in West Hempfield, but there was a general decline in support when Stevens ran in 1858, with the exceptions of Sadsbury, Penn, Manheim Township, and Adamstown. If Class C areas were generally the more conservative supporters of the Whigs, and thus gave Stevens less support when he ran again, there is little indication of it. There is no negative correlation at all between increased support of Hiester in 1852 and decreased support of Stevens in 1858. There is generally increasing support for the Republicans in the 1860s but no definite patterns emerge.

Class C jurisdictions were mostly inhabited by people of German backgrounds. Martic and West Hempfield were both settled in one half by Germans, and in the other half by Scotch-Irish (the latter may account for their strong nativist tendencies in West Hempfield. Adamstown and Strasburg borough were a mixture of ethnic backgrounds, while Sadsbury was divided between Quakers and Scotch-Irish Presbyterians.

During the Revolution, the Scotch-Irish were perhaps the most fervent advocates of American independence. This was undoubtedly because of the religious and political persecution they suffered in Ireland and Scotland in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries at the hands of the English. When they came to Pennsylvania in the early eighteenth century they were encouraged to settle along the southern boundary to keep the Catholics in Maryland from

moving north. As settlers in Ulster, they had had long experience in battling both the English and the native Irish Catholics. When they arrived in southern Lancaster County, in the middle eighteenth century, they encountered some Mennonites and large numbers of Quakers who were already there.

During the Revolution, the Quakers and the Orangemen engendered mutual bitterness because of the Quaker's refusal to fight for independence and the Quakers' even more galling refusal to pay taxes to support the war. The Quakers, in turn, had grown to dislike the Scotch-Irish for their aggressive attitudes toward the Indians and against the colonial government. At any rate, there was still mutual hostility between the Quakers and the Ulster Presbyterians until after the Civil War.

The Scotch-Irish, moreover, were strong supporters of nativism because of their endemic hostility to Irish Catholicism that stemmed from their settlement in Ulster. Stevens built his majorities by appealing to the Scotch-Irish nativist sympathy and the abolitionist sympathies of the Quakers. In Sadsbury there was a strong vote in favor of Anthony Roberts in 1854, but in 1858 Stevens received nearly 80 per cent of the vote. This likely resulted from Stevens' appeal to the Sadsbury Quakers on an issue both shared ardently: abolitionism. The reaction of the Quakers to the Christiana Riot in Sadsbury Township in 1851 left no doubt where they stood on abolition of slavery.

Class D jurisdictions were areas of lukewarm Republican support. In this class there is seen a noticeable increase in the number of Presbyterian churches, many with large congregations. An unusually large number of Episcopalians and Quakers also appear in Class D.

Basically, Class D townships fall into two behavior patterns. First are those areas which start off with strong support for Stevens. These include Fulton, Conoy, Caernarvon, East Cocalico, East Donegal, Drumore and Little Britain townships, and the towns of Marietta and Elizabethtown. Increased support for Hiester in 1852 is noted in these districts with the exception of Conoy, Caernarvon, Drumore and Little Britain. In 1854, seven of these nine districts gave Roberts strong support, the exceptions being Caernarvon and Elizabethtown. In Fulton, Marietta, and Conoy districts Roberts received majority support while in East Donegal he received a strong plurality. Somewhat weaker support came from East Cocalico, Drumore, and Little Britain townships.<sup>11</sup>

All of these districts except East Cocalico were strongly Scot Presbyterian. Caernarvon, a Welsh-German settlement, and Elizabethtown; a Scot-German mixture, show no support for the Know-Nothings. The vote tally for Elizabethtown which included West Donegal township, was at the time a bastion of the Scotch-Irish, so there are significant exceptions to the rule that the Scotch-Irish areas supported nativism. Within every one of these townships there was a rise in support for Roberts in 1856, followed by another rise in support for Stevens in 1858 (except in Drumore and Maytown). There were no patterns of signifi-

cance that stood out among this group in the elections of the 1860s.

In the Class D townships where Stevens received only minority support in 1848 and 1850, a different pattern emerges. In Paradise, the Northeast Ward of Lancaster city and in Columbia borough, the vote for the Whigs was a minority until after the birth of the Republican party. All showed significant approval of the Know-Nothings. Columbia and the Northeast ward of the city were important urban areas where nativism had a strong appeal. The township of Paradise was another of the heavily Scotch-Irish southeastern townships. It remained Democratic in 1854, but just barely.

It is odd that one ward of Lancaster city did give a bare majority of its votes to Stevens in the 1860s, while the other three wards did not. Table 7 indicates that nearly 80 per cent of the people in this ward were in the second and third occupational class (see explanation). There were moreover a larger percentage of those in the highest class. Perhaps the relative prosperity accounts for the slight Republican majority. All of the localities in Class D are in some ways atypical of the average Lancaster county jurisdiction. Fulton, Drumore and Little Britain are in the south end of the county; they were Scotch-Irish Presbyterians and Quakers in a county that was mostly German and Lutheran or Baptist. They had poor soil (as did East Cocalico) in a county noted for its agricultural bounty. Donegals were also partly Scotch-Irish. Marietta, Columbia, and the northwest ward of Lancaster city were urban areas in a largely rural and agricultural constituency. Caernarvon, though it was largely German, still had significant minorities of Welsh Quakers and Episcopalians (it also had a medium-sized Presbyterian congregation).

In short, all of the Class D jurisdictions were not just lukewarm in their support for the Republicans. They were basically out of step with the general social profile of Lancaster county; they were not prosperous farmers of German extraction. This atypicality becomes even more pronounced in Class E.

**C**lass E is the category of non-support of Stevens and the Republicans. Three of the eight voting districts in this classification are within the city of Lancaster. There are large congregations of Lutherans owing to the large size of the city Lutheran churches. There are sizeable Catholic congregations in the southwest ward of the city (one was German, the other was Irish). There is only one Mennonite church, however.

In the graphs that reflect Class E's voting behavior there are three geographical categories and patterns. The agriculturally poorer northeastern townships of West Cocalico and Brecknock seem to fluctuate in their support for Stevens, with little support for the Know-Nothings. Brecknock's support of the Republicans declined dramatically in the 1860s: this may have been a result of a certain anti-authoritarian streak among its largely German Mennonite inhabit-

ants. During the 1850s, such hostility built up toward the compulsory common-school law that it became impossible to collect school taxes during that period.<sup>12</sup> Brecknock became strongly pro-Confederate during the Civil War, the only township in Lancaster county to do so.<sup>13</sup> This, of course, explains why the inhabitants voted against the Republicans. The other rural area represented in this category is the southeast. Both Bart and Colerain were strongly Scotch-Irish Presbyterian. They supported nativism in 1854, though Bart only gave a plurality endorsement to Stevens. They were perhaps the poorest agricultural areas in Lancaster county.

Washington borough had a nearly evenly divided populace of Democrats and Republicans, with few Know-Nothings. The town was primarily a lumbering town which depended on the Susquehanna river for transportation, but its prosperity had waned by the middle of the century after the upper Susquehanna valley had been settled and logged. Only during the Civil War did some prosperity return.<sup>14</sup> There was little change in the voting pattern of that period, however.

Three of Lancaster's city's four wards (Lancaster had four wards from 1852 to early 1868) were in the category of non-support. All three did not support Stevens' faction in an election except in 1854 when the northwest ward gave Roberts a majority and the other two wards in Class E gave Roberts a plurality. Table 7 shows that the southwest ward, which supported Stevens the least, was also the ward inhabited by more people in Class I (laborers) than either the northwest or southeast wards, which voted only slightly more for the Republicans (the slight variations in voting support probably make this insignificant) but there were also higher total percentages of foreign-born residents in the southwest ward (see Table 3-A).

The Class E jurisdictions were thus radically different from the rest of Lancaster county. One other radically different constituency deserves investigation for its effect on voting behavior in 1854. These were Lancaster county's Catholics. The total congregational capacity of all the Catholic churches in Lancaster county in 1860 was put at 3640 by the 1860 census,<sup>15</sup> roughly 3.1 per cent of Lancaster county's population in that year.

Lancaster gave a majority of its support to Roberts and that is where the Catholic population of Lancaster county was concentrated. It seems valid to say, then, that areas where Catholics were a visible minority would be more likely to have voted for the Know-Nothings. Otherwise, Lancaster County's Catholics were too small a minority to have an effect on voting patterns — except in the city, where they contributed to the Democratic majorities almost certainly.

There seem to have been undesirable effects of religion on social behavior. While large Lutheran congregations were scattered through the five categories of support, some of the other congregations were predominantly in one particular category. Mennonite congregations were very strong in the areas

where Republican support was the highest. Nearly all of the localities that gave Stevens over 60 per cent of the vote, Classes A, B and C, had large Mennonite congregations. Few of the areas that were predominantly Mennonite gave the Know-Nothings strong support. East Lampeter and Conestoga were strong Know-Nothings areas which had Mennonite churches, but the Mennonites were not overwhelmingly strong in these areas. In townships such as Pequea and West Lampeter, nativism was very weak. While the German Baptists and Methodists were most strongly represented in the classes of medium strong support, the areas that had German Baptist congregations did not exhibit any particularly consistent voting patterns nor did the Lutherans, who were scattered throughout the classes of support. The Jews of Lancaster were a small minority and they did not have a permanent synagogue in Lancaster County until 1866, thus there is no information on how this part of the religious community voted.<sup>16</sup>

*T*he other religious body which demonstrated a noteworthy consistency in voting was the Presbyterian community. The Presbyterians were strongly nativist in general—probably as a result of the anti-Catholicism that the Scotch-Irish brought over from Ulster. They were also not particularly opposed to slavery and slaveholding from a moral standpoint.

Thomas Wharton gives a good account of how some of the various religions in Lancaster county reacted to abolitionism.<sup>17</sup> The German congregations (he mentions the Mennonites as an example) “never apologized for slavery, but they never became very pronounced in their opposition to it.”<sup>18</sup> While the Quakers were the first religious group to refuse membership to slaveowners, Wharton believes “they spent no sleepless nights devising ways to speed. . . bondsmen to their freedom.”<sup>19</sup> He is skeptical of the reputed welcome that Lucretia Mott, the noted abolitionist, received in the Lancaster Quaker Meetinghouses in Sadsbury, Penn Hill, and Eastland. Among the anti-slavery churches he includes the Methodists, who were the county’s largest single denomination.<sup>20</sup>

Wharton speaks of the Presbyterians as having been generally strongly anti-abolitionist. When the pastor of the Chestnut Level Presbyterian Church in Drumore spoke out against slavery, he met “the usual malediction and contempt of a large portion of the community even including some of his own congregation.”<sup>21</sup> A Presbyterian abolitionist citizen of Sadsbury went to a “John Brown meeting” at the Smyrna United Presbyterian Church and found only two fellow members of his church while the rest of the 60-odd people attending the meeting were Quakers.

Despite the drastic changes in issues that confronted the voters between 1848 and 1868, they remained relatively true to their parties. Benson generalized that New York State voters identified themselves

so emotionally with one party in the 1827 to 1832 phase of party fluctuation that New York voters thereafter continued to maintain party allegiances until

*new noneconomic* (his emphasis) conflicts developed that were intense enough to dissolve the bonds of old loyalties and old associations.<sup>22</sup>

This interpretation of Lancaster county voting behavior shows that although in 1854 the "old loyalties" could be dissolved through a noneconomic disruption, they could and did re-emerge after the disruption subsided.

Briefly, Benson argues that voting behavior is influenced by:

(1) long established political associations and loyalties. . . (2) leadership and local antagonisms having nothing to do with politics. . . (3) local historical traditions, conflicts, needs and issues; (4) differences in organization and control over communications media, as well as differences in control over ostensibly nonpolitical institutions.<sup>23</sup>

Lancaster county's voting behavior fits this model between 1843 and 1868. Lancaster county was perhaps the most cohesive ethnocentric political unit (of major size and importance) in America for the greater part of the Republic's first century. Lancaster city was thoroughly bilingual when Thaddeus Stevens arrived in 1842. Newspapers were still published in German in the city and the county. Lancastrians thus fit into two categories: Germans and non-Germans.

Omitting for a moment the disruption in party loyalty caused by the Know-Nothing movement in 1854 (and, to a lesser degree the native American and Temperance third party movements), party loyalty was determined to a large degree by the characterizations: Germans and non-Germans; Pietists vs. Presbyterians; rich agricultural areas vs. poor agricultural areas; rural areas vs. urban areas. There were no clear-cut priorities to this antagonism. Brecknock, German and Mennonite, voted Democratic and harbored pro-Confederate sympathies during the Civil War, not for any particular political reason but because of the township's rather truculent and anti-authoritarian traditions.<sup>24</sup> These traditions may well have stemmed from its comparative poverty in relation to the very rich townships in the middle county.

East Donegal, on the other hand, though comparatively rich was partly Scotch-Irish Presbyterian and though it was not as Democratic as were its fellow Orange-ish townships in the southeast, it was restrained in its support for the Whigs and Republicans, though not for the Know-Nothings.

Boroughs as similar and as close together as Marietta and Columbia voted differently (Marietta supported Know-Nothingism and Republicanism while Columbia was marginally Democratic until 1862). Marietta, though, was settled mainly by the Scotch-Irish of the Donegals while Columbia, though settled by the Quakers, was more homogeneous.

There was one strong thread in the voting behavior of Lancaster county: Lancaster township, the Lampeters, Manor townships, Manheim township, and, to a lesser extent the Earls – the middle townships – were substantially German,

they were of Pietistic faiths to a large degree and they possessed incredibly rich lime soil that made them well-renowned for their prosperity. The other localities simply allied themselves with, or declared their hostility to, these townships and the attributes they represented (and the organization that represented them: the Whig organization).

The north central townships, having similar attributes, supported the Whigs as well, but the townships of the extreme northeast declined to support the richer fellow-German farmers to the south. The Donegals and minorities of Scotch-Irish in all the northwest townships were unenthused about the German-dominated Whig and Republican organization. There were Democratic majorities in the southeast and in Lancaster city where there was the greatest disparity between the predominant social groups and the predominant social groups of the county in general. The more individualistic Scotch-Irish in the South preferred the Jeffersonian traditions of little governmental interference,<sup>25</sup> while the city dwellers conformed to the Democratic voting patterns of most of the northeastern urban areas. The Mennonites, in the middle townships, had been strongly Federalist in the early days of the Republic and continued to vote for the more conservative party (with the exception of two votes in favor of Jackson in 1824 and 1828).<sup>26</sup> This may have been because of a more community-minded approach to the problems of government.<sup>27</sup>

*T*he disruptive non-economic issue of Know-Nothingism shifted the old party loyalties and mutual antagonisms—the Scotch-Irish and the city dwellers generally supported Roberts as did some of the other non-Mennonite and marginal Whig areas. The Quakers and the Methodists, though nominally in opposition to nativism from the standpoint of this investigation, could not make their voices felt strongly against it.

When the smoke of the 1854 campaign had cleared, the Republican party had emerged, with Thaddeus Stevens as its guiding light. The issue of nativism was largely moot in the light of the more serious sectional controversy looming on the horizon in 1856. Voting behavior in Lancaster county largely resumed the pattern to which, over the years, it had become “emotionally attached.” The city and the poor townships of the southeast, which were opposed to abolitionism, became Democratic strongholds once again and the other areas (with the exceptions detailed previously) resumed toward the Republicans similar voting patterns to those they had previously demonstrated in support of the Whigs. The Quakers and the Mennonites, at least nominally abolitionist, quickly took to the Republican party and once again, to Thaddeus Stevens. The other Whig townships soon followed suit, for it had become obvious that Stevens, who had labored so long and hard to destroy the Silver Grey Whig organization had inherited its mantle. With the Whigs gone and the slavery crisis deepening, Thaddeus Stevens was at last the man of the hour to his fellow Lancastrians.

In his eulogy of Thaddeus Stevens before Congress, Oliver J. Dickey, Jr., the newly-elected Representative from Lancaster, spoke of the relationship between his mentor and predecessor and the constituency he represented:

Mr. Stevens was deeply loved and fully trusted by his constituents. He was often in advance of their views; sometimes he ran counter to their prejudices or passions; yet such was his popularity with them, so strong their faith in his wisdom, in the integrity of his action and the purity of his purpose that they never failed to sustain him.<sup>1</sup>

In the funeral orations at the time, Mr. Dickey used exaggerated rhetoric to convey his constituent's opinions of Stevens. Yet there is truth in what he said. Stevens did lead the views of his constituents and they did put their faith in him. He was a leader in the best sense of the word—he acted in Congress as he saw fit according to the dictates of his own moral vision, not that of his constituents.

He was always an outsider to the people of his district. He was a Vermont Yankee in the stronghold of the Pennsylvania Dutch. He described himself as "impious" yet he represented the stronghold of pietism. He was a vehement abolitionist from a district that adjoined a slave state.

Stevens was cunning, it is true, and moreover he was guilty of gross opportunism, but he was also honest and forthright in standing up for what he believed, especially regarding slavery and free public education. While he edged his faction into power on the issue of nativism, he later repented his departure from his belief in the "equality of man before his Creator."<sup>2</sup> William E. Robinson, the Democratic Congressman from Brooklyn, and an Irish Catholic, gave a speech in Congress following Stevens' death in which he acknowledged his political enmity with Stevens but praised him for his sympathy, ". . . for the oppressed people of Ireland, for the vindication of the rights of American citizens (and) for the speedier extension of citizenship and suffrage to our immigrant population."<sup>3</sup>

In his political career in Lancaster County, Stevens appealed to different people at different times. At the end of his career, though, he had earned the respect and trust of most of Lancaster county as well as most of their votes. He had inherited, moreover, the respect as well as the organizational support of many of his Silver Grey Whig enemies.

In his long political life he degraded the political institutions with which he was associated; he went far beyond the accepted standards of political practice even in those more freewheeling days to accomplish the furtherance of his own career as well as the ends he so strongly desired. That Stevens did not live any longer to direct his Reconstruction policies may have been more of a benefit to the nation than a loss. While he had the vision to implement his policies, his

lack of restraint in doing so might have engendered a stronger Southern backlash and even longer lasting sectional bitterness.

“I have made but little history,”<sup>4</sup> Stevens once wrote to a friend toward the end of his career. His accomplishments live on today: the Civil Right Amendments to the Constitution and Stevens’ role in the impeachment of Andrew Johnson have evoked much recent controversy. Thaddeus Stevens was lying and he knew it. He had made a great deal of history.

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### *Editor’s Note*

The author provided a large number of maps, charts and graphs with his manuscript. We regret the physical and financial limitations of the *Journal* made many of them impossible to include. The author’s manuscript was edited where necessary to reflect these deletions.

TABLE 1.—CONSISTENCY OF PARTY VOTE 1843-1866 IN LANCASTER COUNTY

W—Whig Party D—Democratic Party R—Republican A-M—Antimasonic Party  
 N-A—Native American Party W-M—Workingmen's Party K-N—Know-Nothing

<i>Year</i>	<i>Vote for Congressman</i>	<i>Vote for County Commissioner</i>
1843		
W	4898	5098
D	3940	3851
A-M	1382	1385
W-M	27	51
1844		
W	7286	7936
D	5096	5059
N-A	2574	1908
1846		
W	3866	4025
D	2521	2561
N-A	823	691
1847	(Governor)	
W	8744	8866
D	1931	1824
N-A	354	343
1848	(Congressman)	
W	9569	9726
D	5456	5449
1850		
W	5701	5873
D	4069	4037
1852		
W	8840	9661
D	6465	5916
1854		
W	5731	5728
D	4266	4668
K-N	6561	5482
1856		
R	10001	10398
D	8320	8033
1858		
R	9513	9571
D	6340	6323
1860*	(Governor)	
R	13012	12445

TABLE 1. — Continued

<i>Year</i>	<i>Vote for Congressman</i>	<i>Vote for County Commissioner</i>
1862		
R	11174	11454
D	6659	6511
1864		
R	11204	11324
D	7158	7145
1866		
R	14722	14580
D	8675	8576
1868		
R	14903	15074
D	8674	8680

Source: Election returns Lancaster *Intelligencer* 1843, 44, 46, 47, 48, 50, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 66, and 68 and Lancaster *Examiner* 1852 and 1854.

\* Stevens ran unopposed for Congress in 1860. All tabulations involving the 1860 election have substituted the percentage of the vote received by Governor Curtin, since that vote nearly approximates Stevens' unopposed support.

TABLE 2.—CONSISTENCY OF ANTIMASONIC AND NATIVIST PARTY SUPPORT, 1843-1847

<i>Township</i>	<i>% 1843 A-M</i>	<i>% 1844 N-A</i>	<i>% 1846 N-A</i>	<i>% 1847 N-A</i>
Bart	30.4	29.3	1.3	0.0
Brecknock	19.0	3.3	0.0	0.0
Caernaven	6.3	0.6	0.6	0.3
Coleraine	13.2	5.9	3.8	0.3
Columbia boro.	14.6	15.7	15.5	1.4
Conestoga	12.2	32.8	16.4	4.2
Conoy	41.5	46.2	43.6	0.4
Drumore	31.5	25.5	10.5	8.2
Earl	29.2	8.5	8.5	0.9
East Cocalico	3.6	0.3	5.0	0.6
East Donegal	7.5	5.2	13.2	1.5
East Earl	4.2	3.8	0.0	0.0
East Hempfield	6.9	7.7	1.3	0.0
East Lampeter	27.6	30.2	13.3	5.7
Elizabeth	16.0	24.2	19.6	3.2
Elizabethtown	4.8	2.6	5.5	0.0
Ephrata	20.1	7.8	14.8	3.1
Fulton	0.4	6.0	2.9	0.0
Lancaster twp.	3.0	2.9	0.0	5.1
Leacock	33.7	44.2	12.7	0.3
Little Britain	0.9	16.8	1.8	0.4
Manheim twp.	6.2	7.8	7.6	2.6
Manor				
Indiantown	21.0	18.7	0.8	0.6
Millersville	20.4	10.1	5.3	0.5

TABLE 2. — Continued

<i>Township</i>	<i>% 1843 A-M</i>	<i>% 1844 N-A</i>	<i>% 1846 N-A</i>	<i>% 1847 N-A</i>
Marietta boro.	25.5	25.2	21.6	19.4
Martic	27.4	29.9	1.1	1.1
Mount Joy twp. (Harrison)	25.5	46.8	25.7	4.4
Paradise	21.5	21.0	4.3	0.3
Penn-Manheim	—	—	9.3	4.3
Penn-Lititz	—	—	1.4	3.5
Petersburg	3.1	3.1	2.3	0.9
Rapho-Manheim boro	7.6	0.0	0.0	0.3
Sadsbury	2.3	5.7	8.7	3.5
Salisbury	21.8	30.7	11.2	3.8
Strasburg boro	9.6	16.5	1.0	0.0
Strasburg twp.	40.5	14.7	1.0	0.0
Upper Leacock	—	20.7	10.2	3.1
Warwick	0.9	14.1	6.2	5.0
Washington boro	2.0	10.5	0.0	0.0
West Cocalico	4.2	0.3	1.5	0.0
West Earl	9.5	8.0	5.9	1.1
West Hempfield	3.4	3.3	0.5	0.0
West Lampeter	1.5	1.9	0.0	0.0
Lancaster city:	10.2	25.6	19.3	5.3
East ward	—	25.6	17.8	4.8
West ward	—	25.7	21.0	5.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>15.1</b>	<b>17.2</b>	<b>11.4</b>	<b>3.2</b>

Source: Election returns, Lancaster *Intelligencer*.

TABLE 3.—FOREIGN BORN, 1850.

<i>District</i>	<i>Ireland</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Britain</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Unknown</i>
Bart	77	7	0	0	4
Brecknock	0	12	0	0	0
Caernaven	5	14	6	5	0
Coleraine	45	6	0	1	0
Columbia boro	144	250	8	8	4
Conestoga	1	51	0	1	1
Safe Harbor*	241	79	82	0	3
Conoy	5	3	0	2	0
Bainbridge	7	14	3	0	0
Drumore	27	11	1	3	5
Earl	16	0	1	1	0
4th Elec. Dist.	1	33	0	0	0
East Cocalico	0	9	0	17**	0
East Donegal	12	30	2	0	16
Maytown	0	3	0	0	3
Marietta	38	126	5	2	1
East Earl	14	13	1	0	0
East Hempfield	0	58	0	5	0
East Lampeter	9	47	1	0	0
Elizabeth	0	12	3	2	0

TABLE 3. -- Continued

<i>District</i>	<i>Ireland</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Britain</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Unknown</i>
Ephrata	0	46	0	0	0
Fulton	15	4	22	0	0
Lancaster twp.	103	53	1	0	1
Leacock	49	31	2	6	2
Little Britain	41	0	2	0	0
Manor					
Safe Harbor*	7	0	2	0	0
Millersville	0	45	0	0	0
Washington boro	2	19	0	0	0
Mount Joy twp.	11	27	1	0	20
Manheim boro	2	13	0	1	0
Martic	43	14	5	4	0
Paradise	58	33	2	1	0
Penn	—	—	—	20**	0
Rapho	4	8	37	0	1
Sadsbury	1	58	17	1	21
Salisbury	59	35	18	4	0
Strasburg boro	14	32	2	3	0
Strasburg twp.	12	101	5	1	0
Upper Leacock	20	35	0	9	0
Warwick	4	48	0	41**	0
West Cocalico	0	11	0	0	0
West Donegal	7	68	0	0	7
West Earl	3	20	4	0	0
West Hempfield	48	266	9	0	0
West Lampeter	4	79	1	0	1
Lancaster city					
Northwest Ward	116	276	22	3	0
Northeast Ward	160	225	23	13	0
Southeast Ward	70	364	26	20	0
Southwest Ward	97	255	39	20	0

Source: Seventh U.S. Census, Population (1850).

\* Safe Harbor is divided between Conestoga and Manor townships.

\*\* Birthplace was listed as "Europe".

TABLE 3-A.--FOREIGN-BORN PERSONS UNDER 40 YEARS OF AGE IN LANCASTER CITY IN 1850

Ward	Total White		German		Irish		English		Other		Total Foreign-Born Since 1810 %	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%		
NE	3038	5.2	158	2.4	74	1.2	16	.5	7	.2	255	8.3
NW	4146	5.5	231	1.5	62	.4	19	.4	3	.1	315	7.5
SE	2718	8.3	226	1.4	37	.2	7	.2	17	.6	287	10.5
SW	2225	7.0	155	4.2	95	.5	10	.3	7	.3	267	12.0
Total	12127	6.5	770	2.3	268	.4	52	.4	34	.3	1124	9.5

Source: Compilation from Seventh U.S. Census (1850) by John W. W. Loose, Lancaster County Historical Society.

GRAPH 1 - Know-Nothing Strength in 1854 and 1855




TABLE 4.-PERCENTAGE OF SUPPORT 1850, 1870

- Township
- Bart
  - Brecknock
  - Caernaven
  - Clay
  - Colerain
  - Columbia
  - Conestoga
  - Safe Harbor
  - Conoy
  - Bainbridge
  - Drumore
  - Earl
  - New Holland
  - East Cocalico
  - Adamstown
  - East Donegal
  - Marietta
  - Maytown
  - East Earl
  - East Hempfield
  - East Lampeter
  - Eden
  - Elizabeth
  - Ephrata
  - Fulton
  - Lancaster twp
  - Lancaster city
  - Leacock
  - Little Britain
  - Manheim twp.
  - Manor
  - Millersville
  - Washington boro
  - Martic
  - Mt. Joy twp
  - Elizabethtown
  - Mt. Joy boro
  - Paradise
  - Penn
  - Pequea
  - Providence
  - Rapho
  - Manheim boro
  - Sadsbury
  - Salisbury
  - Strasburg twp
  - Strasburg boro
  - Upper Leacock
  - Warwick
  - West Cocalico
  - West Donegal
  - Newville
  - West Earl

TABLE 4.—PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION BORN IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES,  
1850, 1870

<i>Township</i>	<i>Percentage 1850</i>	<i>Percentage 1870</i>
Bart	3.8	5.0
Brecknock	0.9	0.2
Caernaven	1.9	1.0
Clay	—	0.0
Colerain	3.2	7.8
Columbia	10.0	8.6
Conestoga	1.5	4.4
Safe Harbor	4.6	—
Conoy	1.0	0.6
Bainbridge	4.8	0.3
Drumore	1.7	7.8
Earl	1.9	1.1
New Holland	—	1.2
East Cocalico	1.2	1.0
Adamstown	—	0.5
East Donegal	3.0	5.7
Marietta	8.2	10.8
Maytown	0.9	1.5
East Earl	1.4	1.1
East Hempfield	2.8	3.8
East Lampeter	2.9	3.9
Eden	—	3.8
Elizabeth	0.7	0.8
Ephrata	2.3	1.3
Fulton	2.3	2.0
Lancaster twp.	19.5	14.0
Lancaster city	14.0	16.7
Leacock	4.6	0.5
Little Britain	2.3	2.4
Manheim twp	4.2	5.5
Manor	3.4	2.7
Millersville	9.0	4.3
Washington boro	3.6	2.4
Martic	2.1	2.4
Mt. Joy twp	2.2	2.0
Elizabethtown	—	5.4
Mt. Joy boro	—	3.2
Paradise	5.1	1.3
Penn	1.0	1.9
Pequea	—	1.4
Providence	—	2.6
Rapho	1.4	2.0
Manheim boro	2.2	3.2
Sadsbury	6.4	3.2
Salisbury	—	1.5
Strasburg twp	—	4.0
Strasburg boro	6.9	2.9
Upper Leacock	3.4	2.8
Warwick	4.2	2.5
West Cocalico	0.6	0.6
West Donegal	5.9	4.8
Newville	—	15.0
West Earl	1.6	1.3

TABLE 4. — Continued

<i>Township</i>	<i>Percentage 1850</i>	<i>Percentage 1870</i>
West Hempfield	11.8	15.7
Mountville	—	3.5
West Lampeter	4.3	2.7

Source: Seventh U.S. Census (1850)

TABLE 5.—REPUBLICAN VOTE, 1862-1868, BY CATEGORIES OF SUPPORT.

<i>Township</i>	<i>Stevens % 1862</i>	<i>Stevens % 1864</i>	<i>Stevens % 1866</i>	<i>Dickey % 1868</i>
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## CLASS A JURISDICTIONS (OVERWHELMING SUPPORT—OVER 80%)

Newtown (Rapho)	—	97.1	96.1	94.8
Pequea	91.2	83.3	88.6	89.9
W. Lampeter	87.3	87.2	92.4	91.5
Conestoga	84.6	78.8	83.8	84.0
E. Lampeter	82.3	80.4	85.6	88.1
Strasburg twp	82.4	80.8	81.7	83.1
Indiantown (Manor)	80.9	78.2	82.3	82.6

## CLASS B (VERY STRONG SUPPORT—70-80%)

W. Earl	79.8	66.6	85.0	84.6
Clay	86.5	69.1	79.2	84.5
Lancaster twp	75.5	76.8	80.7	78.8
Petersburg	79.6	76.3	76.6	79.1
Millerstown	73.7	76.3	76.7	75.4
Sporting Hill (Rapho)	90.3	75.9	76.7	84.8
Springville	82.9	71.8	75.0	66.7
Elizabeth	74.2	61.6	74.2	71.3
E. Earl	73.4	72.5	73.1	75.2
Mt. Joy boro	72.8	71.0	72.8	76.5
Upper Mt. Joy twp	71.7	73.0	71.9	73.9
Salisbury	69.0	70.7	71.6	72.6

## CLASS C (STRONG SUPPORT—60-70%)

Earl	69.0	68.4	73.8	76.0
Sadsbury	78.6	68.9	64.6	67.7
Providence	74.0	68.4	65.7	67.3
Leacock	62.0	68.3	72.3	75.6
W. Hempfield	74.4	66.6	67.4	65.7
E. Hempfield	69.3	61.2	66.3	68.8
Lower Mt. Joy	73.2	56.6	66.2	72.5
Warwick	63.9	64.9	67.5	67.0
Rapho (Upper Sec.)	64.5	63.0	64.7	63.7
Penn	66.4	61.3	63.8	64.2
Manheim twp	65.6	62.0	63.7	67.6
Martic	61.2	63.0	63.5	66.8

TABLE 5. — Continued

<i>Township</i>	<i>Stevens</i> % 1862	<i>Stevens</i> % 1864	<i>Stevens</i> % 1866	<i>Dickey</i> % 1868
Ephrata	65.6	58.3	62.7	63.9
Adamstown	62.5	60.2	62.0	66.3
Strasburg boro	66.7	62.0	60.6	61.7
Upper Leacock	63.1	60.5	59.3	68.2

## CLASS D (MILD SUPPORT—50-60 %)

Fulton	56.9	65.4	59.7	59.0
Marietta boro	67.0	55.7	59.3	60.5
Paradise	58.8	55.3	58.6	60.9
Conoy	62.1	56.7	58.4	63.1
Caernaven	57.5	58.2	59.9	55.8
E. Cocalico	56.6	52.9	66.2	64.2
E. Donegal	52.7	56.2	55.8	56.6
Elizabethtown	50.3	56.4	54.4	47.5
W. Donegal	54.1	56.4	50.0	54.2
Drumore	53.3	55.4	50.8	51.4
Columbia boro	52.6	50.7	53.2	52.4*
Lancaster city				
N.E. ward	49.2	52.6	52.4	**
Little Britain	52.0	49.5	52.2	57.1
Eden	47.2	53.4	50.6	49.4

## CLASS E (NON-SUPPORT—LESS THAN 50% OF THE VOTE)

Washington boro	48.5	50.0	49.6	48.3
W. Cocalico	48.8	44.0	52.9	53.4
Bart	48.2	52.1	46.8	48.8
Lancaster city				
S.E. ward	47.9	48.2	35.9	**
Lancaster city				
N.W. ward	41.5	49.8	46.5	**
Brecknock	47.2	41.5	45.3	42.6
Lancaster city				
S.W. ward	33.3	38.2	43.5	**
Coleraine	32.9	35.2	39.8	37.1

\* The 1868 election percentage for Columbia was the total for all three wards.

\*\* By the time of the 1868 election, Lancaster had been divided into eight wards which bore no resemblance to the previous four. Therefore the percentages have not been included.

TABLE 6.—TOTAL ASSESSED PROPERTY VALUE PER CAPITA\* OF LANCASTER COUNTY JURISDICTION, BY CATEGORIES OF VOTING STRENGTH\*

<i>Jurisdiction</i>	<i>1850 Value per capita</i>	<i>1860 Value per capita</i>
<b>CLASS A JURISDICTIONS (OVERWHELMING SUPPORT)</b>		
Pequea	*	\$447.92
W. Lampeter	\$527.08	—
Conestoga	325.71	311.48
E. Lampeter	554.62	603.91
Strasburg twp	451.98	—
<b>CLASS B (VERY STRONG SUPPORT)</b>		
W. Earl	572.97	502.63
Clay	*	362.04
Lancaster twp	564.66	534.63
Manor	509.46	547.59
Rapho	430.99	1070.74
Elizabethtown	328.87	373.13
E. Earl	—	362.19
Mt. Joy boro	—	104.97
Mt. Joy twp	229.12	338.45
Salisbury	441.94	324.92
<b>CLASS C (STRONG SUPPORT)</b>		
Earl	635.43	437.57
Sadsbury	210.95	202.94
Leacock	511.09	516.15
W. Hempfield	396.34	393.03
E. Hempfield	480.17	449.90
Warwick	234.71	683.77
Penn	438.12	478.98
Manheim twp	567.78	—
Martic	143.09	—
Ephrata	361.75	376.03
Adamstown	—	1366.11
Strasburg boro	215.81	—
Upper Leacock**	489.71	1270.64
<b>CLASS D (MILD SUPPORT)</b>		
Fulton	171.23	174.26
Paradise	420.06	413.28
Conoy	429.02	223.96
Caernaven	306.41	256.89
E. Cocalico	318.77	743.77
E. Donegal***	551.33	590.54
W. Donegal	257.15	—
Drumore	192.53	171.88
Columbia boro	154.05	172.92
Lancaster city		
N.E. ward	—	432.18
Little Britain	132.45	235.24
Eden	*	189.95

TABLE 6. - Continued

<i>Jurisdiction</i>	<i>1850 Value per capita</i>	<i>1860 Value per capita</i>
<b>CLASS E (NON-SUPPORT)</b>		
Washington boro	--	101.32
W. Cocalico	231.81	283.49
Bart	163.95	178.38
Lancaster city S.E. ward	--	241.37
Lancaster city N.W. ward	--	273.31
Brecknock	148.73	156.78
Lancaster city S.W. ward	--	309.32
Coleraine	166.18	180.69

\* Pequea and Clay township were created in 1854; Eden was created in 1856.

\*\* Upper Leacock's value per capita is based on an estimate by the census taker. (1860 census)

\*\*\* Includes Marietta borough.

Source: Seventh & Eighth U.S. Census (1850 & 1860) Population and Social Census Record.

TABLE 7.—LANCASTER CITY OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION AND VALUATION FOR TAX ASSESSMENT PURPOSES, 1857

	<i>N.E. Ward</i>	<i>S.E. Ward</i>	<i>N.W. Ward</i>	<i>S.E. Ward</i>
Class I (\$75)	15.3%	36.4%	24.0%	41.8%
Class II (\$100)	58.2	56.7	61.9	43.0%
Class III (\$200-399)	22.6	5.4	12.5	10.2%
Class IV (\$400-999)	2.5	0.9	1.4	4.4%
Class V (\$1000)	1.4	0.6	0.2	0.6%

Class I—Laborers, sextons, handicapped workers.

Class II—Skilled artisans, small merchants, small inn-keepers and tavern-keepers.

Class III—Mrechants, inn-keepers, clergymen, teachers, lesser attorneys, lesser physicians.

Class IV—Large merchants, attorneys, physicians, public officials, manufacturing superintendents, engineers.

Class V—Prosperous attorneys, judges, public officials, civil engineers.

Source: Compilation from Lancaster City Tax Assessment Returns by John W. W. Loose, Lancaster County Historical Society.

## Notes for Introduction

<sup>1</sup> Fawn M. Brodie, *Thaddeus Stevens, Scourge of the South*, p. 139.

<sup>2</sup> Half a century after his death, Stevens was resurrected to millions of moviegoers around the world as the arch-villain Stoneman (replete with black mistress) in D. W. Griffith's *Birth of a Nation*, which was based on Thomas Dixon's novel, *The Classman* may have been the high point of Stevens' post-mortem notoriety.

<sup>3</sup> Ralph Korngold, *Thaddeus Stevens, a Being Darkly Wise and Rudely Great*, pp. 404-05.

## Notes for Part One, Chapter I

<sup>1</sup> Ralph Korngold, *Thaddeus Stevens, A Being Darkly Wise and Rudely Great*, p. 13. See also Fawn M. Brodie, *Thaddeus Stevens, Scourge of the South*, p. 32.

<sup>2</sup> Brodie, *Stevens*, p. 32.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>4</sup> Korngold, *Stevens*, p. 26. Korngold suggests Stevens may have become interested in Antimasonry to outflank the Federalist party. See pp. 69-70.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53. See also Thomas Frederick Woodley, *Thaddeus Stevens*, p. 116.

<sup>8</sup> Korngold, *Stevens*, p. 54.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54. See also Woodley, *Stevens*, p. 115 and Brodie, *Stevens*, p. 76.

<sup>10</sup> Despite Stevens' leadership from the Antimasonic wing, the Whig Antimasonic coalition was now dominated by the Whigs. Hereafter the name Whig—unless otherwise noted—refers to the coalition and its members.

<sup>11</sup> Brodie, *Stevens*, p. 76.

<sup>12</sup> Alphonse B. Miller, *Thaddeus Stevens*, p. 51.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>14</sup> The full quotation is in Korngold, *Stevens*, p. 56. "The most respectable of them—the "Captains of Ten," were keepers of disorderly houses in Kensington. There came journeymen butchers who were too worthless to find regular employment—next professional boxers who practiced their pugilistic powers for hire and low gamblers who infest the oyster cellars of the suburbs. A portion of them consisted of a class of men whose business you would hardly understand—dogkeepers who in Spring Garden and Southwork, raise and train a ferocious breed of dogs which they fight weekly for wages and for the amusement of the indignant people. Their troop was flanked by a few professional thieves and discharged convicts. These men gathered up from the dens and hovels, were refitted with such cast-off clothes as their employers could command and hired at fifteen dollars the head and freight to come to Harrisburg, instruct the legislators in their duties and *protect their rights*." See also Brodie, *Stevens*, p. 77, and Woodley, *Stevens*, pp. 122-23.

<sup>15</sup> Woodley, *Stevens*, p. 124.

<sup>16</sup> Korngold, *Stevens*, p. 58.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 54-60. Cf. Miller, *Stevens*, pp. 51-54, and Woodley, *Stevens*, pp. 118-31.

<sup>18</sup> Woodley, *Stevens*, p. 135.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 137.

<sup>20</sup> Korngold, *Stevens*, p. 62, quoted in a letter to John B. McPherson.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63. For full quote, see Alexander Harris, *A Review of the Political Conflict in America. . . Comprising Also a Resume on the Career of Thaddeus Stevens*, p. 62

<sup>22</sup> Brodie, *Stevens*, p. 82, believes the Whigs refused to grant Stevens a position of leadership and that he was "a man without a party." Cf. Woodley, *Stevens*, pp. 42, 199, and Korngold, *Stevens*, p. 64. See also Richard Nelson Current, *Old Thad Stevens, A Story of Ambition*, pp. 73-73.

<sup>23</sup> Brodie, *Stevens*, p. 82.

<sup>24</sup> Korngold, *Stevens*, p. 64.

<sup>25</sup> Brodie, *Stevens*, p. 82.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.

<sup>27</sup> Korngold, *Stevens*, p. 66.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67. Also Miller, *Stevens*, pp. 80-81.

<sup>29</sup> Stevens' role in the Buckshot War was not soon forgotten by his enemies. As late as 1859, Representative Lucius Lamar of Mississippi said to Stevens, "I almost tremble for the South when I recollect that the opposing forces will be led by the distinguished hero of the Buckshot War. *Ibid.*, p. 103. Woodley, *Stevens*, p. 260.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27. For full account, see Brodie, *Stevens*, pp. 39-44.

## Chapter II

<sup>1</sup> Brodie, *Stevens*, pp. 35-43.

<sup>2</sup> Woodley, *Stevens*, pp. 22-28, and 190-91.

<sup>3</sup> Harris, *Political Conflict*, p. 87.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 87.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88. Stevens refrained from using law books at a trial and he ingrained the custom on the Lancaster Bar. See W. U. Hensel, "Thaddeus Stevens as a Country Lawyer," Lancaster County Historical Society Paper, X, pp. 259-67.

<sup>6</sup> James A. Woodburn, *The Life of Thaddeus Stevens*, p. 57.

<sup>7</sup> Alexander H. Hood, "Thaddeus Stevens," *A Biographical History of Lancaster County*, ed. by Alexander Harris, p. 582.

<sup>8</sup> See Brodie, *Stevens*, pp. 94-95 and Korngold, *Stevens*, p. 69 on the subject of Stevens' liberality, see Hood, "Thaddeus Stevens," pp. 588-95.

<sup>9</sup> John Edward McNeal, "The Antimasonic Party in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania: 1828-1843," *Journal of the Lancaster County Historical Society*, LXX, p. 15.

<sup>10</sup> Hood, "Thaddeus Stevens," p. 478. See also David R. Keller, "Nativism or Sectionalism: A History of the Know-Nothing Party in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania," *Journal of the Lancaster County Historical Society*, LXXV, p. 46.

<sup>11</sup> McNeal, "Antimasonic Party," p. 114.

<sup>12</sup> The estimate is by John W. W. Loose, "Voting Participation in Lancaster City and County, 1820," Unpublished manuscript, Lancaster County Historical Society.

<sup>13</sup> *The Lancaster Examiner*, Oct. 11, 1843.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> Brodie, *Stevens*, p. 103. Korngold, *Stevens*, p. 70.

<sup>16</sup> Harris, *Political Conflict*, p. 93, and Korngold, *Stevens*, p. 70. Korngold also says here that during this campaign Stevens and Webster both addressed a large Clay rally in Philadelphia simultaneously from two different platforms. While Webster at first drew the larger crowd, "repeated bursts of cheering and applause attested Stevens' success (and) Webster's listeners began to desert until the balance was greatly in Stevens' favor."

<sup>17</sup> Alexander Harris, *A Biographical History of Lancaster County*, p. 601.

<sup>18</sup> *Examiner*, August 28, 1844. Also Keller, "Know-Nothing Party," p. 47.

- <sup>19</sup> Harris, *Lancaster County*, p. 478.
- <sup>20</sup> Keller, "Know-Nothing Party," p. 47.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.
- <sup>22</sup> *Examiner*, October 8, 1844 and February 5, 12, 1845.
- <sup>23</sup> There are no surviving copies of the *Lancaster Intelligencer*, however, from June 1845 to July 1847, at the height of the career of the Native American Party.
- <sup>24</sup> Printed verbatim in the *Examiner*, July 8, 1846.
- <sup>25</sup> *Examiner*, July 1, 1846. The use of the word "all" in this passage indicates that Stevens did have some connection with the Native American party.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 3, 1846.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>29</sup> Harris, *Political Conflict*, p. 97.
- <sup>30</sup> *Intelligencer*, Aug. 28, 1848.
- <sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>32</sup> Harris, *Political Conflict*, pp. 97-98, quoting from Hood, *Lancaster County*, p. 589.
- <sup>33</sup> *Examiner*, Aug. 30, 1848.
- <sup>34</sup> *Intelligencer*, Aug. 28, 1848.
- <sup>35</sup> *Examiner*, Aug. 30, 1848.

### Chapter III

- <sup>1</sup> Harris, *Political Conflict*, p. 136.
- <sup>2</sup> Korngold, *Stevens*, p. 110.
- <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93.
- <sup>4</sup> Nearly every account of the Christiana Riot varies in the details. For the most thorough narrative, see W. U. Hensel, "The Christiana Riot and the Treason Trials of 1851," *Lancaster County Historical Society Papers*, XV (1911). See also Hensel in "Thaddeus Stevens," pp. 20-22, and Korngold, *Stevens*, pp. 93-93. Brodie quotes William Parker, the leader of the black farmers' resistance, *Stevens*, pp. 115-18. Harris uses the accounts of Gorsuch's son and the U.S. Deputy Marshall, *Political Conflict*, pp. 146-53.
- <sup>5</sup> Harris, *Political Conflict*, p. 150.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 152. See also Hensel, "Thaddeus Stevens," pp. 20-23. Perhaps the best account is in Brodie, *Stevens*, pp. 117-18.
- <sup>7</sup> Brodie, *Stevens*, p. 117.
- <sup>8</sup> Korngold, *Stevens*, p. 95.
- <sup>9</sup> *Examiner*, Aug. 4, 1852. The newspaper blamed Stevens' intransigence for the unfavorable settlement of the Texas boundary question. It also accused him of needlessly endangering the Compromise of 1850 by introducing a bill to abolish slavery in Utah "where it never existed," and advocating repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law.
- <sup>10</sup> Brodie, *Stevens*, p. 120.
- <sup>11</sup> Keller, "Know-Nothing Party," p. 51.
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53. Keller paraphrases Stevens as saying, "he would rather vote for the entire Democratic ticket than for those responsible for the persecution of Baughter."

- <sup>15</sup> Michael F. Holt, "The Politics of Impatience: The Origins of Know Nothingism," *The Journal of American History*, LX, p. 324.
- <sup>16</sup> The Lancaster *Inland Weekly*, Sept. 16, 1854.
- <sup>17</sup> Keller, "Know-Nothing Party," p. 57.
- <sup>18</sup> *Intelligencer*, Sept. 20, 1854.
- <sup>19</sup> Keller, "Know-Nothing Party," p. 69. Also, W. U. Hensel, "A Withered Twig," *Journal of the Lancaster County Historical Society*, XIX (1915), p. 176.
- <sup>20</sup> *Examiner*, Sept. 27, 1854.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* Also Brodie, *Stevens*, pp. 121-22. Harris, *Political Conflict*, p. 164, and Keller, "Thaddeus Stevens," p. 61.
- <sup>22</sup> Views differ on Stevens' relationship with Mrs. Smith. Brodie views her as his mistress, *Stevens*, pp. 86-93. While Korngold maintains that they had a Platonic relationship, *Stevens*, pp. 72-76. Korngold also says that Stevens was on good terms with the parish priest, pp. 76, 440.
- <sup>23</sup> Keller, "Know-Nothing Party," p. 73.
- <sup>24</sup> Korngold, *Stevens*, p. 97.
- <sup>25</sup> Brodie, *Stevens*, p. 129.
- <sup>26</sup> Harris, *Political Conflict*, p. 153; Quoted from the *Report of Robert J. Brent to the Governor of Maryland*.
- <sup>27</sup> Keller, "Know-Nothing Party," p. 79.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83. See also *Intelligencer*, Sept. 14, 1856 and Sept. 21, 1856.
- <sup>30</sup> *Examiner*, Oct. 13, 1858.
- <sup>31</sup> *Intelligencer*, Aug. 31, 1858.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 31, 1864.
- <sup>33</sup> *Examiner*, Aug. 22, 1866.
- <sup>34</sup> Korngold, *Stevens*, pp. 178-210. Also Brodie, *Stevens*, pp. 154-68.
- <sup>35</sup> Woodley, *Stevens*, p. 589.

### Notes for Part Two, Chapter I

- <sup>1</sup> McNeal, "Antimasonic Party."
- <sup>2</sup> In 1843 the total city vote was 1303, while in 1844 it was 1541. From the *Intelligencer* Election Returns for Oct. 11, 1843 and the *Examiner* returns for Oct. 8, 1844.
- <sup>3</sup> This bears out Keller's contention that the rebel Antimasons "composed the backbone" of the Antimasonic party. See Keller, "Know-Nothing Party," p. 47.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.
- <sup>5</sup> Korngold, *Stevens*, p. 25.
- <sup>6</sup> In the 1850 election the mean vote for a Republican candidate was 5775. Stevens received 5701 votes. *Examiner*, Oct. 15, 1850.
- <sup>7</sup> Holt, "Know-Nothingism," pp. 309-31.
- <sup>8</sup> Keller, "Know-Nothing Party," p. 85.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86.
- <sup>10</sup> Brodie, *Stevens*, p. 131.
- <sup>11</sup> Buchanan in fact wrote to his niece, "We have met the enemy and we are theirs,"

<sup>12</sup> His overall support in the County never dipped below 60 per cent between 1858 and 1866. See *Intelligencer* election returns for Oct. 12, 1858; Oct. 14, 1867; Oct. 11, 1864; and Oct. 10, 1866.

<sup>13</sup> Lincoln received 13,466 votes out of 21,453 votes cast, or 61.2 per cent of the vote. Stevens received 11,204 votes out of 18,372 votes cast, or 61.0 per cent of the vote.

<sup>14</sup> *Intelligencer*, Aug. 29, 1848.

## Chapter II

<sup>1</sup> Lee Benson, for one, argues for a wide-ranging theory of voting behavior beyond simple socio-economic determinism. In *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy*, p. 278, he says that "in the United States, unlike other countries, almost every social conflict, tension, and disagreement may function potentially as a significant determinant of voting behavior." He goes on to argue for a theory of voting behavior based on an analysis of the voter's role and his perception of his role in society both as an individual and in various societal groupings. (See pp. 277-287.) Unfortunately, the limits of time and space have forced this paper into a rather crude empirical analysis of the effect of religious affiliation and relative wealth on voting behavior.

<sup>2</sup> The vast majority of Lancastrians were born in Penna. (Seventh U.S. Census).

<sup>3</sup> A full analysis of the occupational breakdown of Lancaster County unfortunately had to be abandoned because of the limits of time in this paper.

<sup>4</sup> These figures were arrived at by taking the total property assessment listed by the census taken for each borough or township (under the Social Survey of the Census Bureau) and dividing it by the population of that particular borough or township. See the Seventh Census of the United States (1850) Population and Social Statistics (Ms. National Archives) and also the Eighth Census of the United States (1860), Population and Social Statistics (Ms. National Archives).

<sup>5</sup> Census takers also reported their own estimates of a locality's "real" property value in the Social Census, but these were grossly inconsistent, though they were most often approximately double the actual assessment.

<sup>6</sup> Again, though, these figures are more useful than the estimates of the census-takers themselves.

<sup>7</sup> In Lancaster County in 1860 there were 98,711 people in Lancaster county outside of Lancaster city in an area of 944 square miles (again excluding the city), which is a density of 104, approximately equivalent to the population density of North Carolina in 1970.

<sup>8</sup> This profile is a general impression from the Seventh and Eighth U.S. census records.

<sup>9</sup> Stevens supported the Republican party line on the tariff but Brodie says Stevens "carried over into the complicated problems of war finance the debtor's point of view." This would be expected from a representative of an agricultural area who himself had endured bankruptcy. See Brodie, *Stevens*, pp. 169-86 for a discussion of his economic views.

<sup>10</sup> Strasburg borough (Graph C-15) was referred to as "Hell Hole" in the late eighteenth century in its days as a stage way-station. Though it perhaps had shed its seamy reputatuin by the middle of the nineteenth century, it continued to vote Democratic. There were hard times in the 1850s because of the decline in stage transportation. A railroad was built connecting Lancaster and Strasburg, which was completed in 1851 or 1852, but Strasburg borough was financially troubled for the next ten years. It became a sober Republican town in the short period of prosperity afterward. See H. M. J. Klein, *Lancaster County*, pp. 72-73 (VI).

<sup>11</sup> Conoy had the most consistent record of support for Stevens, yet it is unclear why.

<sup>12</sup> H. M. J. Klein, *Lancaster County*, pp. 223, VI.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 224.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

<sup>15</sup> All were known to be in existence in 1854. *Ibid.*, pp. 763-74.

<sup>16</sup> Frederick S. Klein, *A History of the Jews in Lancaster County*, p. 32, estimates that there were approximately 20 Jewish families in Lancaster in 1855 when the first Jewish congregation was chartered. Klein observes that these families were German Jews, or Ashkenazim, and that they arrived with the wave of other German immigrants in the 1840s. An older Jewish congregation of Spanish and Portuguese extraction, or Sephardim, seems to have died off or moved out. This congregation, which may have numbered about 900 people, disappeared from view in 1804 (p. 22). The Jews, though, were completely accepted as another sect of the German community, and there is no record of anti-Semitic overtones in the nativist campaigns.

<sup>17</sup> Thomas Whitson, "The Early Abolitionists of Lancaster County," *Lancaster County Historical Society Papers*, XV: 69-85.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 76.

<sup>20</sup> According to Keller, "Know-Nothing Party." p. 87.

<sup>21</sup> Wharton, "Early Abolitionists," p. 75.

<sup>22</sup> Benson, *Jacksonian Democracy*, p. 311-312. Especially relevant to this discussion are Benson's chapters outlining a theory of American voting behavior and his interpretation of New York State voting behavior, pp. 270-328. He is unsure whether this theory applies to the 1854 party fluctuation.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 292-293.

<sup>24</sup> H. M. J. Klein, *History of Lancaster County*, p. 224.

<sup>25</sup> Benson, *Jacksonian Democracy*, pp. 298-3-1. Benson is speaking here of Dutch New Yorkers but there are parallels between them and the Scotch-Irish of Lancaster County.

<sup>26</sup> John W. W. Loose, "Voting Parties in Lancaster County," also Keller, "Know-Nothing Party," p. 43.

<sup>27</sup> Benson, *Jacksonian Democracy*, p. 300. Again, Benson is referring to New York State groups but there are parallels in Lancaster County.

## Notes for Conclusion

<sup>1</sup> Speech by Oliver J. Dickey, Jr., *Memorial Addresses on the Life and Character of Thaddeus Stevens, Delivered in the House of Representatives, Dec. 17, 1868*, U.S. 40th Cong. 3rd Sess. 1868-1869 Gyssem oo, 7-8.

<sup>2</sup> This is taken from the epitaph Stevens wrote for himself. It is on his tombstone.

<sup>3</sup> Speech by William E. Robinson, *Memorial Address on . . . Thaddeus Stevens*, p. 76.

<sup>4</sup> Brodie, *Stevens*, p. 363.

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